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The Application of Complexity Theory to the Strategic 
Development of an Organisation 
Abstract 
How useful is complexity theory for describing the strategic development of an 
organisation? I begin by using Whittington's framework to give an overview of 
mainstream strategy literature. I highlight some of the shortcomings in current 
approaches to strategy and suggest that a new approach is needed. 
Complexity theory is offered as a new approach. I examine the complexity 
theory literature. I discuss rules based and connectionist approaches to 
complexity theory and the use of complexity theory concepts as metaphors. 
The complexity theory concepts of sensitivity to initial conditions, 
disequilibrium, positive and negative feedback and emergence of order are 
identified. Shortcomings in using the theory to describe a social system are 
then given. I examine the research paradigms open to researchers and 
conclude that to apply complexity theory to a social system, research within a 
phenomenological paradigm is required. I present an three and a half year 
ethnographic study of AYTAG, a public sector regulatory organisation. I use 
narrative to describe its development in terms of complexity theory concepts. 
The organisation set out to become flexible and flat structured, with multiskilled 
professionals and a strong centre to drive it forward. What emerged was an 
hierarchical organisation with powerful operational departments, a weak centre 
and a traditionally skilled workforce. AYTAG retained its primary role of 
regulator but failed to promote its influencing role. I found that order emerged 
at the boundary between the organisation's legitimate and shadow systems. 
The underlying dynamic which led to the order that emerged was the need to 
reduce anxiety. I examine the usefulpesp of each complexity theory concept to 
our understanding of the development., of AYTAG. I describe the difficulties 
involved in determining the exact nature of initial conditions in social systems 
and the need to consider disequilibrium as a social state rather than a 
particular action or event. In particular I highlight the use of the concept of 
feedback as an interesting avenue for studying organisations. I examine the 
nature of feedback processes at the level of the organisation and at individual 
system level. I describe the interplay between them and its effect on the order 
emerging in AYTAG. I draw attention to some of the difficulties I found in 
applying complexity theory concepts to a social system, such establishing 
precise definitions of the different concepts. I question the assertion that 
organisations are naturally complex adaptive systems producing novel forms of 
order and suggest that in social systems equilibrium seeking behaviour is the 
norm. They self organise into hierarchy. I conclude by saying that complexity 
theory has to be informed by the behavioural sciences if it is to help our 
understanding of human systems. 
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"For this world also which seems to us a thing of stone and flower and blood 
is not a thing at all but is a tale. And all in it is a tale and each tale is the sum 
of lesser tales and yet these also are the selfsame tales and contain as well 
all else within them. So everything is necessary. Every least thing. This is a 
hard lesson. Nothing can be dispensed with. Nothing despised. Because 
the seams are hid from usyou see. TheJoinery. The way in which the world 
ismade. We have noway to know what couldbe taken away. Whatomitted. 
We have noway to tell what might stand and what might fall. Andthose 
seams that are hid from us are of course in the tale itself and the tale has no 
abode or place of being except in the telling only and there it fives and makes 
its home and therefore we can never be done with the telling. " 
From Cormac McCarthy, "The Crossing" 
Introduction 
The Organisation Studied and the Purpose of the 
Research 
During the 1980's and 1990's there was widespread change in the public 
sector. These changes related to the way the sector was structured and to the 
services it provided. One of the results of the changes was the spread of the 
glquango" in the British system of governance. The growth of quangos does 
not necessarily increase or decrease the level and extent of state activity. It 
shifts the allocation of functions and resources between the different domains 
of the state from the elected to the appointed or self appointing domain. 
The term quango is described by Wilson (in Payne and Skelcher, 1997) as an 
umbrella beneath which a variety of organisations shelter. Weir and Hall (in 
Payne and Skelcher, 1997) suggest that the term is so indiscriminately used 
that it has lost its meaning. 
The essential features of quangos are that 
I. they are created as a result of government action, although not 
necessarily directly by government 
2. they have no direct electoral accountability 
3. they are responsible either for commissioning, purchasing or delivering 
certain public services or adjudicating over individual decisions made by 
public bodies or advising public policy makers 
"Opening up Quangos" (1997) comments that the establishment of Executive 
Agencies in the UK has allowed a clear delineation between the functions of 
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policy formulation and policy implementation. In this way areas of relative 
freedom from bureaucratic constraint have been created in which a more 
businesslike climate can be maintained. Establishing an operational unit 
around clearly demarcated and coherent set of functions allows the 
development of operational goals, uniting staff with a clarified sense of 
mission. 
AYTAG, the organisation which is the subject of this research, is a quango. It 
was established in 1996 as part of local government reorganisation in Scotland 
to take over the functions of various bodies that had a role in environment 
protection and regulation. Environmental protection had previously been 
mainly undertaken by local organisations governed largely by locally elected 
representatives. In April 1996 all existing environmental protection functions 
were brought under the control of one agency, AYTAG. This quango brought 
together Water Quality Boards, (WQBs) previously responsible for regulation of 
inland and costal waters, civil servants previously responsible for the regulation 
of large scale industrial processes and the air pollution control and waste 
regulatory duties of local authority environmental health departments. The 
formation of AYTAG also meant that a strategic national approach to 
environment protection could be developed alongside the provision of a 
coherent service at operational level. 
AYTAG was unusual because of the number of different organisations that 
gave up their work to it. Over 500 employees came from 63 different 
predecessor bodies. Around 150 were directly recruited. The Water Quality 
Board staff had worked in small organisations with relatively undifferentiated 
structures. Local authority staff came from organisations larger than AYTAG 
with clearly defined central support departments. People from different 
professional backgrounds with experiences of working in different 
organisational cultures suddenly found themselves working together. There 
had been considerable work undertaken prior to April 1996 to determine a 
structure for the organisation to integrate the regulation of the different 
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environmental media. There were clearly expressed strategic objectives and 
the Corporate Management Team had articulated the type of organisation they 
wanted to manage. This was very different from what many of AYTAG's 
employees had previously experienced. 
Reports produced during the period when AYTAG was being set up and in the 
first four months after it became operational give a clear indication of the 
direction the organisation wanted to take. These reports included the Options 
Team Second Report, Minutes of Board and Corporate Management Team 
Meetings and the first Corporate Plan. Interviews with directors and members 
of the Options Team during the course of the research reaffirmed what was 
said in these documents. They all tell us that AYTAG set out to be an 
organisation with 
1. a flat structure with wide spans of control 
2. an emphasis on employee flexibility 
3. empowered managers and delegation of authority to its lowest point 
4. an emphasis on value for money 
5. a strong centre to knit the business together out of the organisation's 
predecessors 
a reputation as an influencer in environmental matters as well as a 
regulator. 
On transferring into AYTAG many managers found themselves in operational 
divisions managing interdisciplinary teams where much more was demanded 
of them. Multiskilled teams of professional environmental protection officers 
were seen as critical to the development of a "one door approach" to which 
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AYTAG aspired. They were also seen as an efficient and effective use of staff 
resources. The development of strategies and policies for environment 
protection, staffing and financial resources was the realm of head office 
divisions. In their previous organisations, operational managers had significant 
input in to strategy and policy development. In AYTAG they were in roles that 
downgraded their involvement in these areas. 
I joined AYTAG one month after its formation in May 1996 as training and 
development manager. AYTAG was in a very fluid state. My job was to 
develop the skills of managers and front line professionals to enable the 
organisation to move towards its vision. Early in 1995 1 had been introduced to 
the work of Ralph Stacey, and in particular, his work on complexity theory and 
how it could be a used to conceptualise strategic development in 
organisations. I recognised that I was in a good position through my work to 
use AYTAG as a research case study to contribute to our understanding of 
how complexity theory can be applied to organisations and their development. 
The strategy literature is full of tools, techniques and advice for managers to 
help them work towards their stated goals. Many of these do not question 
managers' unity of intention when they make plans to reach their goals. 
Strategic plans frequently have to be changed to take account of 
circumstances that analytical tools have failed to highlight. I wanted to 
investigate whether complexity theory could improve our understanding of 
organisation development and explain why to a lesser or greater extent 
organisations do not to achieve their stated aims? When we think of 
organisations as complex adaptive systems is this The purpose of this 
research is two fold. Firstly it will add to the number of empirical examples of 
the application of complexity theory to the study of organisations. There are 
relatively few academically robust empirical organisational studies reported in 
the literature. They are insufficient to describe the development of a human 
system from a complexity theory perspective. The second and main purpose 
of the research is to explore how far complexity theory is a useful conceptual 
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device for understanding the strategic development of organisations. To 
contain the research within manageable proportions I limited it to four key 
complexity theory concepts; sensitivity to initial conditions, negative and 
positive feedback processes, disequilibrium and emergent order. We have 
seen the development of different approaches to complexity theory however 
these concepts are common to them all. I use these four concepts as devices 
for examining what happened in AYTAG and to gain insight into why AYTAG 
failed to achieve its vision. 
I 
In this thesis I identify four areas where there is a contribution to knowledge. 
The research makes a methodological contribution through the adoption of an 
ethnographical approach to a longitudinal study of change and development in 
an organisation. What is presented is a real empirically rich example. The 
research furthers our understanding of the application of complexity theory in 
three ways. Firstly, by commenting that complexity theory can offer an 
explanation of the prevention of change. Secondly, by introducing the human 
dimension, it furthers our understanding of the application of complexity theory 
to social systems. And finally it sheds light on the multi-level nature of change 
processes particularly in relation to positive and negative feedback processes. 
Dynamics which drive change in the system that is the organisation drive 
resistance at individual system level. 
Introduction 
Chapter One 
The Theoretical Approaches to Strategy 
In this chapter I briefly describe the different approaches that have been taken 
to studying the strategic development of organisations. The study of strategy 
is multifaceted. In order to compare and contrast the many different 
perspectives it is useful to use a structured framework. Mintzberg et al (1998) 
and De Wit and Meyer (1998) both offer structured ways of looking at strategy 
formulation and implementation. Mintzberg and his colleagues divide strategy 
theories into eleven different schools. These include the design school, the 
learning school and so on. De Wit and Meyer ask us to look at strategy from 
three different perspectives - content, process and context. In this chapter I 
have chosen to use the framework developed by Whittington (1993) as it 
provides a broad and concise basis to discuss divergent views on the 
formation and implementation of strategies. I briefly introduce complexity 
theory showing how it does not fit neatly into any one of Whittington's 
individual categories. This chapter paves the way for chapter two in which I 
argue that a new approach to the strategic development of organisations is 
required. 
In the mid 1970's discontinuities in the business environment led to major 
changes in the way organisations viewed strategy and strategic planning. 
Energy prices exploded, inflation was erratic and growing, economic growth 
was stagnant, customers were becoming politicised, wages in Western Europe 
increased to become the highest in the world and there was rapid 
internationalisation of competition. As these events occurred they replaced 
the continuities that businesses had become accustomed to since the Second 
World War. Companies responded in different ways but those that survived 
detected that their planning systems did not work and they changed their 
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approach. For some this took years. Shell was one of the first to gain 
attention through their use of scenario planning. The logic behind this was 
that by developing worst case and best case situations and developing plans 
to meet these, managers would be able to cope with the real situation which 
would most likely be somewhere between the two. Strategic planning went 
from producing a formal plan identifying the best way forward for increased 
growth to a shorter more flexible document acknowledging that it was 
necessary to make assumptions, assessments, guesses and evaluations to 
cope with frequent change. It also went from being driven by corporate 
planners to a much increased involvement of all levels of management in its 
development (van Mesdag, 1987). This opened up opportunities for a variety 
of theories and models to be developed by academics and management 
consultants to "aid" organisations in their approach to the strategic 
development of their businesses. 
There are strongly differing opinions on most of the key issues within the field 
of strategy. These run so deep that even a common definition of the term is 
scarcely possible (De Wit and Meyer, 1998). Mintzberg (1988) suggests that 
we might be fooling ourselves pretending that concepts such as strategy can 
be reduced to a single definition. The word is generally used in different ways 
suggesting that implicitly we accept various definitions even though formally 
we tend to quote only one. The variety of conflicting views means that 
strategy cannot be reduced to a number of models or flow diagrams which can 
simply be followed like an instruction manual. 
In order to study strategy a structured process has to be followed so that the 
various approaches can be viewed separately, compared and contrasted. A 
common way of looking at the strategy literature is to divide it into two areas 
"strategy content" and "strategy process" (De Wit and Meyer, 1998; Pettigrew, 
1992; Quinn et al, 1988). Strategy content includes the work of Ansoff 
(1984), Porter (1980) and Chandler (1962), and is concerned with the 
classical, rational approach to strategy. Strategy process encompasses a 
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wide range of views on what constitutes strategy and is expressed by writers 
such as Mintzberg (1988), Hannan and Freeman (1988), Granovetter (1985) 
and Cyert and March (1963). In last ten years " strategy content", the classical 
rational approach which was by far the dominant view has been challenged 
and has lost ground to other approaches. This means that it is now useful to 
distinguish the different views which lie within "strategy process" so that they 
can be considered separately. 
Whittington (1993) provides a useful model for doing this. His model, figure 
1.1, is shown below. 
Figure 1.1 Generic perspectives on strategy 
Outcomes 
Profit maximising 
CLASSICAL I EVOLUTIONARY 
Processes 
Deliberate I Emergent 
SYSTEMIC I PROCESSUAL 
Pluralistic 
adapted from Whittington (1993) 
Whittington defines four basic conceptions of strategy - rational, fatalistic, 
pragmatic and relativist all of which have very different implications for how 
organisations go about "doing strategy". The rational or classical approach is 
the oldest, underpinning the planning methods dominant in textbooks. It is still 
the most influential. The evolutionary approach is fatalist and has strong links 
with Darwinian evolutionary theory. Processualists are pragmatists who 
emphasise that organisations and markets are unreliable. They advocate an 
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incremental approach. The Systemic approach is relativistic regarding the 
ends and means of strategy. Strategy is inescapably linked to the cultures 
and powers of the social systems in which it takes place. Wittington's basic 
conceptions are, in my view, a usefully structured way of understanding and 
separating out the variety of approaches that exist in the strategy field. 
The Classical Approach to Strategy 
Classical strategic thought stresses the importance of a top down, planned 
and rational approach. The emphasis is on the future. its explicit focus is on 
goals and the logical flow of actions and resources to take the organisation 
towards these goals. For the classicists rational planning is the way to achieve 
profitability. Strategy is formal and explicit. Its only goal is profit maximisation. 
This approach can be traced back to the militaristic ideals of Ancient Greece, 
through to the eighteenth century and Adam Smith. It became a coherent 
discipline from the 1960's based around the writings of Alfred Chandler, Igor 
Ansoff and Alfred Sloan (Whittington, 1993). Its dominance as an approach to 
strategy has its origins in the 1920's in two American Companies Du Pont and 
General Motors in which the Du Pont family had a large stake. 
Alfred Sloan recognised the need for strategy, which he called policy, when he 
took over the presidency of General Motors in the mid 1920's. He stressed 
the importance of keeping it separate from the day to day business of 
operations - policy creation separated from policy execution was essential to 
the long term success of the business. In General Motors the operational 
managers were excluded from the Executive Committee which had 
responsibility for policy development. This "elevation" of policy became a 
fundamental part of classical thinking. The management consultant Peter 
Drucker wrote two books that publicised Sloan's approach, "The Concept of 
the Corporation" in 1946 and "Big Business" in 1947. Igor Ansoff was much 
impressed with Sloan and cited him in the first ever strategy textbook which he 
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wrote in 1965 - "Corporate Strategy'. More recent strategy writers such as 
Andrews (1987) argue that strategy formulation is an activity widely shared in 
the management hierarchy, rather than being concentrated at the higher 
levels. 
The word "strategy" comes from the Greek word for "general" linking it to the 
military. Military metaphors are widespread in business today. For classical 
theorists, the military model is complemented by a strong inheritance from 
economics. Academics with an economics background have given the 
business strategy field many basic techniques - for example Michael Porter in 
his 1980 book "Corporate Strategy - Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Firms". Classical approach writers provide managers with a variety of tools, 
techniques and formulae with which to diagnose their situation and plan with 
military like precision their way forward. Economics has also contributed 
another cornerstone of the classical approach, the construct of rational 
economic man. This can be traced back to Adam Smith and his book "The 
Wealth of Nations". This conception of man allowed strategy formation and 
implementation to be conceived of as a controlled, conscious process. 
Organisations had to have structures that allow the top managers to focus on 
their strategic responsibilities. This led to the development of multidivisional 
companies. Divisions are headed by operational managers responsible for 
strategy implementation. Success or failure is determined internally through 
the quality of managerial planning, analysis and calculation. This approach 
was pioneered by Alfred Sloan in General Motors. He, in turn, was influenced 
by the writing of Alfred Chandler. Chandler was the first writer to promote the 
idea that the structure of the organisations should follow strategy. He defined 
strategy as " the determination of the basic long term goals and objectives of 
an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out these goals". Structure he defined as 
"the design of the organisation through which the enterprise is administered" 
(Chandler, 1962). This led to the multidivisional or "M" form of organisation 
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which has become the dominant organisational structure of American based 
and American influenced multinational companies (Williamson, 1975). 
As organisations are organised into units a distinction is drawn between 
corporate plans and business unit plans (Hofer and Schendel, 1978). The 
corporate plan is concerned with what activities or business the company 
should be in and how the corporate level should manage that business. The 
value of the corporate plan is that in addition to co-ordinating and making 
consistent the business unit plans it creates "synergy" so that the whole adds 
up to more than the sum of the parts. The business unit plan sets out how 
that business unit is going to secure competitive advantage by achieving the 
performance objectives set by the corporate level. As business units are 
generally organised functionally into divisions such as finance, personnel, 
sales and production, the business unit strategy is translated into functional or 
operational strategy. 
For the Classicists strategy is a linear process. First comes the analysis with 
its typical emphasis on tools such as SWOT analysis, then strategy 
formulation with the generation and evaluation of strategic options and finally 
the implementation stage when the option chosen is converted to a number of 
concrete activities to be carried out. Strategy is also rational as strategists 
identify, determine, evaluate, choose, translate etc based on rigorous logic 
and extensive knowledge of a wide range of factors. Michael Porter (1980) 
put classical economic theories of market form into a framework for analysing 
the nature of competitive advantage in a market and the power of a company 
in that market (Porters Five Market Forces). Another major contribution by 
Porter to strategic thought is the more controversial notion of generic 
competitive strategies such as overall cost leadership, differentiation and 
focus. These are the ways of coping with the five competitive market forces 
and outperforming industrial rivals (Porter, 1980). Other techniques include 
gap analysis (Argenti, 1980; in Stacey, 1993), value chain analyses (Porter, 
1985) and cost benefit analysis (Mirsham, 1980). 
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Ansoff contributed the notion of decision classes (Ansoff, 1965) which 
categorised decisions into strategy, policy, programme and standard operating 
procedures. Ansoff's precise definitions have been largely ignored but his 
broad distinctions have been accepted. They are familiar as strategy, 
structure and process. In his later work Ansoff (1990,1984) acknowledged 
that change is occurring more rapidly and is less easy to predict. He is more 
sensitive to the increasing complexity of organisations and the people who 
work in them recognising that human and organisational inertia have to be 
overcome when strategic change is necessary. In his comparison of Western 
and Japanese decision making processes he acknowledges that they are 
based on different intellectual traditions. These later works provide a bridge 
into both the Processual and Systemic approaches to strategy. However 
Ansoff maintains that whatever the level of unpredictability it can be identified 
in advance of acting by strategic diagnosis (Ansoff, 1990). 
Complexity Theory and the Classical Approach 
The classical approach focuses on "formal systems" giving little consideration 
to what is tacit in an organisation. Complexity theory helps us look at formal 
and informal organisational systems and take into account the influence of an 
organisation's history. Classicists maintain that organisations should work 
towards reducing instability and offer a rational linear approach to planning. 
Complexity theory approaches contradict such assumptions arguing that 
organisations should not to think that equilibrium is the norm. Complexity 
theory accepts that routine predicable activities should be subject to planning 
and that organisations can plan in the short term. What complexity theory also 
recognises is that for the longer term a different approach is required which 
allows appropriate responses to emerge. Organisations face contradictions 
when they try to plan; first, let chaos develop because it is the only way to find 
new forms of order and second, look for order but not too much because it 
may be a source of chaos. Order is necessary to achieve organisational 
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mission, for actors to position themselves in the power structure and hierarchy 
and to facilitate decision making. 
The Evolutionary Approach to Strategy 
The evolutionary approach to strategy has its roots in Darwinism and the 
survival of the fittest. Rather than have a firm belief that top management can 
plan and act rationally they expect markets to secure profit maximisation. The 
competitive processes of natural selection are stressed. Evolutionists are 
fatalists who argue that whatever methods managers adopt it will only be the 
best performers that survive. The Boston Consulting Group, proponents of the 
evolutionary school, have produced models for managers to use when trying 
to determine their way forward. Alchian (1950, in Wittington, 1993) appealed 
directly to the biological principal of natural selection proposing an evolutionary 
theory of the firm that downgraded managerial strategy and emphasised 
environmental fit. Markets not managers choose the prevailing strategies 
within a particular environment. Strategic fit or coalignment between a firm 
and its external environment is the key to competitive advantage (Carini et al, 
1998). 
Evolutionary strategists initially emphasised competition in product markets as 
a means of eliminating inefficient competition. Critics of this view including 
Penrose (1952, in Whittington, 1993) were quick to point out that many large 
companies dominate markets rather than being disciplined by them and have 
sufficient power to act as a buffer against competitive markets. Evolutionary 
strategists have gone on to emphasise other markets such as managerial 
labour markets, the market for capital as selecting the best performers for 
survival. With this broader viewpoint incompetent managers are eliminated as 
they fail to develop their careers, as they find themselves unable to borrow 
money, fall victim to take-overs etc. So by one market or another the pressure 
for profit maximisation is maintained. 
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Using a population ecology perspective, Hannan and Freeman (1988) argue 
that overall efficiency can best be achieved by ensuring a steady stream of 
new entrants into organisational populations. They saw populations of 
organisations surviving, thriving or declining in particular environments. The 
wider ecological perspective goes beyond the problems an individual 
organisation has in coping with the environment to seeing an organisation as 
one of a population which co-exists with or competes with other populations of 
organisations. The environment of each consists mainly of other organisations 
so that the existence of each is bound up with that of its own kind and of other 
kinds. What matters is an abundance of diverse initiatives from which the 
environment can select the best and the relatively ill adapted can be quickly 
weeded out. For the evolutionist it is best to let the environment do the 
selecting rather than the managers. 
Organisations have to maintain an effective alignment with their environment 
while managing internal interdependencies. According to Miles and Snow 
(1978), to align the organisation and the environment successfully, 
management has to solve three problems and solve them continuously. The 
entrepreneurial problem is to choose the general market domain of operation 
and target it with the right products and services; the engineering problem is to 
find ways of making the products and offering the services and the 
administrative problem is to organise and manage the work. The aim should 
be an effective adaptive cycle. 
Colvin (1991) suggests that strategy characterises a firm's competitive 
orientation and can be conceptualised as a pattern of business related 
decisions. To understand these patterns, strategy typologies have been 
developed. In each of them, two core strategy types are associated with a 
firm's success. The first emphasises the innovative aspects of a firm's activity 
and is comparable to the Prospector (Miles and Snow, 1978), Differentiation 
(Porter, 1980) or Entrepreneurial (Colvin, 1991) strategy. This approach is 
Chapter 1 14 
characterised by differentiation by offering products which are considered 
unique along dimensions such as design, brand image, service and features. 
It involves minimising customer sensitivity to price rather than competing on 
cost, while seeking out new markets and products. The second successful 
strategy in these different typologies emphasises stability. Firms pursuing the 
Defender (Miles and Snow, 1978), Cost Leader (Porter, 1980), or 
Conservative (Colvin, 1991) approach aim to achieve cost leadership through 
an advantage such as tight cost control in a stable product area. 
Contingency theory also promotes the view that the organisation must fit the 
environment if it is to succeed. The theory asserts that success will be 
secured when the organisation secures a good match between its situation 
and its strategies and structures (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). Mechanistic bureaucracies are said to be appropriate for 
stable environments but flexible, organic structures are required for turbulent 
environments. The design of an effective organisation has to be adapted to 
cope with the "contingencies" which derive from the circumstances of the 
environment, technology, scale, resources and other factors in the situation in 
which the organisation is operating (Child, 1984). 
Adopting the principle of competitive exclusion established by the Russian 
biologist Gause in 1934 which proposes that two species cannot co-exist if 
they make their living in the same way Henderson (1989, in Whittington, 1993) 
concluded that business survival in a competitive environment depends on 
strategies of differentiation. Many evolutionary theorists doubt if organisations 
have the capacity to achieve differentiation and adaption in a deliberate and 
sustainable way. Complex biological organisms usually adapt more slowly 
than their environment resulting in human organisations having limited 
capacity to anticipate and respond positively to environmental changes. 
Environmental fit is more likely to be the result of chance or good fortune than 
the outcome of a deliberate strategy. 
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Alchian (1950, in Whittington, 1993) warns against overestimating the power 
of strategy as organisations are hit by unpredictable and uncontrollable market 
forces. Success is the result of the chance of being in the right place at the 
right time and investing in long term strategising is expensive and a waste of 
time. Strategy can be a dangerous illusion with the exception of a few firms 
with significant market power the only real competitive advantage is relative 
efficiency which means managers have to concentrate on costs. 
Complexity Theory and the Evolutionary Approach 
Like the classicists, evolutionary approaches focus on "formal" organisational 
systems. Both primarily accept negative feedback models. The "informal 
organisation" where many positive feedback processes are found tends to get 
ignored or is seen as unhelpful to strategy development. There are similarities 
between complexity theory and evolutionary models but the former does not 
reject the notion that strategy is an emergent property. Complexity theory views 
organisations as non linear systems driven by positive and negative feedback. 
When driven by negative feedback an organisation is sustained in its adaptive 
fit with its current environment. The result is regular patterns of human 
behaviour brought about by shared mental models that inhibit innovation. 
Competitive environments change continuously. Organisations stumble not 
because they fail to adapt but because they do not create and innovate. 
Viewed as a complex adaptive system an organisation is capable of producing 
endless variety. Natural selection weeds out all systems that reach states of 
either complete instability or complete stability. Survivors are those systems 
that maintain "bounded instability". 
Processual Approaches to Strategy 
Processualists adopt a pragmatic approach to strategy. They share the 
Evolutionists doubt about rational strategy development but are less confident 
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about markets ensuring profit maximising outcomes. They regard 
organisations and markets as messy phenomena from which strategies 
emerge with much confusion and in small incremental steps. By not striving 
for the unattainable ideal of rational action and accepting and working with the 
world as it is, managers can obtain competitive advantage. Cyert and March 
(1963) laid the foundations for this approach by producing a behavioural 
theory of the firm. "Rational economic man" is considered to be a fiction; 
people are "boundedly rational" (Cyert and March, 1963). 
By this is meant that human beings are 
+ unable to consider more than a handful of factors at a time, 
* reluctant to carry out unlimited searches for relevant information, 
+ biased in interpretation of data 
* prone to accept the first satisfactory option that presents itself rather than 
searching for the best. 
The Processual approach to strategy is based on two fundamental themes. 
The theme of cognitive limits on rational action which has been developed 
further by Henry Mintzberg (1987) and the micro politics of organisations which 
was taken forward by Andrew Pettigrew (1985). Human nature means that the 
environmental scanning, the calculations and the data analysis advocated by 
the Classicists tend always to be flawed and incomplete. The importance of 
rational analysis is downgraded by the Processualists. It is considered to limit 
the search for strategic flexibility and it reduces the expectations of success. 
The micro-political view of organisations argues that organisations are not 
united in optimising a single factor such as profit. They are coalitions of 
individuals bringing their personal objectives and value systems into the 
organisation. The members bargain with each other. The combination of 
political bargaining and bounded rationality favours strategic conservatism with 
the need for change only imperfectly recognised. Strategic behaviour tends to 
become routinised and systematised. Organisations gradually adapt as 
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awkward messages from the environment force themselves on managers. 
Contrary to what the Evolutionists believe Processualists argue that the market 
is tolerant of less than optimum performance and firms can build in 
organisational slack to cushion themselves against the need for strategic 
change. Firms "satisfice" rather than "profit maximise". Organisations do not 
search for optimum solutions but satisfy themselves with the established 
routines and heuristics of the organisation. Because organisations live within 
these they have a narrow band of "choices". 
The regular routine of strategic planning is a comforting ritual. According to 
Weick and Sandilands (1990) it doesn't matter if the plan is wrong so long as it 
can give managers a sense of purpose to act. The Classicists' sequence of 
strategy formulation followed by implementation is reversed. Mintzberg (1987) 
doubted that top managers had the capacity to prescribe effective strategies in 
isolation and proposed that strategy should be seen as "crafting". The 
strategist needs to retain a closeness and an awareness such as a craftsman 
would have with their material. For Mintzberg strategy is a continuous and 
adaptive process with formation and implementation inextricably entangled. It 
is the "science of muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959), and "logical 
incremental ism" (Quinn, 1980). Smart strategists appreciate that they cannot 
always be smart enough to think through everything in advance (Mintzberg, 
1987). They are committed to a process of experimentation and learning. 
The incremental approach does not rule out "strategic intent" in which an 
organisation has a broad clear sense of direction allowing flexibility and 
opportunism to be taken advantage of along the way. However according to 
Mintzberg (1987) the underlying strategic logic may only be perceived after the 
event. Strategies are often "emergent" noticeable only when a series of small 
steps emerge into a pattern. 
The resource based theory of the firm which has its roots in the classical 
approach has evolved into a theory which recognises the importance of social 
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and "non-rational" factors making it part of the Processual approach. An 
organisation's competitive advantage lies in what is unique and embedded in 
its resources which constitute its core distinctive competences. A firm's 
resources are not all bought and sold in the market they include tacit skills and 
knowledge, patterns of co-operation and intangible assets that take time and 
learning to evolve. The ability to compete lies in the internal resources of the 
firm and not externally through positioning the firm in the right market. 
Strategy depends on building core competence and not chasing every market 
opportunity (Hamel, 1991). Core competences are the collective learning in 
the organisation especially how to co-ordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies. Unlike physical assets 
competences grow rather than deteriorate as they are applied and shared. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argued that the way in which many organisations 
are structured around strategic business units (M Form) interferes with the 
organisation's ability to be competitive. It can lead to under investment in core 
competences and core products. 
Senge (1993) forwarded a view that the primary institutions of western society 
are orientated towards controlling rather than learning; rewarding individuals 
for their performing for others, rather than for cultivating their desire to learn. 
By focusing on performing for someone else's approval, organisations create 
the very conditions that predestine them to mediocre performance. In an 
increasingly dynamic and unpredictable world it is no longer possible for the 
person at the top to "figure it all out. " This model has to give way to integrating 
thinking and acting at all levels. Senge used the term "learning organisation" 
to describe an organisation which can develop successfully in a competitive 
and complex environment. Learning organisations require a different form of 
leadership with leaders taking on roles as designers, teachers and stewards. 
Leadership does require leaders to have a vision of the desired future state 
and an accurate picture of current reality. The gap between them generates a 
natural creative tension. Individuals, groups and organisations learn how to 
work with creative tensions and how to use the energy such tensions 
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generate. In order to carry out the new leadership roles, leaders require three 
critical new skills, building shared visions, surfacing and challenging mental 
models and engaging in systems thinking. 
The Processualist critique sees classical strategic thinking as a reduction of 
the unknowable into a comforting simplicity that merely affords meaning to the 
manager. It is not about choosing markets and policing performance. It is 
something that may only emerge retrospectively. Most importantly 
organisations need to cultivate internal competences so that they can turn the 
messiness of organisations and markets to their advantage. By doing this, by 
cultivating the flexibility of incremental adaption, organisations can work 
towards maximum performance. 
Complexity Theory and the Processual Approach 
Processual approaches to strategy are more pluralistic than either the 
evolutionary or classical approaches and they pay more attention to informal 
organisational processes. Processualists acknowledge that instability is 
continually present in organisations and accept that organisations have to 
work with it continuously. In this way they are similar to complexity theory. 
The focus for processualists is on strategy process rather than strategy 
content. Complexity theory offers the promise of reuniting the two (Maclntosh 
and MacLean, 1999). Like strategy content, strategy processes often turn out 
to be different from what had been envisaged. These differences are down 
played or "explained away". Complexity theory can help us understand these 
differences, as it allows different strands of organisational behaviour theory to 
be brought into the equation. The theory helps us see that organisations can 
only move forward in times of rapid change if they capture and act on relevant 
and vital information which is present but traditionally has not necessarily been 
acknowledged. Managers who can handle a dynamic unwritten list of issues, 
aspirations and challenges which exist in all organisations and translate these 
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into meaningful data will enable that organisation to develop strategically 
(Stacey, 1991). 
Systemic Perspectives on Strategy 
The Systemic approach is relativist. Central to it is the belief that decision 
makers are not detached rational individuals interacting in purely economic 
transactions, they are people who are deeply rooted in densely interwoven 
social systems. Economic activity cannot just be considered in the context of 
financial calculations. Economic behaviour is embedded in a network of social 
relations which can include family, state, professions, educational and ethnic 
background and religion. These networks define what is appropriate and 
reasonable behaviour and therefore influence both the strategy outcome and 
process. The Systemic theorist will argue that organisations differ according to 
the social and economic systems in which they are embedded. They are not 
all profit maximisers which classical theory says they choose to be and 
evolutionary theory says they have to be. Nor are they the product of internal 
limits and compromises as put forward by Processualists. The norms which 
guide strategy are derived from the cultural rules of local society and not by 
the cognitive boundaries of individuals. 
The differences between the social systems of countries and changes in those 
systems are important to Systemic theory. Different kinds of enterprise 
structures become possible and successful in particular social contexts. 
Writers on strategy frequently ignore the purpose of an organisation or make 
assumptions that all organisations exist for the same basic reasons. Business 
organisations play an important role. The purposes they attempt to fulfil will 
have a significant effect on the functioning of society (de Wit and Mayer, 
1998). 
Chapter 1 21 
The idea of strategy may itself be culturally peculiar. The Classical approach 
to strategy gained popularity in North America after the second world war and 
has strong connotations of free will and self control. These ideas are alien to 
some cultures such as Muslim and Chinese. Fundamentalist Moslems see life 
as a path preordained by God. The Chinese often explain events in terms of a 
combination of luck and fate. Some cultures such as the French see the 
enlisting of state resources as a natural part of strategic management. To 
operate successfully firms have to subject themselves to the conforming role 
of the social pressures of their own countries. The work related values of any 
individual national culture are distinctive and different. This results in 
differences in organisational processes and behaviour. Hofstede (1980) 
argues that we should not expect the same conceptions and prescriptions to 
be appropriate in all cultural areas. Cultural differences have an important 
impact on how organisations function. American business works in a culture 
that respects profit, values technical procedures and has strong faith in the 
free market. Regardless of whether the formal planning processes of the 
Classical approach are economically effective they have to be carried out to 
conform to the cultural norms of that particular business environment. 
Firms using copycat strategies can be said to be adopting a systemic 
approach. They can look at what others do and then copy it. This strategy is 
more often referred to as benchmarking or adopting best practice. Firms 
adopting such strategies can run into problems if they are operating in one 
cultural environment and try to copy the successful practices of a different 
culture. The Western admiration for Japanese practices such as "quality" is 
such an example. There are many features both cosmetic and fundamental 
that distinguish American, European and Japanese industry and attempts to 
imitate successful strategies based in other cultures often overlook important 
cultural issues. In addition successful strategies are individual to the particular 
firms which adopt them (Kay, 1995). 
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Shivastava (1986) points out that the Classicists put the emphasis on a top 
down management approach and profit maximisation which serves to 
reproduce the conditions of a hierarchically organised capitalist society. The 
tendency for organisations to have different levels of strategy; corporate level, 
business level and functional level also supports this view. Shivastava goes 
on to argue that Classical strategic management is not a neutral scientific 
discipline but an ideology which serves to perpetuate that society. Challenging 
the narrow range of options which are open to strategists operating with the 
Classical framework is to challenge the established social order. Morgan 
(1986) comments on the rise of the professional managerial class. Since the 
1920's control of businesses has shifted from owners to managers. His view 
is that the discipline of "strategy" reflects the ideological needs of the 
professional managerial class rather than that of maximising capital growth. 
The formally structured rational Classical strategy making approach gives 
managers culturally acceptable power because it is cloaked in science and 
objectivity. 
The systemic approach encourages managers to consider the key elements of 
the social systems in which they work. It challenges the idea that there is a 
single applicable model. The objectives of strategy and the manner of 
strategy making depend on the strategist's social characteristics and the social 
context in which they operate. Therefore the Classical approach may be 
appropriate to some societies but not all. 
Complexity Theory and the Systemic Approach 
The systemic approach has similarities with complexity theory in that it 
acknowledges that internal organisational characteristics can generate "norms 
of behaviour' or in complexity theory terms emergent outcomes. Complexity 
theory concepts such as sensitivity to initial conditions, disequilibrium and 
positive feedback can enrich this approach by paying attention to 
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organisational history and encouraging the exploration of situations that are 
not in equilibrium and how these can be used to help survival. 
In Conclusion 
The purpose of this brief review of the approaches to strategy through 
Whittington's (1993) framework has been to show in a concise way that 
strategy is multifaceted. The word strategy itself has different meanings. 
There are strongly differing views running through the literature and different 
strategy theorists start from different basic assumptions about the world. I 
have briefly shown that complexity theory does not fit neatly into any of 
Whittington's categories and that it may offer an useful alternative perspective 
to give us insight into organisations that cannot be gained from using the 
individual approaches described by Whittington. I will now move on to argue 
in my next chapter why a new approach to the study of strategy is required, 
one which can bring together the divergent strands that exist in the strategy 
literature. 
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Chapter Two 
The Need for a New Approach to Strategy 
Having described the major approaches to strategy I want now to examine why 
these are insufficient. In this chapter I look at some of the theoretical 
assumptions that underpin our understanding of strategy. I consider some of 
the limitations of current theory and why a new approach is needed. This new 
approach is based on complexity theory which I will discuss in my next chapter. 
Strategic management is about managing change at its most fundamental level 
not merely change within an organisation but change that affects the 
organisation's very existence. Change has continued throughout history 
serving to illustrate the importance of strategy and managing change. Human 
adaption to change whether singly or in groups has been sufficiently rapid in 
terms of generation turnover to keep pace with the rate of change required. 
Adaption occurring within the span of a generation now requires individuals and 
the groupings of them in organisations to change more often than is 
comfortable, or for some possible (Schendel, 1994). 
In the 1990's the study of strategy fell on hard times with well known consulting 
firms such as McKinsey and the Boston Consulting Group who built their 
reputations on strategy consulting playing down their strategy focus. Academic 
doubt was voiced as to the value of strategy literature and schools of thought. 
Deregulation, excess capacity, mergers, acquisitions, environmental concerns 
and technological discontinuities are some of the catalysts which are driving the 
need for a changed approach to strategic thinking, strategy development and a 
re-examination of the appropriateness of traditional strategy paradigms. 
Traditional industrial boundaries are breaking down and there is a lack of clarity 
as to the boundaries of new and emerging industries. 
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Theoretical assumptions underpinning strategy theories 
In order to understand current strategy theories it is necessary to look at the 
roots of the western scientific approach. This is an extension of Greek thinking 
beginning with Democritus and continuing through the Enlightenment until 
today. The optimistic positivism that grew out of the Enlightenment was so 
successful in shaping our understanding and control over the physical word 
that as a result it has been incorporated into the social sciences and the 
understanding of the management and organisation of business. This leads us 
to try to identify the cause of success before we act. We set long term 
objectives and try to control the movement of a business along a future path to 
achieve it. The result of this is when organisations do not achieve their 
objectives or reach their goals our reactions are those of rapprochement. 
The opposing view championed by Heraclitus can be summed up as "you can't 
step into the same river twice". Everything is changing all the time in a process 
of becoming. This view brings with it the idea of "emergence", ideas about 
living systems and Eastern approaches to philosophy. In Taoism for example 
there is no inherent order. The universe in Taoism is perceived as vast, 
amorphous and ever changing. The elements stay the same, they continue to 
rearrange themselves. The world is a medium of patterns that change, that 
partly but never quite repeat (Waldrop, 1992). Both Eastern and Western 
approaches are weak at dealing with unexpected change, they seek to dampen 
down or exclude the unexpected and neither on its own is creative (Zohar, 
1997). 
Most theoretical models dealing with strategy primarily put forward rational 
explanations within the positivist paradigm. They stress the same internal 
organisational equilibrium, harmony among people, continuing adaptation to 
the changing environment, matching resources to capabilities and securing fit 
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which they say will lead to success, excellence, profit, achieving objectives etc. 
Most management theory has strong parallels with traditional physics and/or 
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Rational models of management do not achieve 
the accuracy of classical physics, but they have had an enormous impact on 
organisations enabling them to handle increasing complexities of scale. Just 
as classical physics cannot deal with all natural phenomena neither can rational 
models deal with all management phenomena. How do you operate when you 
are in an open-ended situation of change and when you don't know what you 
are doing? Such questions may not be admissible for a rational model. 
Unpredictability is a characteristic of complex systems such as organisations 
and because western scientific definitions focus on predictability it is difficult to 
accommodate that complexity in traditional scientific terms. 
The future will be different from the past and different from what we expect it to 
be. Many organisations and the managers within them however behave as 
though the future will be a linear extrapolation of the present. This view is 
governed by our acceptance of a Newtonian perception of reality. Newtonian 
organisations are rule bound. Twentieth century philosophers such as 
Whitehead (Emmet, 1932), Russell, Wittgenstein (in Waldrop, 1992) set out to 
demonstrate that all mathematics could be founded on simple logic. They were 
partly right but the mathematician Godel showed that even some very simple 
systems are inherently incomplete. They always contain statements which 
cannot be proved true or false within the system, even in principle. Turing has 
shown that even very simple computer programmes can be un-decidable 
(Hilton, 1963). The development of chaos theory has taken models of non- 
linearity and shown their application to a wide range of physical and social 
phenomena. 
The application of linear explanatory models is seen as increasingly limited. 
Life is not a series of interconnected events like beads in a necklace. Life is a 
series of encounters in which one event may change those that follow in an 
unpredictable and even devastating way. As the world becomes more complex 
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and interdependent change becomes increasingly non-linear, discontinuous 
and unpredictable, the future becomes less like the past and less like we 
expect it to be. Senge (1990) in his work in systems theory develops complex 
non-linear systems to portray the dynamics of an organisation. This whole 
system view requires very different management expectations and analytical 
processes. Rather than creating a model to forecast the future of the system, 
non linear models encourage the modeller to play with them and observe what 
happens. Different variables are tried out in order to learn about the systems 
critical points and its homeostasis (Senge, 1990). Controlling the model is not 
the goal; more important is to understand how the system works so that 
analysts "can interact with it more harmoniously" (Wheatley, 1992). 
Scientists commonly hold the view that they can stand outside experiments as 
neutral observer. Autopoiesis tells us that we draw reality from the inside. We 
do not perceive the world directly. Incoming data is filtered by our mental 
model of the world. Scientists have an effect on their experiments. Not 
acknowledging this detracts from science and from management in turn as 
many on the ideas of management are derived from science. Organisations 
can be considered autopoietic systems. They produce and reproduce the 
elements they consist of with the help of the elements of which they consist 
(Brans and Rossbach, 1997). 
The limitations of current theory 
Strategy theories, and particularly classical strategy theory which is dominant in 
the literature, have been subject to criticism. Some writers criticise the 
emphasis on rationality. Others say that the true nature of strategic thinking is 
intuitive and creative rather than rational. Peters and Waterman (1982) argued 
that managers were being misled by a belief that they ought to be rational and 
were consequently spending too much time on research and analysis that 
diminished the urge to act, the results were "paralysis by analysis". They 
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condemn the excessive use of rationality in its technical and reasoned senses 
in strategic management and focus instead on "reality testing" forms of 
rationality. Raimond (1996) outlines two strategic mindsets the "Intelligent 
machine approach" and strategy as "creative imagination". The idea that 
strategy is comprehensive and involves large scale action across whole 
organisations has also been challenged. Trying to get the entire organisation 
lined up to change at the same time is unrealistic if not impossible. Different 
parts of an organisation are under different pressures, have different timetables 
and practices resulting in strategic change which is more fragmented and 
gradual rather than radical and coordinated (De Wit and Mayer, 1998). 
Critics of strategy theory have argued that it has proved difficult to demonstrate 
a direct relationship between the presence of formal strategic planning and 
enhanced organisational performance (Mintzberg, 1987). This is because 
planning and implementation are thought of as two distinct activities by 
classicists. The result of this is that planners have difficulty understanding the 
business they are planning for and managers feel little ownership of, or 
responsibility for, implementing the plans. Planning is often overly concerned 
with quantitative analysis of financial variables and therefore misses the rest of 
the substance of the business being planned for. The more human aspects 
particularly the emotions that stem from all high performing human systems are 
also missed. The formulation of strategy is relatively easy, the real issues and 
problems are those of implementation. The conventionally prescriptive 
approach ignores the degree to which strategy in a real business is emergent 
rather than directed. Senge (1990) accepts that organisational work is complex 
with numerous and HI recognised feedback effects, however he still seeks a 
world with a clear sense of direction. 
Strategists today are concerned with the speed of change and ask questions 
about the relevance of existing strategy theory (Hamel, 1998 (2)). Existing 
strategy theories all have their limitations particularly when applied to turbulent 
environments. They are based on recurrent patterns that are recognisable, but 
there are usually too many exceptions for the models to have much predictive 
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value (Levy 1994). Porter's input/output framework (1980) is useful if the 
competitive forces represented by competitors, supplier, buyers etc. are 
relatively stable and independent. A firm can find an appropriate strategy for 
each industry configuration and erect the necessary barriers for protection. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1993) argue that the role of strategy should not be to 
accommodate an existing industry structure but to change it. They used the 
term "strategic intent" quoting Cannon's war cry "Beat Xerox" as the example to 
show how an apparently unreasonable aspiration can be achieved. Their 
model does assume that Xerox would stay the course. Prahalad and Hamel 
focus on the organisation's competencies. Kay (1993) focuses on capabilities 
as key drivers of strategy. However strategic victories won as a result of 
competitive innovation and competence leverage can be short lived in turbulent 
environments. D'Aveni (1994) proposes a "New 7S Framework" to continually 
seek to change the rules of the game and so deal with the fleeting nature of 
competitive advantage. In his framework he proposes that strategy, structure, 
systems, style, staff and skills should give way to superior stakeholder 
satisfaction, strategic soothsaying, positioning for speed, positioning for 
ýiurprise, shifting the rules of competition, signalling strategic intent and 
simultaneous and sequential strategic thrusts. He extends Prahalad and 
Hamel's idea of competitive innovation to a continual process rather than a one 
time breakthrough. D'Aveni's framework put its emphasis on competitive 
dynamics stating that only temporary advantages exist. These are created by 
the company's speed and aggressiveness. The framework is still based on the 
assumption that strategic prophesying is possible and that competitive battles 
are won and lost by a firm's own actions. 
Courtney et al (1997) maintain that the analytical approach to strategy should 
be tailored to the level of uncertainty in the environment. Should organisations 
try to shape the future, adapt to it or reserve the right not to participate until the 
direction being taken by others is clear. Trends that include globalisation of 
firms and markets, shifts in the fields of knowledge production and distribution, 
more highly educated workers and major technical innovations illustrate a 
fundamental transformation in society. These trends have significant 
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implications for organisations in terms of their structures and their strategies. 
Powerful and knowledgeable employees challenge traditional control structures 
and customers demand that their individual needs are met. There is a shift 
from visible assets such as machinery to invisible ones such as competence 
and creativity. There is a shift from invisible customers seen as mass markets 
or segments to individual visible ones with particular demands (Lowendal and 
Revang, 1998). 
Traditionally business strategy in the western world has been the business of 
top management. This group represented the link to external stakeholders. 
Prahalad and Conner (1996) recognised that the management of competent 
and autonomous employees is a topic for strategic management. Employees 
need to continue learning to enable the organisation to continue to compete. 
This results in organisational members at all levels taking responsibility in a 
broader sense than the traditional authority and responsibility allocated to each 
position in a traditional bureaucratic, divisionalised organisation. Employees 
take on multiple roles and their authority and responsibilities shift depending on 
the particular role they are playing at any one time. When this occurs 
employees use their own judgements to guide their actions rather than seek 
permission from further up the hierarchy. They deal with internal and external 
relationships with the result that the strategic apex of the organisation begins to 
crumble away. It diminishes as a centre of information and as a centre of 
power and authority. The classical models assume that the parts of the system 
which bring about change in other parts need to be "stronger', "higher" or more 
"persistant" than the changing parts. Luhmann (in Brans and Rossbach, 1997) 
argues that unstable parts may command stable parts because of the reflexive 
orderings of systems. 
Lowendal and Revang (1998) say that in today's climate organisational 
differences are about how organisations organise their customers and assets 
and the way they try to improve these relationships. At the core of strategy is 
an ability to create maximum value by building and maintaining relationships 
both internally with employees etc and externally with customers etc. As a 
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result both the internal and the external environments become more complex. 
The internal because of technology and the increasing knowledge and skills 
requirements of employees and the external because of uncertainty partly 
caused by the rapid development of technology. 
Mair (1999) looked at the number of times the Honda Company had been used 
by strategy theorists to argue for the relevance of their particular approach to 
strategy making as the reason for Honda's success. Over the decades from 
the 1950's Honda has been a case study for; the Boston Consulting Group and 
Pascale advocates of the Evolutionary approach, Quinn (logical 
incrementalism), Mintzberg (crafted strategy), Hamel and Prahalad (core 
competence), Stalk, Evans and Shulman (core capabilities) all with 
Processualist view points. Different authors have used Honda to exemplify 
their own approach to strategy. The Honda strategy literature does not mention 
failures, they are ignored by strategy writers. The dichotomies that Honda 
faced such as the individual versus the group on the factory floor stressing 
individual in "group" society Japan and team work in "individualist" USA are not 
pursued by the strategy writers. Such a "sound bite" approach leaves one to 
question the appropriateness of any of these approaches in enabling a 
complete picture of strategy to be seen. 
Kanter et al (1997) argue that popular models of planned change like the 
strategic models from which they derive are assumed to start when leaders 
make an explicit decision to seek a well constructed new course of action. 
Such models reflect a bias towards official history and suggest that only top 
management and formal actions count. Retrospective accounts of strategy and 
change processes often distort the real story. Conflict fades into consensus, 
plausible alternatives disappear, early events and the people involved in them 
lessen in importance, fuzziness with hindsight becomes a clear-sighted 
strategy. 
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Van De Ven (1983, in Cameron and Quinn, 1988) asserted that strategy 
theories are based largely on linearity and consistency and the simultaneous 
presence of incongruent and contradictory patterns is seldom explained or 
acknowledged. The need for consistency drives out contradictory thinking. 
Unpredictability is a characteristic of complex systems such as organisations 
and because western scientific definitions focus on predictability it is difficult to 
define that complexity in traditional scientific terms. When unpredictability and 
contradiction are taken into account then organisations can be viewed as non 
equilibrium systems with dynamics that are essentially disorderly, developing 
through political processes in a dialectic manner and displaying one crisis after 
another. The contrary nature of organisations makes it impossible for 
managers to establish a shared intention about comprehensive long-term 
outcomes. These are partly emergent and partly the result of intentional choice 
(Stacey, 1995). 
Organisations consist of formal and informal systems (Schein, 1992). Much of 
the strategy literature focuses on formal systems and tends to downplay the 
informal or "shadow" side that organisations have (Egan, 1994). The shadow 
system is considered a negative influence and firms have traditionally 
introduced rules to contain and dispel it. This hinders the ability of managers 
and employees to identify problems, analyse information and make and 
implement decisions (Baum, 1987). Also often ignored are the many 
paradoxes that exist in organisations such as control versus autonomy, 
differentiation versus integration, collective action versus individual interest, 
boundary opening and boundary closing activities and innovation versus 
conservation. 
The explanations of managing and organising to which we pay most attention 
do not capture enough about continuing interactions between individuals and 
groups within and between businesses and with people outside a business 
(Stacey, 1991). In successful companies Stacey believes that managers do 
not actually use frameworks of missions and values in the real strategic 
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development of their business. They do not use explicit models because these 
do not work in turbulent times. These observations suggest that managers use 
implicit rather than explicit models. Stacey suggests that interactions between 
managers lead to outcomes which are not captured by the explicit explanations 
and that we do not understand at all well the implicit models managers use. 
Managers arrive at a strategy by unconsciously eliminating possibilities that 
don't fit their mental models. The production of long term plans can be 
considered artefacts to create the illusion of managing to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance between what managers are supposed to do and what they can 
achieve (Thi6tart and Forgues, 1995). 
Despite the techniques, prescriptions, strategic analysis etc managers continue 
to experience difficulty in identifying strategic issues and making choices when 
there are conflicting views. This can encourage a focus on the matching of 
existing resources to customer requirements and meeting existing competition. 
It leads to strategies of imitation rather than of creative innovation (Stacey, 
1991). Many firms mainly follow a classical approach whilst at the same time 
disparaging it. Few address the strategy process in a different way despite 
senior managers sensing that rationalism undervalues people and 
underestimates implementation. Many managers feel that new more 
behaviourally orientated approaches are required, but there is little consensus 
of what they might be (Kay, 1995). 
One of the enduring problems facing the field of strategic management is the 
lack of the possibility of theoretical tools becoming available to help predict the 
behaviour of firms and industries. This is particularly the case when 
organisations are undergoing rapid change and through turbulent periods. 
Even if we know that industries are likely to experience periods of stability 
alternating with periods of intense competition we do not know when they will 
occur and what will be the outcome. It is almost impossible to predict the 
impact of a new competitor or technology on an industry. Industries evolve in a 
dynamic way over time as result of complex interactions among firms, 
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governments, employees, consumers, financial institutions and other elements. 
Industry structure influences firm behaviour and firm behaviour in turn can alter 
industry structure (Levy, 1994). 
Each of the four approaches to strategy described by Whittington (1993) can be 
questioned. None on its own can adequately describe how organisations 
develop successfully. Strategy can no longer be just externally focused as 
promoted by the Environmental and Systemic approaches nor simply internally 
focused as advocated by the Processualists and the Classicists. Tensions 
exist in current theory between strategy content and process, strategies 
deliberate (Ansoff, 1984; Andrews, 1987 and Porter, 1980) or emergent 
(Mintzberg, 1988), internally "driven (eg the resourced based view of the firm, 
core competencies) and externally "driven" (eg Porter's five forces). These 
different approaches result in opposing recommendations for managerial 
action. 
The requirements of a new approach 
In the past strategy researchers have limited the attention they have given to 
open ended change and turbulent environments. Many of the existing 
frameworks in strategic management are based on negative feedback models. 
The dynamics of success are assumed to be a tendency towards equilibrium 
and thus stability, regularity and predictability (Stacey, 1995). Advances in 
technology coupled with a global political climate that is favourable to free 
markets have made parts of many industries such as financial services, health 
care and transportation more turbulent. In industries related to information and 
communication the traditional boundaries have disappeared. The number of 
competitive forces that these firms face has expanded and coping with the 
resulting turbulence calls for a new approach to competitive strategy 
(Chakravarthy, 1997). 
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Behaviour in organisations is relatively autonomous, multidirectional and 
dialectical. Organisations cannot be adequately understood with simple 
models borrowed from other scientific disciplines. Using models offers only the 
illusion of understanding organisations. It delays the development of theories 
that address organisations for what they are. The mainstream attitude ignores 
the complexity of human systems and addresses a single dimension of 
organisational life such as rational choice, adaption etc to the exclusion of 
others. For practical purposes it is easier to study organisations in this way and 
they can be studied according to established professional norms. It is difficult 
to acknowledge the complexity of organisations at the same time as building a 
clear cut theory. Focusing on a single dimension and ignoring the complexity 
gives the appearance of a scientific discipline. Partial theories multiply and 
increasingly fragment the field of study. 
Some scholars are pluralists acknowledging rather than denying the complexity 
but denying the possibility of a complex theory. Morgan (1986) and Bolman 
and Deal (1991) for example argue that these diverse theories can be treated 
as complementary lenses for studying organisations. Pluralists do not propose 
new theories but play down the conflict between existing theories. They offer 
strategy students ways of enhancing their awareness of organisational 
complexity. They advocate the use of metaphors and analogies to describe 
organisations. Weick (1998) advocates the use of jazz improvisation as a 
metaphor for the processes of creating innovation in organisations. Mintzberg 
(1998) continues this theme by suggesting that leaders should think of 
themselves as orchestral conductors and lead their organisations in the same 
way a conductor leads an orchestra. Approaching organisations in this way 
can give only an illusion of understanding without having to actually address 
what organisations are. 
Bouchikhi (1998) views organisations as social spaces continually torn by their 
members in multiple and contradictory directions which raises theoretical 
challenges avoided by traditional theories of organisations. Any theory needs 
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to answer such questions as what keeps organisations from collapsing at any 
time, how the externally observable attributes of an organisation such as its 
products do not display random behaviour. If human behaviour is autonomous, 
multidirectional and dialectic, is management a purely symbolic role or does it 
have a substantial but different role from that traditionally presumed. 
Stacey (1991) usefully distinguishes three types of change which organisations 
can experience; closed, contained and open ended. 
1. Closed changed - the consequences of actions and events is predictable. 
For example a customer increases the size of an order the factory increases 
its output. In such situations insignificant events have insignificant 
consequences and can be ignored. 
2. Contained change - events and actions are not exact repetitions of the past 
for example a customer places an order for a variation of the product. The 
organisation can adapt using relatively fixed rules and procedures. 
3. Open ended change is different. Preferences and objectives are not initially 
clear cut or agreed because the level of uncertainty so high. Choices can 
only be made by means of complex forms of learning and political activity in 
which preferences and objectives are discovered. The cause and effect 
links are difficult to identify. Situations can escalate into major 
consequences and totally change the behaviour of the system. Open- 
ended change is difficult to understand in its past form and unpredictable in 
its future form. The organisation has to develop new approaches to control 
and development because the change is unique and has not been 
confronted before. 
Research has shown that organisations are naturally change resistant with a 
strong tendency to inertia and will only change when forced, kicked or disturbed 
into doing something (Menzies, 1960). However once disturbed the track 
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which the disturbance takes through the organisation and the degree of 
transformation it will generate in the pathway it follows, will differ over time and 
across different organisations with no single end result for any disturbance 
(Laughlin, 1991). The pathways themselves may be so complex that it is 
difficult to plot any possible direction a disturbance might take (Morgan, 1986). 
Hamel (1998 (2)) has lamented the lack of a true theory of strategy. Prahalad 
and Hamel (1994) recognise that the strategy field needs a new paradigm to 
break from the limitations of existing mindsets. The need for strategic thinking 
and behaviour among managers is now more important than ever before. This 
reality should force a re-examination of the traditional strategy paradigms. 
Handy (1995) writes about unlearning the way we have done things in the past. 
Senge (1993) expresses it as stop trying to figure out what we have to do by 
looking at what we have done. Hammer (1996) argues that the formulae for 
yesterday's success are almost guaranteed to be the formulae for failure 
tomorrow. Macintosh and MacLean (1999) argue that the calls for a more 
dynamic view of strategy are essentially the same as one which reintegrates 
strategy content and strategy process; both strategic decision taking and 
strategy processes are emergent phenomena. A new conceptual framework is 
required to enable the development of organisations to be studied more 
holistically. 
This framework needs to address 
* appropriate rational planning advocated by the Classicists to deal with the 
more stable routine activities in organisations; 
* the political and cognitive tenets of the Processual and Systemic 
approaches which will help explain how personality, group behavioural 
dynamics and societal norms affect the political learning which leads to 
strategic choice and action and how strategy can be developed as a series 
of small steps over time 
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* the biological, evolutionary arguments for profit maximising put forward by 
the Evolutionists. 
* operating effectively with open ended unpredictable change 
Any new approach has to bridge gaps in current theory, for example those that 
exist between strategy content and strategy process so that apparently 
contradictory views of strategy can be held at the same time rather than one 
appearing to be "right" and the other "wrong". 
Stacey (1991) argues that we need a new dynamic model. I will now move on 
to my next chapter to look at complexity theory which appears to offer a 
dynamic systems approach to the study of strategy and the capability of 
incorporating the issues outlined above. It points away from viewing success 
as a movement towards stable equilibrium and helps us understand the 
dynamics of organising and managing. The science of complexity may provide 
a framework that pulls together into a coherent whole literature covering a 
number of views which do not currently command all that much attention from 
those researching the strategy process (Stacey, 1995). 
The main purpose of this research is to determine if complexity theory is a 
useful conceptual device for understanding the strategic development of 
organisations. Organisation development theorists interested in complexity 
theory express the view that we can use it to deepen our understanding of 
strategic change. The literature relating to the application of the theory to 
social systems has developed quite rapidly since the early nineteen nineties. 
Within that literature views range from those who advocate its use as an 
overarching theory of strategy to those who see its usefulness as metaphor for 
what happens in organisations. I will now move on to review the complexity 
theory literature, examine how we can use the theory to help us understand 
strategic development and discuss the issues that are raised when applying the 
theory to social systems. 
Chapter 2 39 
Chapter Three 
Complexity Theory and its Application to Strategy 
Development 
This chapter is concerned with complexity theory. The theory has come to 
prominence over the last ten or so years. The literature is rapidly increasing but it 
is still fragmented, with confusion over definitions and terms as individual authors 
stake their claim to it. I begin by exploring the various definitions, different 
theoretical perspectives and their key concepts. I continue with a discussion of 
how the theory may be useful to the study of organisations and what constraints 
and limitations there are when applying it. The final section of the chapter 
describes the focus of the research and where data can be gathered. 
Introduction to Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory belongs with the so called "New Sciences" which have grown 
out of contemporary physical scientific thought. As well as complexity theory the 
new sciences include the study of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, dissipative 
systems and chaos theory. Dissipative systems are entities regulated by 
transfers of energy from their immediate environment and as a result continually 
change in order to survive. Chaos theory is the study of the dynamics of change 
moving towards an understanding of the ways in which all systems undergo 
natural and social change. Complexity theory is a cousin of chaos theory 
(Johnson, 1999). Complexity theory is concerned with the emergence of order 
through elements in the system interacting dynamically by exchanging energy or 
information with their environment (Cilliers, 2000). 
Systems are of central importance in complexity theory. Levy (1994) amongst 
others claims that systems theory is the foundation of complexity theory. A 
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system can be defined as a group of interacting parts functioning as a whole and 
distinguishable from its environment by recognisable boundaries. Systems are 
made up of elements which vary according to the type and function of the 
system. Elements interact to form patterns of system behaviour. 
Chaos theory is based on the iteration of mathematical algorithms or the 
application of simple rules of interaction. In chaos theory the iterative formulae 
remain constant. Complexity theory differs as the systems concerned are 
capable of evolving and changing the "rules" of interaction. These systems are 
dissipative systems. The primary difference between natural dissipative systems 
and social dissipative systems is the element of human free will and innovation. 
Social dissipative systems are often referred to as complex adaptive systems 
(Johnson, 1999). 
Complexity theory causes us to take the view that systems are best regarded as 
wholes and studied as such, rejecting the traditional emphasis on simplification 
and reduction. The emphasis is on the interacting whole and the non-reduction 
of its properties to individual parts (Mitleton-Kelly, 1998). Wholeness has 
implications about the way we go about studying and developing organisations. 
Single dimension results cannot predict behaviour (Lucas, 2000 (2)). An holistic 
approach has to be adopted to try to understand the patterns of behaviour the 
system as a whole produces (Parker and Stacey, 1994). It is necessary to look 
at the whole system even it that means taking a crude look, and then allowing 
possible simplifications to emerge from the work (Murray Gell-Mann in Battram, 
1998). 
The development of complexity theory comes from the work of Prigogine 
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) on dissipative structures. Subsequently it has 
been applied to social systems (Tsoukas, 1998; Parker and Stacey, 1994; 
Stacey, 1991) offering a dynamic systems approach to the study of strategy. 
Complexity theory has developed along a very interdisciplinary path taking 
insights and inputs from mathematics, biology, computing, and economics 
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(McKergow, 1998). It can offer valuable insights into management and strategic 
issues (See Stacey, 2000; MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999; Cilliers, 1998; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Definitions of Complexity Theory 
The terms chaos, complexity, complex adaptive systems and complexity 
sciences are increasingly found in the strategy, organisation development and 
change literature. Although Griffin, Shaw and Stacey (1998) say that a broad 
spectrum of writers may be using similar words when talking about complexity 
they often mean something different, there is frequently considerable overlap in 
meaning by authors using the different terms. Some (eg Mitleton-Kelly, 1998) 
attempt to distinguish between the terms, others use them interchangeably. This 
is noticeable in the work of Stacey during the 1990's, however, in the third edition 
of "Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics" he is much more 
specific, acknowledging his reasons for the changes he has made over the years 
(Stacey, 2000). 
A survey of the literature reveals the following terminology. 
" Complex adaptive systems (Shaw, 1997; Juarrero, 2000), 
" Complexity theory (Parker and Stacey, 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Sanchez, 1997; Maclntosh and MacLean, 1999; Cilliers, 2000), 
" Chaos theory (Levy, 1994; Smithson, 1997; Thiertart and Forgues, 1995, 
1997), 
" Complexity sciences (Medd and Haynes, 1998; Lissack, 2000), 
" Science of complexity/ complexity science (Stacey, 1994,1995; McKerrow, 
1996; Lissack, 1997; Shaw, 1997), 
" Complexity (Bouchikhi, 1998; Colado, 1995; Griffin, Shaw and Stacey, 1998; 
Tasaka, 1999), 
" Organised complexity (Kallinikos, 1998) 
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Complexity as a Metaphor (Levy, 1994; Morgan, 1997; Medd and Haynes, 
1998; Lissack, 1997,2000) 
Some authors use these terms with little or no introductory explanation of what 
they mean (eg Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997); others use a variety of definitions. 
Definitions found in the literature vary. Some examples are 
(Santa Fe Group 1996 in Battram, 1998). "Complexity refers to a condition of the 
Universe which is integrated and yet too rich and varied for us to understand in 
simple common mechanistic or linear ways. We can understand many parts of 
the universe in these ways but the larger and more intricately related phenomena 
can only be understood by principles and patterns - not in detail. Complexity 
deals with the nature of emergence, innovation, learning and adaption". 
Stacey (1998) states that the science of complexity studies the fundamental 
properties of nonlinear feedback networks, or complex adaptive systems. 
Chia (1998) writes that the basic premise of a science of complexity is the 
systematic and deliberate descriptive reduction of the complexes of human 
experiences into a transmittable and understandable form. 
Mitleton-Kelly (1998) "There is no single theory of complexity, but several 
theories arising from the various sciences of complexity, Such as biology, 
chemistry, computer simulation, evolution, mathematics and physics. " She 
describes complexity from three different perspectives; interconnectivity, 
dissipative structures and edge of chaos commenting that all three are valid ways 
of thinking about it. She notes that chaos and complexity are at times used 
interchangeably and states, "they are not identical and need to be distinguished 
as their application to social systems may differ. " She proposes a working 
definition for organisational complexity. It "is associated within the intricate inter- 
relationships of individuals, of individuals with artefacts (such as IT) and with 
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ideas, and with the effects of interactions within the organisation, as well as 
between institutions within a social ecosystem. Complexity arises through 
connectivity and the processes of feedback and emergence. " 
Lissack (1999) writes "the study of complex systems, or as some call it 
complexity theory is a rigorous and formal attempt to deal with the issue of 
emergent wholes. " He continues with "it is less an organised rigorous theory 
than a collection of ideas which have in common the notion that within dynamic 
patterns there may be underlying simplicity.... it is also the discipline that has self 
organised to examine the question of how coherent and purposive wholes 
emerge from the interactions of simple and sometimes non-purposive 
components. " 
KurtykaJ(1999) "Complexity theory... views the world in terms of the behaviour 
of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). A CAS consists of interacting agents, 
following rules (or models), exchanging influence with each other and with their 
environment. The interaction of the agents can alter the environment and the 
agents themselves, resulting in the emergence of additional properties within the 
CAS. " 
Lucas C (2000) "Complexity theory states that critically interacting components 
self organise to form potentially evolving structures exhibiting a hierarchy of 
emergent system properties". 
The LSE Website (2001) "We take complexity to mean the intricate inter- 
relationships that arise from the interaction of agents, which are able to adapt in 
and evolve with a changing environment. The theoretical framework being 
developed is based on work in the natural sciences (in physics, chemistry, 
biology, mathematics, and computer simulation) studying complex adaptive 
systems (CAS). The work at the LSE is focusing on complex social systems 
using the generic characteristics of CAS as a starting point, but without direct 
mapping between the disciplines. In other words, organisations are studied as 
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complex social systems in their own right, not as metaphors or analogies of 
physical, chemical or biological CASs". 
Murray Gell-Mann's (1994) comment that "No definition of complexity is intrinsic; 
it is always context specific. " helps us to some extent understand why definitions 
vary. 
Having looked at the various attempts to define complexity theory I feel I come 
closest to Mittleton Kelly's (1998) description. For the purposes of this PhD I 
have formed the following working definition. 
Complexity theory is concerned with the emergence of order in a complex 
adaptive system. Complex adaptive systems are sensitive to their initial 
conditions and exist far from equilibrium. Order manifests itself through 
emergent self-organisation occurring as a result of unpredictable changes 
in the balance between positive and negative feedback processes. 
Theoretical approaches to complexity theory 
Researchers offer different interpretations of the theory (see Anderson, 1999; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Stacey, 1995; Smith and Gernmell, 1991) 
suggesting that it is not a coherent body of work underpinned by a coherent and 
robust theoretical framework (Maclntosh and MacLean, 1999). Two 
interpretations are emerging, sharing common themes but differing in their basic 
assumptions about how order emerges. They can be described as the rules 
based and connectionist approaches. 
The rules based approach has its roots in artificial intelligence, abstract 
mathematical models and in linguistic concepts such as deep structure. Self 
organisation is the emergence of order through the repeated application of simple 
rules. Basic order generating rules govern behaviour, by continuously repeating 
Chapter 3 45 
them complex things can be built. To enable new forms of order to emerge the 
order generating rules or organisational deep structure has to change. This 
approach is closely linked to dissipative structures and has underlying similarities 
with punctuated equilibrium (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Gersick, 1991). 
Parker and Stacey (1994) suggest that business organisations and economies 
are essentially dissipative structures exhibiting both stability and instability at the 
same time. Smith and Comer (1994) suggest that the dissipative structures 
approach can be useful for understanding group effectiveness in a turbulent 
situation and that it may help groups and organisations break away from familiar 
past patterns of behaviour that have become dysfunctional. Thi6tart and Forgues 
(1995) proposed that in dissipative systems "the chaotic evolution may get 
organised around structures that we find at different scales -namely the strange 
attractors. " The attractor creates an implicit order. Inside the attractor space the 
system behaviour is highly complex and unstable. When looking at this 
complexity we can see that it is also organised and that it reproduces at. a smaller 
level what is observed at a more global level. Such "self similarity" can be used 
to explain phenomena such as stock market fluctuations. 
Connectionist approaches to complexity have as their basis neural networks of 
interconnecting nodes and are supported by more interdisciplinary groups such 
as neuroscientists, psychologists and engineers. The networks have no central 
control in the classical sense. Processing is distributed over the network and the 
roles of the various components change dynamically (Cilliers, 1998). Change 
and transformation are dependant on the capacity of the network to learn by 
changing the nature and number of the nodes in the network, the pattern of 
connections between them and the strength of these connections (Wood, 1999). 
In complex adaptive systems such as organisations the nodes or agents only act 
on information available in their immediate environments, from those few agents 
connected to them in a feedback loop (Anderson, 1999). The connectionist 
approach is closely linked to the work of the Santa Fe Institute and to the "edge 
of chaos" perspective. Edge of chaos is the predominant approach in 
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academically reviewed journals, the more popular journals and management 
books that are appearing about the relevance of complexity theory to the 
strategic development of organisations. 
The edge of chaos approach regards the organisation as a complex adaptive 
system. It is driven away from equilibrium but does not descend into chaos. It 
stays out of the bifurcation zone, being nimble enough to never reach it. The 
focus of this approach is operating at the edge and not on the creation of order. 
Operating at the edge keeps the organisation alive. The organisational memory 
defines the choices the organisation takes. The organisation is poised at the 
edge of order and chaos with creative change happening at the edge when the 
system is at the boundary between stability and instability. (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Shaw, 1997; Zohar, 1997; Waldrop, 1994; Stacey, 1993). 
To remain at the edge of chaos organisations have to be effective in the way they 
handle change and develop new strategic directions (Stacey, 1991; Nonaka, 
1988). Declarations of mission and vision become attempts to define boundaries 
rather than literal statements to be followed exactly and in doing so aid rather 
than stifle the organisation (Cilliers, 2000). According to Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997) continuously changing organisations are likely to be complex adaptive 
systems with semi-structures that poise the organisation on the edge of order and 
chaos. These organisations are dynamic and the edge of chaos perspective is a 
more realistic description of how they actually compete. 
The edge of chaos perspective is more frequently associated with work in living 
systems and is based on the premise that such systems typically exist in far from 
equilibrium states; transformation is viewed as a continuous process. The work 
relating to dissipative structures tends to focus on transition between relatively 
stable states with order emerging out of an intervening chaotic period with 
transformation viewed as episodic (Maclntosh and MacLean, 1999). 
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Although there are these different interpretations a number of common concepts 
are observable. These include non-linearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, the 
presence of disequilibrium and positive feedback processes all of which interact 
to produce novel forms of order. The emergence of order is common to both the 
dissipative structures and edge of chaos approaches to complexity theory what 
is disputed is the "mechanism" that gives rise to the emergent order. In the 
research I have undertaken I have chosen to transcend the discussion between 
rules based and connectionist approaches by focussing on the concepts that are 
common to both. The key concepts common to each of these approaches are 
described in the next section. 
The Vocabulary or Common Key Concepts of Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory is not a single discipline. It is a process that represents the 
sharing of ideas, method and experience across a number of fields (Wood, 
2000). If we are to share, we have to have an understanding of the key 
concepts. In this section I describe the common key concepts I am using in my 
research. In trying to separate them out I have found that there is a degree of 
circularity as all are closely related. The key themes are 
Sensitivity to initial conditions 
When we look in the literature for what is meant by the term initial conditions we 
find a vagueness around the definition. What I have distilled from this vagueness 
is that initial conditions are those conditions that exist in the aftermath of the 
creation of a system, that is the factors in the system in the very early stages of 
its existence. The initial conditions are all the factors that exist at that point in 
time. Initial conditions operate as a set, they are enabling and/or constraining 
mechanisms that configure what a system can work towards. Complex adaptive 
systems are highly sensitive to initial conditions partly because of non linearity 
and partly to do with the instability in the system. In non linear relationships a 
given cause can have many different effects or outcomes. A small change in a 
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system variable can have a disproportionate effect on another variable. As a 
result the initial conditions can have a disproportionate effect on an emergent 
outcome of the system as a whole. Cilliers (2000) tells us that a complex system 
has memory, therefore it has a history and that history is of cardinal importance 
to the behaviour of the system. Time and context are central to the identity and 
behaviour of the system. 
Negative and positive feedback processes 
Complex adaptive systems are driven by positive and negative feedback. 
Feedback is negative when it acts on the system to offset or cancel out 
deviations. Negative feedback is dampening and stabilising. A negative 
feedback system is attracted to a point from which it will only move if there is an 
external "shock". Positive feedback is the opposite of negative feedback. 
Instead of feeding back the discrepancy between outcome and intention in a 
manner which closes the gap between the two, positive feedback progressively 
widens the gap. It does not cancel out deviations it reinforces them. Positive 
feedback is amplifying and destabilising. In mechanical systems negative 
feedback is emphasised, in complex adaptive systems positive feedback 
processes are highlighted. 
Dis- equilibriumlYar from equilibrium 
Prigogine established that non linear systems are changeable only if pushed far 
from an initial equilibrium (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). Equilibrium behaviour 
is an either/or choice. Systems can be closed or open. Where there is no 
exchange of energy between the system and the environment or where any 
interaction is stabilised the system is said to be closed. Where there is continual 
interaction with the broader environment of which the system is a part, it is open. 
Closed systems are attracted to a state of equilibrium and are driven by negative 
feedback. They do not change or they change in repetitive and predictable ways. 
Complex adaptive systems are open systems and are driven by positive and 
negative feedback. When such systems are far from equilibrium they 
automatically apply internal constraints to keep instability within boundaries. 
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Self organisation and the emergence of order 
Self organisation in a system is the natural result of non linear interaction not any 
tendency of individual agents to prefer or seek out order. The system evolves 
into an organised form in the absence of external constraints. The importance of 
the emergence of order in a system comes from Prigogine's work on dissipative 
structures (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). Non linear systems can import 
energy or information from the environment which is then dissipated through the 
system. The system still has a structure in the form of irregular patterns capable 
of renewal through self organisation. According to Coveney and Highfield (1996) 
emergent properties appear as macroscopic patterns in collections of elements. 
Order arises because these elements are partially but not fully connected 
(Anderson, 1999). 
The theoretical framework of complexity includes other concepts which 
management and strategy researchers are finding useful such as fractal 
structures, attractors, connectivity, fitness landscapes, bounded stability etc. 
Complexity theory provides a framework for thinking about, and seeing the world, 
that is different from the Newtonian paradigm. Stacey (1991) considers that it 
can offer an explanation of why most phenomena observed in nature and in 
human behaviour have characteristics of order and stability on the one hand 
accompanied by disorder and regularity on the other. 
How can complexity theory be useful to the study of strategic 
organisation development? 
Complexity offers the prospect of an explanatory framework of how 
organisations behave. It offers an alternative way of studying strategy. It is not 
a metatheory encompassing all other theories. There are many authors who 
promote the usefulness of complexity theory to the study of organisations. Allen 
et al suggest that "the complexity framework is complementary to other 
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approaches because this kind of analysis helps us to comprehend the 
fundamental nature of adaptation, knowledge, innovation and leaming that 
characterise the co-evolutionary behaviour of complex social systems". They 
continue by saying that "by taking as a starting point the organisation as a 
complex system of interaction, we are forced to reconsider the nature of the 
processes that we observe, the strengths of interaction and how these shape 
eventual outcomes. .. We are forced to step back from the position of viewing 
the future as a rational predictable process" (Allen et al, 2002. pp 316). Thi6tart 
and Forgues (1995) suggest that complexity theory offers the opportunity to 
reconcile two apparently divergent visions of management, the rational and 
quasi mechanistic on the one hand and the unexpected and disorderly on the 
other. Levy (1994) proposes that complexity theory offers a promising 
framework that accounts for the dynamic evolution of industries and the 
complex interactions among industry actors. According to Stacey (1991) by 
conceptualising industries and organisations as complex adaptive systems a 
number of managerial implications can be developed. Different authors present 
different "takes" on the subject emphasising different aspects and so generating 
different managerial implications and priorities (Rosenhead, 1998). 
In the remaining part of this section I focus on the individual concepts described 
in the previous section. Each can be used descriptively to give different 
perspectives on organisational phenomena to further our understanding of how 
organisations develop and together offer a broad based insight into the 
behaviour of individuals as well as organisations as a whole. 
Sensitivity to initial conditions and non-linearity 
Complex adaptive systems are essentially historical and as a result highly 
sensitive to initial conditions (Juarrero, 2000). The system history is important 
and cannot be ignored as the initial conditions come from it. The activities, 
events, routines, procedures, behaviours and human interactions in an 
organisation constitute the initial conditions for the emergence of future order. 
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Some of these will be amplified through feedback and others dissipated through 
the system. As a result apparently insignificant transactions within organisations 
can lead to large organisational changes and almost undetectable differences in 
initial conditions can gradually lead to diverging system reactions until eventually 
there is the evolution of dissimilar behaviours (Rosenhead, 1998). The track 
initial conditions take through the organisation and the degree of transformation 
generated in the pathway followed will differ over time and across different 
organisations with no single end result (Laughlin, 1991). Organisations contain 
multiple actors with diverse agendas who try to co-ordinate their actions in order 
to exchange information and to interact in other ways. They do all this in a 
dynamic manner. Actions taken by some actors influence actions initiated later 
on by others, often with different frames of reference and value systems 
(Thi6tart and Forgues, 1997). As a result the pathways that an initial condition 
can follow may be so complex that the link between cause and effect is 
effectively lost. 
There are examples in the literature that urge paying attention to initial 
conditions. In banking for example the effect of changing credit policy can set 
off a chain of events and interactions which reverberate back to the bank in the 
form of multiple consequences such as competitor responses, deposit levels, 
loan demands etc (Kurtyka, 1999). Initial conditions have a significant effect on 
how organisations successfully complete mergers and acquisitions particularly 
from the human perspective (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992). Morgan (1993) 
argues that organisations can learn how to use small changes to create large 
effects. Hamel (1998 (2)) writes that strategists rather than working on the 
"strategy' need to concentrate on the preconditions that could give rise to 
strategy innovation. 
Negative and positive feedback processes 
The "general systems theory" strand of thinking sees an organisation as a 
feedback system. Rational decision making models (Porter, 1980; Williamson, 
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1975) and proponents of incrementalism (Quinn, 1992; Mintzberg, 1988) are 
operating in a negative feedback manner resulting in the continuation of 
regularity and stability which is equated with success. Planning and similar 
forms of control are essentially driven by negative feedback, their intention is to 
produce predictable patterns of behaviour. The equilibrium of classical 
economics is also of this type (Parker and Stacey, 1994). Organisations can 
continue to build on their current strengths, however there is evidence that this 
attraction to the stable point leads to failure (Miller, 1993). In practice positive 
feedback is widespread in organisations and leads to self reinforcing change. In 
economic life positive feedback can be observed in bandwagon effects, self 
fulfilling prophesies, self reinforcing growth and virtuous and vicious circles. 
Complexity theory acknowledges that both positive and negative feedback are 
essential to the survival of an organisation. Feedback processes can help us 
understand how and why people behave in the way they do in organisations. 
When managers are carrying out their day to day repetitive business they are 
operating close to certainty and are highly likely to be operating with shared 
mental models which makes them feel secure and not afraid of failure. They are 
using negative feedback to maintain this situation. When managers are trying to 
do something innovative and creative, they question and change existing mental 
models and use positive feedback processes. As creative behaviour is 
inherently destructive, there is inevitably an increase in anxiety, ambiguity 
confusion etc. 
Increase in anxiety, uncertainty and ambiguity, conflict and contradiction can 
result in possible fear of failure and embarrassment. This in turn leads to 
unconscious group fantasies and basic assumption behaviour which directly 
affect how people discover what is going on, how they choose what to do and 
ultimately determines how they behave (de Board, 1993; Baum, 1987). In such 
situations organisational defence routines can cause negative feedback to 
sustain the status quo. When negative feedback processes dominate 
organisations are unable to change and adapt. Basic assumption behaviour 
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may take the form of "fight" (Bion, 1961). Then positive feedback processes 
operate which can lead to amplifying and destabilising effects. When 
organisations are dominated by positive feedback systems which take the form 
of overt and covert political activity and game playing they are attracted to 
disintegration and ultimate failure (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1994). 
Negative and positive feedback in organisations can be seen as counteracting 
forces at play. The dampening negative feedback of written rules, planning 
routines and formal systems which guide managers can serve the purpose of 
creating islands of rationality and certainty pushing the system towards stability. 
Their power of closure assists managers in making decisions and implementing 
them. However such rules and systems are also a source of disorder. They 
tend to stiffen the organisation around artificial codes of working practice which 
prevent a natural adjustment taking place between the internal and external 
dynamic forces the organisation is subjected to. Other forces of innovation, 
initiation and experimentation push the system towards instability and disorder. 
Divergence between the forces of stability and instability create the conditions 
necessary for the development of innovation and future survival of the 
organisation (Stacey, 1993). Successful innovative organisations are ones in 
which both the positive and negative feedback systems are utilised effectively, 
allowing the strategy process to be dynamic and evolving, not a strategic intent 
that can be held constant for a long period. 
Negative and positive feedback processes are found in the different 
organisational systems. The formal organisational systems governing day to 
day organisational behaviour use negative feedback processes allowing the 
organisation to carry out these activities in a rational and stable manner. People 
also operate within a richly connected and informal or decentralised system 
which embraces individuals and groups across organisational boundaries 
(Schein, 1992). This is where the positive feedback operates, amplifying the 
activities of double loop learning, of covert games and unconscious processes 
that provoke people to learn in a constructive manner. (Egan, 1994) refers to 
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this system as the "organisational shadow side. " Traditionally the shadow side 
has been seen as a source of inertia. In the behaviour produced by the 
combination of negative feedback and positive feedback processes there are 
recognisable if irregular patterns in which unpredictable specific developments 
occur over time. These can lead to creativity and innovation required by 
organisations if they are to survive (Stacey, 2000). 
Disequilibrium 
One of the major insights complexity theory brings to strategy theory is that an 
organisation can be viewed as a non-equilibrium system. The concept of the 
organisation moving from one stable state to another as a result of change is 
flawed. Complexity theory points away from viewing success as a movement 
towards stable equilibrium and helps our understanding of the dynamics of 
organising and managing. The idea that people can manage change presumes 
a specific predictable end point, the point of equilibrium. 
Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) has shown that when physical and 
chemical systems are pushed away from equilibrium they survive and thrive, if 
they remain in equilibrium they die. Complexity theorists apply the 
characteristics of these systems to social systems and individuals. When an 
individual or a social system is pushed by circumstances or deliberate 
intervention away from an established pattern of behaviour or when constraints 
are encountered in reaching a goal then humans are forced to experiment, to 
explore alternate ways of reaching goals or change the goals altogether 
(Mitleton- Kelly, 1998). Although we can see that we have to work away from 
equilibrium to find new structures, relationships and different ways of operating, 
classical physics and economics have made it hard to accept that this is 
beneficial. Traditionally organisations have tried to maintain equilibrium through 
rules and regulations. Bureaucracies are an example. Striving to maintain 
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equilibrium results in rigidity and an inability to adapt resulting in failure. 
Organisations are now urged to operate "at the edge of chaos" and maintain 
"bounded stability" in order to survive (Pascale, 1999; Hamel, 1998 (2); Stacey, 
1993). 
Complex organisational systems are characterised by highly interrelated parts 
where opposite forces are at play in a dynamic manner and behaviour is difficult 
to understand and predict (Thi6tart and Forgues, 1997). Unplanned action is 
inevitable and not necessarily due to ignorance or incompetence. In a world 
that is complex and unpredictable the outcomes of actions within an 
organisation cannot be known in advance. Complexity theory can help us 
understand that the failure of management to realise their intended long term 
plans lies in the properties of organisational systems rather than in some form of 
managerial incompetence. The links between actions and long term outcomes 
are so unpredictable that it is inherently impossible for managers to design and 
realise intended long term outcomes. This is a major departure from the more 
traditional approaches to strategy, which downplay the unpredictability of the 
long-term evolution of organisations. 
Seff Organisation and the Emergence of Order 
Organisations are "whole" living systems, once they are broken apart they 
cease to exist. Self organisation and emergent order in organisations cannot be 
predicted from studying the fine detail. What emerges is more than the sum of 
the parts. Emergent properties exist at the level of the system not at the level of 
the elements and express a unity at the systems level which transcends 
differences among the elements, displaying them as features of an integrated 
whole (Coveney and Highfield, 1996). Checkland's work on soft systems 
methodology has provided us with a means of examining social systems 
holistically and as well as way of describing the emergence of changes or "new 
order"in these systems (Checkland and Scholes, 1999). 
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As groups and organisations find themselves in situations of increasingly 
paradoxical demands, the concepts related to self organisation take on greater 
and greater potential significance (Smith and Gemmill, 1991). A self organising 
organisation is one which can discover through experimentation answers to its 
problems improving its capacity of response to changing conditions. Self 
organisation occurs through the formation of interest groups and coalitions 
around specific issues. According to Weick (1979) self organisation in 
organisations originates from experimentation and activities not directly 
connected with the organisation's mission. There are interactions in 
organisational shadow systems where no one is "in control" but patterns of 
controlled behaviour appear, leading to emergent order that profoundly 
influences the actual evolution of the organisation. Managers and policy makers 
find themselves having to rely on a self organising process of organisational 
learning from which the future emerges. The organisation develops a catalogue 
of responses and stimulates learning opportunities though multiple experiments. 
It creates information, captures tacit knowledge and in turn creates meaning 
(Nonaka, 1988). As a consequence it prepares itself for new forms of operation 
when these are required. 
Complexity theory regards organisations as complex adaptive systems made up 
of sub-systems. A subsystem is part of the whole as well as being a whole in its 
own right. A complex adaptive system (CAS) on one level is made up of lower 
level complex adaptive systems interacting and creating the higher level order. 
The structure of complex systems can be summarised as an overall 
heterarchical view where successively higher levels show a many-to-many 
structure rather than a top down tree structure common to conventional thought. 
Non-linear social organisations have fractal like qualities. We can observe 
several layers of similar patterns and configurations at the organisational, at the 
sub organisational, group and individual level (Thi6tart and Forgues, 1995). 
Menzies (1960) in her study of hospital nurses found that supervisory nurses 
criticised their managers for their apparent lack of support and their own staff for 
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their lack of ability to apply themselves in their jobs. These attitudes were 
repeated at more senior levels and in other parts of the organisation. Baum 
(1987) found a similar situation in his study of planners in the USA. 
Complex adaptive systems co-evolve. For organisations this means that two 
types of strategic thinking are required, the horizontal and the vertical. 
Traditionally organisations have practised vertical strategic thinking; vision, 
strategy and action plans with upper and lower levels interacting as a result. 
Horizontal strategic thinking or horizontal integration strategy is to act 
simultaneously on the complex parts that make up co-evolution (Tasaka, 1999). 
An organisation wanting to develop knowledge management has to work in a 
least three different parts - the information system, the management style and 
the corporate culture. 
Understanding the way emergence occurs helps us recognise why change 
management initiatives do not always succeed. Many of these attempt to 
design and control outcomes and as a result they block or constrain emergent 
patterns of behaviour. This implies that such initiatives should concentrate on 
providing enabling infrastructures to allow emergent new patterns of 
relationships and ways of working to arise which would be more in tune with the 
culture of the organisation. We become aware of change only when a different 
pattern becomes discernible. But before change at a macro level can be seen, 
it is taking place at many micro-levels simultaneously (Mitleton-Kelly, 1998). 
Complexity theory can help managers feel more comfortable living "with 
continuous transformation and emergent order as a natural state of affairs" 
(Morgan, 1993; pp. 266). Instead of planning an action in advance, constraints 
can be specified and the local conditions at the time can determine how a task 
will be done. 
Organisations can create an enabling infrastructure by presenting strategic 
concepts which give broad direction and allow freedom of interpretation. The 
strategic ambiguity they represent nurtures fluctuations of viewpoint and 
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creativity as do the presence of co-existing counter cultures. Fluctuations can 
also be created from built-in organisational structures and processes. There is 
recognition that middle managers occupy a key position, as they are able to 
eliminate fluctuations and "noise" within the organisation. They are the starting 
point for action to be taken at upper and lower levels and also serve as an agent 
for change in the organisation's self renewing process. 
Order arises through interactions in the different organisational systems. 
Interaction alone however does not lead to emergence. For it to be a useful 
construct it must be neither rare nor everywhere. If unusual it will have little to 
do with everyday organisational dynamics. If it is everywhere it loses its 
explanatory power (Goldstein, 2000). There is some evidence in the literature 
of what can help or hinder emergent order in organisations. Seel (2003) 
through his work as consultant and film editor has found that good boundaries 
seem to be necessary for emergence to occur. These may be deadlines, clear 
goals and intentions, prescriptions about length or size, and so on. The 
common factor seems to be that there is a well-bounded 'space' within which 
emergence can occur. Emergent order cannot be directed but may be 
influenced. According to Seel (2003) one example would be the placebo 
effect. If we assume that the immune system is a self-organising system which 
can be assisted by medicinal drugs, then it would seem that a placebo can 
help it self-organise in the same way as a drug, provided the human host 
believes that the drug has been administered. Another example that Seel 
gives is labelling theory. It is well-known for example that children who are 
labelled as 'slow' or 'stupid' at school tend to conform to that label. They 
underachieve compared to those with similar innate ability who are positively 
labelled. 
Stacey (1996) argues that in human systems two variables are significant; the 
amount of anxiety and the extent of power differentials in the system. Too little 
or too much contained anxiety inhibits emergence. If the anxiety in an 
organisation is too contained there will be no possibility of change or creativity. 
Too much anxiety can lead toheadless chicken' behaviour or else the building 
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of bogus and obstructive defences. If power differentials in the system are too 
high or too low, emergence can also be inhibited. Too much control, in the 
form of high power differentials between different parts of the organisation can 
result in creativity and readiness for change being subdued or obstructed. 
However if the control mechanisms are too weak the system can dissolve into 
chaotic or random behaviour. 
Self organisation and the emergence of order has consequent implications for 
researchers, managers, consultants and others who study organisational 
systems for research purposes or who work in them to bring about 
organisation change. Traditional methods of analysis and synthesis have 
proved to be of limited use in the search for "knowing the whole. " Methods 
have to be found to comprehend "the whole". These may well turn out to be 
methods such as using intuition, gut reaction and tacit understanding that 
experienced managers have traditionally used and that have been frequently 
been condemned by management researchers as "unscientific". 
Macintosh and MacLean (1999) have argued that complexity theory and in 
particular emergence offers a dynamic view of strategy which could be useful for 
re-integrating strategy content theories with strategy process theories such as 
those described by Whittington (1993). Both strategic decision taking and 
strategy processes are emergent phenomena. Looking at organisations through 
the individual concepts of complexity theory enables us to bring to the study of 
their development different strands of organisational theory. Many of these 
strands have not previously commanded much attention. Complexity theory 
allows us to say something about the way organisations learn, about the nature 
and role of politics in choosing and acting, what part spontaneity and difference 
play in control and what part creative tension and chance play in outcomes. It 
can help establish the conditions necessary for the effective practice of totally 
different forms of managerial control. The qualitative properties of complexity 
theory such as sensitivity to initial conditions, non linearity and disequilibriurn all 
offer perspectives from which the way organisations work can be viewed. 
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Complexity as a Metaphor - Changing Linguistic Mental Models 
The key concepts of complexity theory such as non-linearity have come directly 
from other sciences such as mathematics where they have specifically defined 
meanings. Their use by complexity theorists to describe social systems often 
results in a change of meaning to something less specific and as a result they 
can be regarded as acting as metaphors. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a metaphor as "a rigure of 
speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object to 
which it is it is not properly applicable". A metaphor is a means of expressing 
certain phenomena in a novel way, so that day to day understandings of these 
phenomena may be enriched or replaced by other interpretations. The 
metaphor works by transferring a whole set of ideas and associations from one 
domain to the other (Rosenhead, 1998). The use of metaphors to describe 
activities in organisations is a familiar one. Morgan (1993,1986) for example 
has written extensively on their use. He uses the term metaphor to distinguish 
different paradigms in the way we view organisations. Organisations consist of 
individuals and groups whose knowledge, understanding and interests differ 
considerably. In order to work effectively they require a common language and 
a way of sharing the interpretation of events and actions. Metaphors assist in 
creating and sharing understanding. They establish images of how things fit 
together. Metaphors and the images they create express what is important and 
unimportant in the organisation. 
Weick uses the term "sensemaking" to describe an organisation's need to 
interpret and make sense of the environment around it if it is to survive (Weick, 
1995). The ability to make such sense is, in great measure, a by-product of 
the language of interpretation available to the organisation and its members. 
Nonaka (1988) maintains that knowledge creation is closely tied to language 
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use. It requires both the creative use of metaphors, analogies and models and 
a resolution to the conflicts which such creative uses may provoke. 
The broad usage of "traditional" metaphors and other linguistic devices such as 
proverbs suggest that managers find value in them, however organisations 
struggle with change and individuals struggle with uncertainty which suggests 
that such metaphors may not be the most appropriate for handling these sort of 
situations. Complexity theory based metaphors may be more appropriate. The 
traditional metaphors used to describe organisational life do not fit the key 
concepts of complexity theory. Many of the metaphors used in organisations 
are within the machine or military paradigms. Examples include "chain of 
command, " "running like clockwork, " "re-engineer". They fit well with the 
classical approach to strategy which has dominated management thinking. 
Such metaphors often create meaning that inhibits understanding organisations 
from a complexity theory perspective. 
Many metaphors, proverbs and popular sayings deny the importance of an 
organisation's history to its future development. Comments such as "that's 
history", "all that's in the past", "don't re-invent the wheel", demonstrate this. 
Others that try to acknowledge it such as "don't throw the baby out with the bath 
water' often imply a sense of resignation. The expectation is that what the 
person is saying will be ignored. Many of the expressions used such as "get all 
your ducks in line, " "keep on track" and "in the pipeline" are linear in nature. 
Others such as "we have a mountain to climb" do imply that things may not be 
done in a "straight line" but there is still a very clear end in view. 
As previously stated complexity theory acknowledges the usefulness of both 
negative and positive feedback to successful organisation development. 
Expressions used in organisations tend towards stressing the importance of 
negative feedback - "dampen this down", "put the breaks on", "a stitch in time 
saves nine" etc. Positive feedback has traditionally been regarded as unhelpful 
and the metaphors reflect this - "viscous circles", "bandwagon effects", 
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"spiralling out of control". More constructive positive feedback metaphors such 
as "virtuous circles" are now being used. Many of the metaphors are about 
maintaining equilibrium. "Don't rock the boat" for example and Lewin's much 
quoted change metaphor, unfreeze - change - refreeze are typical. 
Complexity theory research is developing its own language and as a result new 
metaphors can be found. New metaphors create new meaning and therefore 
have the power to create new reality. Complexity metaphors draw our attention 
to certain features in organisations about which organisation theorists were on 
the whole only subliminally aware. Words and phrases such as non linearity, 
feedback loops, unpredictability and emergence make up a new vocabulary we 
use to attempt to re-describe organisations (Tsoukas, 1998). The metaphors 
shift from competing in a game or a war to trying to find the way on an ever 
changing landscape. Such a conception of an organisation's basic purpose can 
change the day-to-day decisions made by managers (Lissack, 1999). Morgan 
(1997) says that the research on complexity is "full of resonant images Jhey 
provide a valuable resource for carrying organisation and management theory 
into a new domain" (pp. 273). Complexity theory offers new metaphors however 
the influence they will have over managerial actions will depend on their 
vividness and on how plausible they appear to managers. 
Theory Constraints and Limitations 
The literature which discusses the application of complexity theory to social 
systems and, in particular organisations is fragmented. Smithson (1997) refered 
to it as a "small literature". Since then considerably more has been written and 
complexity theory is appearing regularly in popular management books as well 
as more academic publications. However the theory is still in its infancy in its 
application to social systems (Mitleton-Kelly, 1997; Thi6tart and Forgues, 1995). 
The variety of definitions, the doubts expressed as to whether it is a theory, 
theories or a framework and the different usage of the terminology associated 
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with complexity highlighted at the beginning of this chapter are all indicators of 
its infancy. Although chaos theory and complexity theory are different social 
scientists sometimes conflate the two. The result is that analogies from chaos 
theory are frequently misapplied (Mitleton-Kelly, 1997). 
Complexity theory (or framework) has been developed out of physical systems 
without necessarily taking into account fundamental differences between 
physical and social sciences. Management complexity authors lean heavily on 
'science' in their texts using phrases like "scientific discoveries have shown 
that... " or "the science of complexity shows that... ". The illustrative examples 
provided are commonly of natural rather than social or managerial phenomena 
such the behaviour of molecules when the temperature of liquid rises or the 
weather (Rosenhead, 1998). Gersick (1991) however has shown us that 
understanding similar theories from different research domains can suggest 
thoughtful insight for others. 
Mittleton-Kelly (1997) and Goldstein (2000) recognise the need for 
circumspection when attempts are made to transfer complexity theory 
formulations from the natural to the social domain. Johnson and Burton (1994, 
in Tsoukas, 1998) and Baurnol and Benhabib (1989, in Levy, 1994) question if it 
is realistic to apply it to social systems. Qualitative differences between the inert 
material world and the living social world are often downplayed (Chia, 1998). 
The temptation is to take findings from these systems and apply them directly to 
human systems such as organisations. Gemmill and Smith (1985) for example 
use the human immune system as an example of a dissipative structure and 
then offer dissipative structures as a model for organisation transformation. 
Beinhocker (1999) states that as both biological evolution and business 
evolution are complex adaptive systems we can employ tools that help us 
understand biological evolution to help us understand the evolution of business 
strategy. 
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Behaviour in physical systems may be assumed to be governed by laws. The 
rules that determine the interactions in human systems are socially constructed 
and are not fixed by laws of nature. In the social world outcomes often reflect 
very complex underlying relationships, for example humans have membership 
of multiple systems which results in the blurring of boundaries between systems. 
Human agency can alter the parameters and structures of social systems (Levy, 
1994). Social and physical systems also differ in sources of unpredictability. In 
the social world far less accuracy is possible in defining precise initial conditions 
and the specification of the system structure is less precise. 
A major problem for complexity theory and organisations is the lack of empirical 
studies currently available. Many of the 'results' cited in the complexity literature 
are not firmly grounded in empirical observations. They are the outputs of 
computer simulations (Goldstein, 2000; Rosenhead, 1998). In such simulations 
the variables can be determined by the modeller and are limited in number. 
McKelvey (1999,1997) argues that we need a systematic agenda linking theory 
development with computational model development and the testing of model 
structures with real-world structures. It is difficult to see how such models can 
account for the intricacies of human behaviour which include; the role played by 
emotion, the options humans have to interpret, adjust or break rules and the fact 
that humans belong to many systems which may or may not have easily defined 
boundaries. In social systems the precise identification and measurement of the 
multiple of variables is considered an impossible endeavour so such systems 
cannot be observed in their entirety. 
The relatively few academically robust empirical organisational studies reported 
in the literature is cause for concern. They are insufficient to describe the 
development of a human system from a complexity theory perspective. Case 
studies undertaken by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), Macintosh and Maclean 
(1999) and MacLean and Macintosh (2002) are examples of trying to move 
complexity theory onto a practical footing, but all are relatively short term 
studies. None explores in sufficient detail such issues as the effects of the 
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different social settings for the firms they were studying. Seel (2001), Griffin et 
al, (1998), Shaw (1997) and Stacey (1996), give examples of consultancy 
assignments where they have applied complexity theory concepts to 
organisational change initiatives they have been called in to facilitate. They 
describe what they did in organisations to create situations to increase 
connectivity and positive feedback so that novel forms of order could emerge, 
but they do not say how effective their interventions were over the longer term. 
Relatively new and insufficiently tested theory is advocated as a sound way to 
work on strategic organisational change. According to McKelvey (1999) "without 
a programme of experimental testing, complexity applications ... will remain 
metaphorical and if made the basis of consulting agendas .... are difficult to 
distinguish from witchcraft". (pp. 21) 
Rosenhead (1998) argues that formally validated evidence is not available to 
demonstrate complexity theory-based prescriptions for long term survival. 
Evidence of longer term success is almost exclusively anecdotal in character. 
Stories range from tales of successful corporate improvisation, to longer 
accounts of organisational death wishes, to innovation which bypasses the 
obstruction of the formal hierarchy. There are also approving quotations from 
business leaders (Rosenhead, 1998). Anecdotal evidence is most persuasive 
to those who are already persuaded. For others it can be hard to judge the 
validity of the examples. Different standards of proof or disproof may be used 
for different sides of the argument. For managers in organisations there has to 
be a balance between acting on plausible insights and firmly rooted theory. In 
the literature managers are given the "advice" that complexity is a useful tool. 
This is sometimes accompanied by catchy phrases such as "Don't analyse, 
intuit the whole", "Don't plan or manage, stimulate self-organisation" (Tasaka, 
1999). Academics largely write about the "promise" of complexity theory. Its 
interdisciplinary nature may work against its acceptance and comprehension 
particularly because the academic world is strongly focused on specialist fields 
and slow to involve outsiders in research (Lucas, 2000). 
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There is criticism concerning the role of subjectivity in discerning emergence. A 
look at some aspects of emergence (level, pattern, predictability) leads to the 
conclusion that any description of emergent phenomena must contain some 
element of subjectivity. According to Seel (2003) we are faced with the issue of 
pattern recognition and the ontological status of perceived patterns. Cilliers 
(2000) states that we may be able to construct good models of complex 
systems but they will always require interpretation. Studying organisations from 
a complexity perspective involves qualitative descriptions of the phenomena 
under investigation. This implies the presence of the observer to understand 
the dynamics taking place (Medd and Haynes, 1998). Is the emergence of a 
new pattern simply a gestalt switch on the part of the observer or is it 'really' 
there? To determine patterns both observation and participation are required 
with the two kept in tension and dialogue (Seel, 2003). However subjective bias 
relating to complexity theory is not substantially different from that in any other 
scientifically informed discipline. Starting with subjectivity does not necessarily 
mean ending up there (Goldstein, 2000). 
Much of the literature urges applying complexity theory to help organisations 
innovate and change (Pascale, 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Stacey, 
1995). Encouraging self organisation and emergence does not necessarily 
mean that the outcome will be better than what existed before. Such examples 
can be seen in the break-up of political structures such as Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union and in organisational mergers that fail. Self organisation and 
emergence are powerful forces that need to be channelled appropriately with 
conditions created to work towards a "better" state. According to Goldstein 
(2000) this can possibly be done through working with psychological, physical 
and social "boundaries". 
Some writers such as Stacey (1993) have gone as far as stating that the links 
between cause and effect are completely lost. This is often followed by 
descriptions of the futility of long-term planning. Goldstein (2000) argues that 
complexity and emergence does not violate causality per se, what has 
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happened is that our ability to trace all the micro determinates responsible for it 
has been challenged. There is predictability in chaotic systems due to the 
presence of attractors; this also challenges the notion that emergence is 
completely unpredictable. There is a need to enhance our understanding of 
how coherent patterns emerge and reconfigure as a result of interaction, how 
knowledge is effectively used and how stability, change, routine and novelty are 
interwoven and feed on each other (Tsoukas, 2001). What is required are 
advances in classification schemes for helping to discover pattern of sequences 
and thereby gaining greater predictability Goldstein (2000). Seel's (2003) 
comments mentioned earlier in the chapter on the placebo effect and labelling 
theory and David Cooperrider's appreciative inquiry work (1990) on the way 
positive intentions can lead to positive outcomes suggest that it is possible to 
influence the broad general direction of emergence in human systems although 
not to control or specify it. 
Stacey (2000) has highlighted the importance of the organisation's shadow 
system to the emergence of order. In my last chapter I noted that the strategy 
literature tends to ignore or downplay the presence of the shadow system. 
Stacey is right to highlight its importance. However much of what he subscribes 
to can be explained succinctly through work of earlier authors such as Menzies 
(1960) and Argyris (1992) on social defences mechanisms and Hirschorn (1990) 
and Kets de Vries and Miller (1994) on the psychodynamics of organisations. It 
remains to be seen what additional value complexity theory can add to our study 
of organisational shadow systems, their interaction with formal or legitimate 
systems and their contribution to understanding of how organisations develop. 
There is a debate in the literature about the element of the system. Stacey 
(1995) writes about decision rules and scripted relationships between people 
who can change the rules, schemas or scripts which govern their behaviour. He 
argues that informal feedback networks form around issues which individuals 
join. Weick (1979) and Schein (1985) express it as regularities in human 
behaviour coming about because each successive piece of behaviour is 
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conditioned by the institution in which it occurs. For Talcot Parsons the ultimate 
element of a system is the action. For Luhmann an action only becomes such if 
the system interprets an event as an action. Elements of systems are not pre- 
given entities but are generated by the system itself. In Luhmann's philosophy 
everything that exists does so only in relation to a system (Brans and Rossbach, 
1997). This debate is taken up by Maclean and MacIntosh (2002) who suggest 
that those arguing for an edge of chaos perspective have the human being as 
the element of the system. Those electing for a dissipative structures approach 
consider that there are other options, the element of a system may be 
organisational routines, tasks, competences etc. 
Complexity theory provides general guidelines and constraints; it does not offer 
specific models to predict exact outcomes (Cilliers, 2000). The prediction of 
complex behaviour is only possible as a form of generalisation. It can for 
example tell us in broad terms when to expect bifurcation points which alter the 
ratio of order and disorder but it cannot tell us if we should hurry or retard such 
bifurcation. It cannot help managers make accurate predictions. There is the 
danger that because of their generality complexity theory statements can 
appear as motherhood and apple pie. According to Rosenhead (1998) this 
gives them a sense of being unchallengeable. Many authors do make very 
general statements which in themselves are not helpful. Morgan (1997) is 
typical, suggesting that insights into complexity have enormous implications for 
modern management, rethinking what we mean by organisation and especially 
the nature of hierarchy and control. He continues by urging managers to 
"leam the art of managing and changing contexts. Learn how to use small 
changes to create large effects. Live with continuous transformation and 
emergent order as a natural state of affairs. Be open to new metaphors that can 
facilitate process of self organisation" 
However he does not conclude by offering managers help to implement his 
suggestions. 
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Social sciences have long been influenced by the metaphors and methods of 
science. While science has undergone dramatic changes in the twentieth 
century, the type of science that remains influential in the social sciences is that 
of enlightenment science. Complexity theory is being helpful in challenging the 
Newtonian view in the social sciences however many of the claims for it as a 
complete paradigm shift or revolution may be over enthusiastic. It may be that 
complexity theory will be most profitably used in the social sciences if it is seen 
not so much as a set of mathematical formulations but as an alternative 
imagery, a source of inspiration and a repository of insights. It may be most 
useful as a metaphor. However one of the problems of using complexity theory 
in this way is that metaphors can be linguistic fashion statements. Once 
another fashion comes along the complexity metaphors will be forgotten. 
I summarise this brief review of constraints and limitations by agreeing with 
Letiche (2000) who says that complexity theory desperately needs to "explain 
itself'. Much of it is theoretically messy and its insights are somewhat unclear. 
This I am sure is no different from any other theory in the early stages of its 
maturation process where theory and practical application are being developed 
at the same time. Complexity theory is acquiring a much firmer foundation and 
usefulness as a scientific explanation of organisation development. It does offer 
an alternative way of thinking and if organisations are seen as complex adaptive 
systems evolving within social ecosystems then strategy and management will 
be seen from a different perspective. As with any theory the "value added" is 
dependent on personal perspectives. 
The Research Focus 
As this review of the literature demonstrates the application of complexity theory 
to the study of the development of organisations is still very much in its early 
stages with theoretical propositions far outweighing examples of its practical 
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application. Inherent in key concepts of complexity theory is the implication that 
the theory can be useful in two ways; firstly for explaining how individual 
organisations have reached their present state, and secondly as a guide to their 
future development. It remains to be seen if its main contribution will be as a 
theory of explanation rather than as a theory of broad prediction. The purpose 
of my research is provide an empirical study showing the value of complexity 
theory as a theory of explanation, rather than a theory to guide my actions as I 
worked in ATYAG. As a theory of explanation we need to be able to describe 
an organisation in terms of the key concepts of complexity theory. I aim to show 
that the strategic development of an organisation can be explained through four 
key complexity theory concepts. 
9 its initial conditions, 
* events and actions both planned and unplanned which create 
disequilibrium 
and the feedback processes operating in the organisation. 
leading to the emergence of order 
By doing this I will add to the body of empirical evidence of the usefulness 
complexity theory to our understanding of how things happen in organisations in 
the way they do. The research will contribute to Goldstein's (2000) call for 
advances in classification schemes for helping to discover pattern of sequences 
and Tsoukas' (2001) desire to see an enhanced understanding of how patterns 
emerge and reconfigure as a result of interaction. 
Suggested Data Collection Areas 
AYTAG began operation in April 1996.1 joined in May 1996. My position 
enabled me to study the organisation closely over a relatively long period of time 
- three and a half years. The time period was sufficient for me to look for order 
emerging in AYTAG and I could do this by gathering data to demonstrate that 
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the key concepts of complexity theory; sensitivity to initial conditions, 
disequilibriurn occurrences and negative and positive feedback processes come 
together to produce the order emerging in the organisation. 
In order to show the relevance of concepts of complexity theory given in the 
previous paragraph data had to be gathered. According to Stacey gathering 
data for researching complexity theory involves playing a role in the legitimate 
system and the shadow system simultaneously inferring that data has to be 
gathered from both systems. Based on Stacey's (2001) views and those of 
Seel, (2003); Thietart and Forgues, (1997) and Shaw, (1997) 1 considered areas 
where it would be useful to gather data. These are indicated in table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 Data Collection Areas 
Complexity Thoughts on where to collect data and what data to collect 
theory - Key 
Concepts 
Initial conditions The nature of the previous organisations, their size, structure, etc 
Reports and studies recommending setting up of AYTAG and the 
organisation of its work. 
The structure of AYTAG 
The transfer of staff into the new organisation 
Recruitment policy for senior managers and additional staff 
Policies and procedures in place to guide the regulatory activities 
Early human resource initiatives to integrate staff and functions 
Public perception of the need to protect the environment 
Management styles and cultures in the previous organisations 
Feelings and opinions of employees about the new organisation 
Disequilibrium Changes to senior staff 
Unexpected crises for example an environmental disaster 
Large swings in funding commitments for example for new offices and 
laboratories, research, training, etc 
Sudden intakes/ redundancies of large numbers of employees 
New work as the result of the requirement to implement new legislation 
Covert resistance to change initiatives for example through criticism and lack 
of time to carry out tasks 
Feedback Continuous shifts in resources in a particular direction 
Decisions supporting change initiatives 
Regular communication to staff through newsletters, e-mail etc on progress 
Unshifting opinions on the organisation and change initiatives 
Continuation of traditional ways of working 
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Emergent Order Patterns appearing in the way decisions are taken 
Patterns of behaviour appearing in staff 
Development of the management process 
Changes to staff workloads/skill bases 
Achievement / non achievement of publicly stated strategic objectives 
Shifts in the balance of power between members of the corporate 
management team 
Organisational structure changes such as increases / decreases in hierarchy 
Conclusion 
According to Tsoukas (1998) we badly need complex theories to take into 
account context, time, history, meaning, politics and emergence. In chapter one 
I outlined the different approaches to strategy and in chapter two argued that 
strategy theory needed a new approach. Complexity theory can provide that 
new approach by throwing fresh light on social phenomena and why 
organisations develop in the way they do. As an open complex system an 
organisation is subject to fluctuations in information, resources, people, 
technologies and legislation and it has to adapt to a shifting landscape. 
Complexity theory helps us realise that we cannot control or predetermine 
outcomes of interest. It allows different strands of organisational behaviour 
theory such as the psychodynamic of organisations, group and individual 
behaviour etc to be brought into the equation rather than sticking to linear 
mechanistic tools to guide the organisation forward. It demands communication 
between the different parts of the organisation and listening to a wide range of 
people. Complexity theory allows us to include stability and instability, 
uniformity and variety, and explain how choices are made and enacted in a 
continuing loop through time (Colado, 1995). Its qualitative properties such as 
sensitivity to initial conditions, strange attractors, time irreversibility and 
bifurcation processes all offer perspectives from which organisations can be 
viewed. With bigger organisations, changes in societal norms, faster 
communications and greater access to information, complexity theory has 
become a useful explanatory blueprint. 
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This chapter has been a brief critique of complexity theory. I have highlighted 
two critical points. Firstly there are relatively few robust academic studies and 
secondly there are concerns about how easily the theory can transfer to human 
social systems. My research described in the following chapters aims to 
address both these points. By contributing a detailed ethnographic study it will 
add to the relatively few academically robust empirical organisational studies. 
Secondly it examines the currently under explored issues in relating complexity 
theory to social systems and in doing so considers how far complexity theory is 
a useful conceptual device for understanding the strategic development of 
organisations. 
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Chapter Four 
The Methodological Approach to the Research 
The framework in which the researcher operates affects all aspects of the 
research; the initial literature review, the research questions, the methods chosen, 
how the research results are written up and distributed. According to Zohar 
(1997) our questions, assumptions, prejudices and beliefs that make up our 
paradigm determine how we will act and therefore what changes we will bring 
about. Prior to deciding how research should be undertaken a researcher needs 
to explore the paradigmatic options to him/her and their appropriateness to the 
chosen field of study. The methodology has to fit the research aim. 
In this chapter I will argue that reductionist approaches to the study of 
organisations are inappropriate when a researcher alms to demonstrate that 
complexity theory is a helpful way of explaining the development of organisations. 
The nature of the theory itself requires a qualitative approach with implications for 
the researcher's skills and the research methods. I argue that case studies are 
useful to the development of new theory regardless of research paradigms. I 
describe my reasons for taking an ethnographic approach with participant 
observation as my main data collection method. I conclude the chapter reviewing 
the strengths and limitations of my chosen approach. 
Research Frameworks and the Social Sciences 
The research frameworks in the social sciences are split into two broad 
paradigms; positivist or reductionist and phenomenological. The requirements 
these paradigms are summarised in figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 Research Paradigms 
Research Methods 
Increasing concern for 
external objectivity, 
hypothesis testing and 
increasing world 
Generalisation by the 
researcher through large data 
sets 
Reductionist 
methodology 
" Positivist/ 
" Post Positivist 
Phenomenological/ 
Qualitative 
methodology 
" Ethnography 
" Participant 
inquiry 
" Grounded 
theory 
" Soft systems 
methodology 
" Action research 
/action science 
" Clinical method 
Increasing concern for 
context and involving 
/helping the 
"researched" 
The Positivist or Reductionist Paradigm 
Generalisation by the reader 
through recognition of 
patterns applicable to their 
own situation 
"The predominant research tradition in the social and behavioural sciences has 
been of a quantitative, empirical nature. It is based upon the statistical analysis of 
data collected by means of descriptive and comparative studies and experiments. 
This approach is usually termed positivistic. It assumes that only knowledge 
obtained by means of measurement and objective identification can be 
considered to possess truth. " 
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Rubenowitz pp. 152, in Gurnmerson, 1991 
This frame of reference requires establishing the real causes of real events and 
the effects of real intervening variables (Gummerson, 1991). Positivism has been 
the primary epistemology since Descartes in the 17th century. John Stuart Mill 
(1843 - 1906) was one the first to encourage social scientists to emulate the so- 
called hard sciences in order to achieve a more rapid maturation of their fields of 
study. This approach has been invaluable in furthering our understanding of the 
development of organisations from the work of Taylor and scientific management 
in the early 1990's to more recently Porter (1980). The dominance of the 
quantitative approach in the social sciences stems from a concern for 
acceptability and an appearance of being "scientific. " 
In a reductionist approach to research the roles of the researcher and the subject 
are mutually exclusive. The researcher contributes all the thinking and makes the 
decisions, the subjects contribute the action to be studied (Reason and Heron, 
1995). There is strong emphasis on the researcher as objective observer, 
standing outside the research looking for objective knowledge and "one truth". 
According to Daft (1983) the research challenge is to plan the work so that it 
comes out as predicted. Research follows a predetermined path, "scientific 
method", in order to verify (positivism) or falsify (post positivism) an hypothesis or 
a model. The distinction between verification and falsification was made by Karl 
Popper as a way of dealing with the problem of induction (Easterby Smith et al, 
1991). Quantitative research is undertaken using specific methods which require 
large sample sizes and rely heavily on statistical analysis. Generalisation and 
replicability are emphasised. Reductionism regards the whole as no more than 
the sum-of its parts and through reductive separation and study of the parts the 
whole will be determined. The quantities approach is authoritarian in so far as 
researchers take all the decisions about content, methodology and findings. It 
ensures that the institutions to which the researchers belong remain the 
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gatekeepers of the knowledge gained. Such research is necessarily ahistorical, 
acontextual, and frequently aprocessual. When used in the social sciences it 
isolates individual events and activities as units of analysis in order to study them. 
As a result these studies are divorced from the immediate and more distant 
context in which they are embedded. Consequently inadequate descriptive 
theories and guides for action are likely to be developed (Pettigrew, 1985). 
Practical Limitations of the Reductionist Paradigm 
The practical difficulties of the reductionist approach are well documented. 
Common sense beliefs about the world are taken on trust in order to experiment. 
To test a particular hypothesis the plausibility of all other hypotheses entering the 
experiment have to be assumed (Clegg et al, 1985). The replicability of the 
researchers observation does eliminate the risk of a single observer's eccentricity 
but it does not enforce the difference between fact and opinion (Sherrard, 1997). 
People holding similar but invalid opinions will cite identical observations to 
support their view. Repeatability does not guarantee their objectivity. Rather 
there is a shared consensus arising out of the features themselves. Daft states 
that when researching organisations "the myth that successful research comes 
out as predicted, probably more than anything else, restricts the discovery of 
knowledge in our discipline" (Daft 1983, pp. 540). As Marshall and Rossmann 
point out "quite unlike its pristine logical presentation in journal articles, real 
research is often confusing, messy, intensely frustrating and fundamentally non- 
linear" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 21; in Parkhe, 1993). 
As the limitations of the positivist or reductionist approach have become more 
apparent other systematic ways of studying complex systems have been 
developing. From the second half of the 19th century there have been "anti- 
positivists" including Weber, later Wittgenstein and Sartre who have moved away 
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from the science of the enlightenment and suggested that individuals do not exist 
in isolation and therefore need to be understood as part of the cultural and social 
environment. According to Reason (1994) there is a view emerging in the study 
of human social systems which is more holistic, pluralistic and egalitarian that is 
essentially participative. This has given rise to a number of new knowledge 
building paradigms such as constructivism and critical theory. Critical theory is a 
grouping of several alternate paradigms which include participatory inquiry and 
post-modernism (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). These paradigms share assumptions 
such as a belief in a plurality of methods and that each method has its validity 
determined by the specific situation in which it is applied and by the type of 
knowledge sort (Kock et al, 1997). 
Phenomenological Paradigms 
This approach moves us towards more localised, pragmatic and constructivist 
practical knowledge based on the experience and actions of all those involved 
and away from the search for a singular truth (Reason, 2001). It does not try to 
explain causal relationships by means of "objective" facts and statistical analyses. 
Instead it uses a more personal interpretative process in order to understand 
"reality". Such an approach allows flexibility and opportunity to pursue emerging 
insights. Language takes on a central role. Qualitative assessments partially 
replace quantitative data and general characteristics are of lesser interest than 
specific features. What can be taken as "data" for the research is much more 
varied and can encompass orthodox forms such as statistics and interview 
transcripts to less orthodox expressive forms such as story telling and dance. 
Data can be gathered through free floating discussions and informal 
interpretation, avoiding the temptation to force material into models which would 
result in barriers to the consideration of the material. Theory is derived from data 
and then illustrated by characteristic examples of data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
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Such research is concerned with what is tacit and unconscious and as a result 
researchers have to confront defences and overcome anxieties if these issues are 
to be brought to the surface. Intuitive faculties are systematically cultivated in 
order to make sense of diverse data and bring it into a coherent pattern of 
meaning (Reason and Goodwin, 1999). This not only makes for a rich enquiry, it 
also provides a means through which ordinary people may experience and 
validate the data being used. The researcher's intervention can change in 
response to the changing nature of the context. The phenomena to hand are not 
reduced to their constituent parts searching for law like rules which govern them; 
the researcher seeks to understand social phenomena in terms of patterns of 
interactions and feedback loops (Weick, 1979). 
The research process is much more two way with input at various stages by the 
"researched" such as the research focus, design and conclusions so that the 
research becomes an emergent process. The research frequently has a dual aim, 
to produce knowledge that is useful to a group of people and to empower people 
through the process of constructing -and using their own knowledge (Reason, 
2001). The researcher can use a variety of methodologies such as grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), soft systems methodology (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1999), action science/action research, ethnography and clinical method 
to seek to generalise insights about the pattern of one situation that may have 
relevance for understanding a similar pattern elsewhere. In recording the 
outcomes of the research narrative is used to describe actions of interacting 
agents, the occurrence of events unfolding over time and how they intertwine to 
produce current phenomena. 
If the researcher wishes to follow an interpretative approach it is not possible to do 
so at a distance. It requires their personal commitment through investing their 
personality and experience into the field of research. The researcher is 
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encouraged to acknowledge their biases and assumptions about the world and 
not hide behind a mask of objectivity. Carrying out research is recognised as a 
powerful and political act. Personal experience of the area of study is considered 
to be a scientific merit. The researcher is concerned with metaphors and the 
images that people use as well as what is factual (Stacey, 1995). 
The Limitations of Phenomenological Approaches 
This alternate view is not without its critics who identify a number of weaknesses. 
Firstly what is often referred to as qualitative research is primarily an approach to 
the collection and analysis of data which can be used in a number of distinctive 
research approaches. For example when a researcher conducts a semi- 
structured interview he or she will collect comments made by the interviewee that 
can later be presented as an analysis of trends. This can lead to confusion about 
what is meant by qualitative research (Kock et al, 1997). Validity and reliability 
are also areas of controversy. The problem of validity in phenomenological 
research concerns the difficult of gaining an accurate or true impression of the 
phenomenon under study. To what extent are the researcher's biases affecting 
what is being observed. Reliability centres on the replicability of the research; for 
example data is collected in a non standard way and is often generally not useful 
for statistical treatment. Without a statistical analysis to confirm patterns and 
trends researchers cannot ensure that their findings are real. Reliability comes in 
qualitative research when the study is repeated and it generates the same range 
and diversity and the same explanatory associations. Proponents of qualitative 
approaches argue that most fieldwork is exploratory and is concerned with 
producing descriptions and explanations of particular phenomena or with 
developing theories and not with testing existing hypotheses. The methods used 
are less structured and as a result more flexible so that the researcher can alter 
the problems and questions they are pursuing as they gain greater knowledge of 
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their subjects. This enables insight into new realities or new ways of looking at 
old realities (Tyrrell, 2001). 
To a large extent problems of validity and reliability can be overcome by seeking 
confirmations, refutations and reformulation throughout the course of the research 
(Morgan, 1993). Yin (1994) recommends safeguards against unconstrained 
subjectivity which include using a variety of data collection methods and 
triangulation of the resulting data. He also recommends reporting all the steps of 
the data collection, analysis and the grounds of interpretation. Moreover the use 
of intuition which is encouraged in qualitative research is a universally recognised 
subjective component of scientific discovery (Reason and Goodwin, 1999). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) go as far as to say that although verifying theory is the 
researcher's principle task for existing theories, when developing new theories the 
researcher's main goal should be their systematic generation from the data of 
social research. 
Generalisability of findings is another key issue. Studies often have small 
numbers of client organisations and can be in-depth, longitudinal studies making it 
difficult to generalise across a number of organisations or industries. The 
researcher has little control over the environment in which they operate. This can 
prevent the production or testing of strong theories and the building up of 
research models based on "solid" evidence. The development of general theories 
from findings of individual studies needs to be done transparently if it is to have 
validity. The reader has to be able to work through from findings to theories and 
see how the researcher has arrived at his or her interpretations. According to 
Lester (1999) this may well involve the researcher appearing in the research. The 
personal involvement of the researcher may introduce biases in the research 
methods, the interpretation of data and the reporting of the findings. Research 
methods employed such as action research often produce little in the way of 
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documentation. They are seen as lacking scientific discipline. As a result they do 
not always command high academic interest. 
Practitioners of qualitative research argue that it is inappropriate to judge its worth 
using the tools of the positive approach. In reply to positivist accusations of 
subjectivity qualitative researchers will argue that objectivity is deceptive rhetoric 
as it is impossible for researchers to be completely objective. No method of data 
collection can be free from presuppositions. Criticisms can easily be made when 
research conducted within a particular paradigm is assessed from the vantage 
point of another. Both paradigms require the ability to see reality in a new light. 
Moon et al (1991, in Stevenson and Cooper, 1997) suggest that inquiry positions 
lie along a continuum with positivism at one end and constructivism at the other. 
Any inquiry stance will entail certain suppositions concerning epistemology (how 
we know) and ontology (what can be known). Implicit in the idea of a continuum 
is the possibility of adopting some middle ground. 
The debate about the relative merits of the different approaches to research will 
continue. We should bear in mind Lewin's comments that 'Yo proceed beyond the 
limitations of a given level of knowledge, the researcher as a rule, has to 
breakdown the methodological taboos which condemn as "unscientific" or 
'illogical" the very methods or concepts which later on prove to be the basis for the 
next majorprogress" (Lewin, 1949; in Morgan 1993, pp. 295). 
The Skills Required by Researchers 
Different paradigms assume researchers with different skills. Positivist and post 
positivist researchers require being skilled in quantitative methods including 
statistical techniques in order to measure the phenomena in question. A 
fundamental assumption is that researchers are able to eliminate the influence 
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that their biases, prior experience and knowledge may have on a research project. 
The researcher here is the "objective observer". The relationship with those they 
research is one of uscientific neutrality". 
On the other hand researchers undertaking projects using a qualitative inductive 
process argue that a position of objective observer is impossible and possibly 
unhelpful when seeking to gain new knowledge. All observations are 
acknowledged to be theory laden. Researchers have to be much more self aware 
so they are able to reflect on how their prior experience and belief systems 
impinge on their research and take steps to reveal them and their possible effects. 
As the research is much more of a two way process with input from the 
"researched", researchers need to be more highly skilled in group process skills 
such as facilitation to enable them to effectively engage with the people with 
whom they are working and support their personal growth and development. The 
researcher has to develop enquiry skills and validity procedures to help improve 
the quality of the research process. These include; the management of emotional 
states, being open, reframing and reflecting ideas and conclusions, challenging 
consensus collusion, refraining from investing personally in an action but 
remaining committed and managing conflict and distress (Reason, 2001). 
Strategy and Organisation Development Research 
Theories and models derived from the positivist paradigm dominate the strategy 
literature. Hypothesised connections between a specific cause, usually in the 
environment, and a specific effect, usually in part of the organisation being 
studied, are tested using cross-sectional data on organisations obtained from 
statistics, public documents, questionnaires and interviews (Stacey, 1995). 
Studies in scientific management, operations research, systems analysis, 
cybernetics, total quality management and business process re-engineering all 
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embrace this logical, analytical, deductive approach to development (Wood, 
2000). 
Management practice as well as strategy research is steeped in ways of 
conceptualising organisations as systems in equilibrium with their environments. 
Leading on from the work of Frederick Taylor in the early 1900's organisations 
have sought to operate as closed systems through efficiency measures and rules 
and regulations to assert managerial control (Pugh and Hickson, 1989). From the 
1960's organisations have been seen as open systems in a more dynamic 
equilibrium with their environment (Boisot and Cohen, 2000). This informs the 
goals and methodologies of management and organisation development 
practitioners and strategists. Researchers have provided many models for 
understanding organisations in these terms. The design perspective of the 
research focuses on the organisation's legitimate system, its prescribed network 
of relationships and hierarchies, its bureaucracies, its approved ideology and 
explicitly shared culture. This rational picture of business problem solving and 
development has had as its major concern the content or "what" of strategy - the 
outcome which is sought - and has had less to say at an explicit level of how to 
achieve the outcome. Lagging behind are process theories of how to achieve the 
strategic outcomes so logically derived from analysis of the organisation's 
environment and competitors (Pettigrew, 1985). 
The comparative lack of research based on process theory and the dominance of 
reductionist methodologies have meant that organisations have been studied as 
timeless fixed items. Weick (1979) argued that organisations can only be 
understood in terms of their organising activities. Viewing an organisation for 
longer periods of time will create the impression that organising is underway. 
Viewing it for shorter periods will suggest an organisation exists. Therefore we 
observe either an ongoing process that appears frozen or steady because it is 
glimpsed only briefly or we observe that the process is continuously changing if 
Chapter 4 85 
we watch for a longer time span. According to Weick (1979) crucial events are 
explained in processes, their structuring, modification and disappearance. 
Research into strategy development in organisations falls either into strategy 
content or to a lesser extent strategy process. As discussed in chapter two, calls 
for a more dynamic view of strategy are a move towards the reintegration of 
strategy content and strategy process (Macintosh and MacLean, 1999). Such a 
move requires a pluralistic research agenda, to take researchers beyond current 
mindsets and will incorporate quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
Cameron and Quinn (1988) argue that the traditional ways in which organisational 
scientists think are inappropriate for analysing complex organisations. For 
example, there is an underlying assumption that organisations engage in rational 
decision making (Weick, 1979). Such thinking according to Cameron and Quinn 
is unidirectional, uniformistic, hierarchical, classificational and quantitative. They 
observe that organisations are becoming more sensitive to the presence of 
simultaneous opposites or contradictions in effective management and 
organisation behaviour. Cameron and Quinn then state that the requirement for 
understanding complex phenomena is thinking that is mutualistic, heterogenic, 
interactionist, qualitative, relational and contextual. Van de Ven (in Cameron and 
Quinn, 1988) similarly asserts that organisational and management theories 
match analytical thinking in narrowness and unidirectionality. Daft (1983) raises 
an important point when he says that one of the difficulties many authors have in 
developing interesting and insightful theories about organisational development 
can be explained by their lack of experience of organisations. 
To overcome such criticisms there is a growing body of organisation development 
researchers who take a more subjective, inductive or co-operative approach (See 
Stacey, 1996,2000; Shaw, 1997; Schein, 1995; Reason, 1994; Kets de Vries, 
1991 and Cooperrider, 1990). These researchers place greater emphasis on 
Chapter 4 86 
looking at what is odd, contradictory and paradoxical in what people say in 
organisations. Argyris and Schon (1978) have shown that behaviour in 
organisations is driven by theories in use which can often differ from espoused 
theories - that is people often say one thing and do another. This has raised 
awareness of the problems of traditional methods of gathering data to test 
hypotheses, as the data collected is based on what people in organisations say 
they do. The growing emphasis on the importance of tacit knowledge, below the 
surface and contradictory, is making it sometimes less likely that the 
straightforward application of questionnaires, documents and interview data to the, 
testing of hypotheses is reliable (Liedtka et al, 1997; Nonaka, 1991). Cassell and 
Symon (1994) argue that only qualitative methods are sensitive enough for 
detailed analysis, critical when organisation dynamics are being studied. Data 
collection and analysis are integral parts of the research process, but they are 
intermediate points between an initial hunch and the final story about the 
organisational world (Daft, 1983). 
The Nature of Complexity Theory and the Implications for 
Researchers 
In the previous chapter I gave my working definition of complexity theory and 
discussed the key concepts I am using for this research - sensitivity to initial 
conditions, feedback processes, disequilibrium and the emergence of order. 
MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) argue that complexity theory itself should 
determine an appropriate research methodology. I strongly support this 
argument. Complexity theory argues that order emerges in organisations through 
the self-organisation of systems and is undeterminable in advance. Organisations 
are complex adaptive systems in which the whole greater than the sum of the 
parts. The approach to the research has to align with these concepts. 
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Many of the problems in the study of organisations stem from attempts to treat 
them as if they were objects (Boisot and Cohen, 2000). In general systems theory 
a system is ahistorical in character, reversible and has no memory (Cillers, 1998). 
Complexity theory highlights the sensitivity of a system to its initial conditions. 
The system history shapes its future development. The time dimension is 
essential to the understanding of complex adaptive systems, they are, to all 
intents and purposes irreversible. The reductionist approach to research is 
essentially an ahistorical approach thus making it inappropriate for the study of 
organisations from a complexity theory perspective if we are seeking insight into 
an organisation's sensitivity to its initial conditions. 
The reductionist approach of testing hypotheses about causality independently of 
each other assumes that the systems being studied are linear or approximately so 
or are non linear but are required to operate in states of stable equilibrium. Linear 
organisation is generally predictable in its consequences. From a complexity 
perspective however organisations are essentially non linear systems and 
therefore it is difficult to find the specific causes of specific effects. Even where it 
is possible to do so, with hindsight it provides little useful information about the 
future. Non linear modes of organisation can generate obvious or surprising 
consequences, properties "emerge" from the interaction of local level processes. 
This emergence or "structure" or "pattern" cannot be understood or predicted from 
the behaviour or properties of the component units alone (Eve et al, 1997). The 
emergent properties at different levels cannot be completely reduced to or wholly 
explained in terms of another level (Hodgson, 2000). Analytical reductionism is a 
valid mode of explanation when both the whole and its parts can be observed. In 
much of organisation theory the whole is unobserved and as a result is then 
identified as the sum of its parts. If organisations are non linear feedback systems 
with emergent properties then reductionist approaches to researching them are 
likely to produce misleading conclusions. The theory of emergence, in which the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts, offers a non-reductionist account of 
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complex phenomena as such cannot be researched using a reductionist 
methodology (Hodgson, 2000). 
According to Boisot and Cohen (2000) complex adaptive systems do not directly 
react to events but to their internal representation of them, organising information 
to generate plausible representations of their environment as a basis for action. 
Such systems act recursively producing changes that are progressive and 
different each time around. Representations of the environment shape the 
organisation's capacity and hence its conception of what it should or could be. 
The organisational context is critical. It develops a dynamic of its own which 
escapes the control of organisational actors. The organisation is what observers 
see and because of this it is not possible to separate the organisation as an object 
from the perceiving subject. The implications for the researcher are that he or she 
has to be able to; understand the intentions of organisational actors and the 
interplay between them, observe patterns of overt and covert behaviour and get 
as close as possible to the phenomena being investigated (Thietart and Forgues, 
1997). None of this is possible if the research takes an external objective stance. 
Theory that is developed from the deep insights gained will both be more accurate 
and more appropriately tentative because the researcher must take into account 
the intricacies and qualifications of a particular context. Such an approach to 
research will only be valid within a qualitative framework. 
In order to deal with the emergent nature of complex adaptive systems Reason 
and Goodwin (1999) advocate a science of qualities. This is an iterative process 
which cycles through phases of action and reflection with periods of divergent and 
convergent activity. Complexity theory tells us that convergence with its 
implications of negative feedback and divergence implying positive feedback 
contribute to the building of emergent properties. There are a number of research 
methods such as action research, ethnography (Gummerson, 1991), grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), co-operative inquiry (Reason, 1994), clinical 
Chapter 4 89 
inquiry (Ket de Vries and Miller, 1987) in which cycles of action and reflection 
occur. These have been described as Mode Two research (MacLean and 
Macintosh, 2002; Tranfield and Starkey, 1998). Implicit in these methods is the 
lack of prediction of the actual outcome of the research process. They only 
facilitate its emergence. As such they may be appropriate methods for examining 
organisations through a complexity lens. They are however the methods that are 
less frequently applied to strategy research (Stacey, 1995). 
Complexity theorists argue that it is impossible to offer prescriptions for long term 
organisation success. Traditionally the research questions posed are conditioned 
by the notion that strategic management should reduce the level of uncertainty, so 
diminishing the element of surprise in the development of the organisation. The 
complexity theory framework poses a different question, how do or should 
managers conduct themselves in the presence of irremovable uncertainty, 
surprise, the unknowable and open endedness (Stacey, 1995). Research 
therefore has to focus on; explanation or hypotheses about whole systems, their 
dynamics, the conditions under which they display different kinds of dynamic and 
the relationship between the dynamic and innovative success. As Weick (1979) 
has pointed out it is not the tangible fixtures of the organisation that are crucial, 
these merely provide the media through which processes are expressed. Their 
tangibility and visibility has little to do with their degree of importance for 
understanding what occurs. Their importance lies solely in the shape they will 
give to the processes that occur over and over in any organisation. Qualitative 
descriptions seem best suited for capturing the circular texture of organisational 
phenomena, the emergence of order and to express the importance of the 
historicity of the phenomena being explained. 
In my view if research into the application of complexity theory to the strategic 
development of an organisation is to be convincing it has to meet two main 
criteria. 
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1. It has to be accessible so that it can be of use to the management 
community both researchers and practitioners. 
2. The research methodology used has to be congruent with complexity 
theory itself. 
Reason and Goodwin (1999) have said that the principles of complexity theory 
should lead us to towards a form of research and practice in organisations which 
is intimate, systematic and emergent. Much research into organisations never 
reaches managers; it does not become useable knowledge. It is presented in 
unfamiliar language and without helpful linkages to enable managers to see its 
practical application. Reason and Goodwin (1999) also suggest that the 
principles of complexity theory should be used as design principles to create the 
conditions for high quality creative inquiry and as criteria to assess the emergent 
understanding and practice. These two prerequisites point us firmly in the 
direction of a qualitative, participative approach. 
The Case Study Approach 
Parkhe (1993) argues that the development of theory should follow a research 
route which begins with exploratory research, followed by descriptive research and 
finally by explanatory research. To advance the application of complexity theory to 
the understanding of social systems exploratory research needs to be carried out. 
Yin (1984) noted that exploratory research allows an investigator to examine a 
phenomenon and develop suggestive ideas in a flexible way. A suitable starting 
point is a single case study (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989; Parkhe, 
1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). According to Lowe (2001) as ideas about the 
nature of knowledge change case studies look increasingly relevant. The 
contribution of case study analysis is in adding depth to more conventional 
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approaches. A case study permits the researcher to get close to the action and 
provide rich, thick data for analysis (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Descriptive case analysis provides the intellectual raw material for 
useful theory (Daft, 1983). 
Traditional case study researchers have tended to let their analyses emerge over 
time choosing to focus on contexts and on describing the phenomena and contexts 
richly. The ultimate goal of such research is to provide a vivid description of the 
social scene, to describe the context in which events occur and to reveal the deep 
structure of organisation behaviour (Light, 1979). A good case study can be holistic 
and convey a feeling of what it is like to experience an organisation or a problem 
from the inside. It can explain attitudes and behaviours in context and from their 
participants' own frames of reference (Clegg, 1985). Laughlin (1991) says that 
change "pathways" in organisations can only be understood in the context of actual 
organisational examples. He quotes from Greenwood and Hinings (1988) when he 
states that it is from attempts to map tracks in different institutional settings that a 
richer understanding of organisational evolution and transformation will occur. 
As a form of research a case study is defined by interest in individual cases and not 
by the methods of inquiry used (Stake, 1994). Case studies are undertaken by 
researchers using interpretative paradigms as well as those who have a more 
positivist orientation. It is important to consider case studies as a method not 
implying a particular form of data collection. This may be quantitative or qualitative. 
Case Studies within a Phenomenological Research Paradigm 
Case studies carried out within a qualitative framework give detailed descriptions of 
specific phenomena with deeper understanding of particular contexts. Such case 
studies create exemplars from which other researchers can compare their 
experiences and gain theoretical insights. When a phenomenological approach is 
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taken to case study research it may be inappropriate for the researcher to attempt 
to generalise his or her findings. However it is appropriate and possible for them to 
be generalised by their readers who can share the meanings they embody and 
identify with them as a result of their own experiences and settings (Clegg, 1985). 
The classic case study approach has been so powerful because the authors have 
described phenomena so well that others have little difficulty seeing the same in 
their own experience and research (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). Knights (1995) 
suggests that case research ought not to concern itself with generalisability but 
should seek instead to emphasise its strengths which include telling convincing 
stories and the ability to express the uncertainty and undecidability of 
organisational life. It is these strengths which give case researchers a distinct 
position in contributing to the appreciation of the intricacies of organisational action. 
Two common qualitative approaches to case studies are ethnography (Cooke, 
1997; Gurnmesson, 1991) and action research (Argyris, 1992; Gurnmesson, 1991). 
Ethnography 
The ethnographic approach is concerned with the descriptions of social patterns. 
The ethnographer learns from others about their culture. The primary method of 
access is participant observation, a highly empirical and inductive method of data 
gathering (Gummerson, 1991). 
An ethnographic approach can be described as one in which the investigation 
seeksto 
e gain a close up detailed rendition of the real world 
* challenge the logical positivist position by claiming that all evidence is relative 
and therefore cannot be independent of the investigator - thereby favouring 
participant observation as the dominant mode of data collection 
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* permit and even encourage fieldwork to continue for long periods of time so that 
the regularities and rituals of everyday life can surface (Yin. 1993) 
The ethnographer's primary goal is to obtain valid data for "science" and is not 
usually to change or help a system being studied. The ethnographer's clients are 
seen primarily as academics (Cooke, 1997). Unlike the action researcher the 
ethnographer is not there to "help" the client or organisation. Even where there is 
an intention to help it is subservient to academic rigour. Ethnography is used 
extensively to further our understanding of social systems and there is a very 
extensive literature particularly in sociology and anthropology. Since organisations 
can be viewed as "tribes" with their own cultures, researchers have used 
ethnographic methods to study them. There are many examples of ethnographic 
studies carried out to gain a greater understanding of organisations. The 
researcher can take on the role of an employee. Thorpe (1980, in Easterby Smith 
et al, 1991) used this approach to gain an understanding of how lack of attention to 
motivational needs led to disillusionment and apathy in the workforce. Roy(1952) 
used it when working as an employee in a machine shop of a large company to 
show how the piecework scheme was manipulated. Researchers can explicitly 
agree with an organisation to be present over a specific period of time with the 
researcher moving around observing, interviewing and participating as appropriate. 
Fairhurst (1983, in Easterby Smith et al, 1991) used this approach to study 
employee attitudes to organisational rules. 
Action research 
Lewin was the first to use the term action research to refer to a specific research 
approach in which the researcher generates new social knowledge about a social 
system while at the same time trying to change it (Kock et al, 1997). Gummesson 
(1991) states that action research always involves two goals, firstly to solve a 
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problem for the client and secondly to contribute to science. It is an approach to 
knowledge production which is theory sensitive and practice led. 
Argyris (1992, pp 414) says of action research that it 
"takes its cues - its questions, puzzles and problems - from the perceptions of 
practitioners within particular, local practice contexts. It bounds episodes of 
research according to the boundaries in the local context. It builds 
descriptions and theories within the practice context itself and tests them 
through intervention experiments, that is through experiments that bear the 
double burden of testing hypotheses and effecting some (putatively) desirable 
change in the situation. " 
Action researchers may make claims about the generalisability of their research 
across local contexts, however they do not describe relationships in which the 
values of a group of dependant variables are uniquely determined by the values of 
a group of independent ones. Generalisations produced from an action research 
project tend to describe thematic patterns derived from enquiry in one setting 
whose valid transfer to other settings depends on confirmation there by further 
experiment. Action research is used in organisations to bring about change and 
involves those whose roles in the organisation will be changed. Examples include 
Moller's (2001) work with educational leaders in Norway and Waterson's (2000) 
work in a local authoritys social services department. 
Limitations of Case Studies 
Weick (1979) in his critique of the case study as a method agrees that they have a 
richness of detail but he gives four drawbacks; they are situation specific, 
ahistorical, tacitly prescriptive and one sided. These four are drawbacks because 
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of their effect on theory construction. He argues that case studies give a static view 
of organisations and do not highlight mechanisms associated with processes, 
change, development and fluidity. Weick's criticism is primarily relevant to case 
studies carried out within a positivist paradigm. In such instances case studies 
tend to focus on problems; this is unhelpful to theory development. Theories he 
argues are built on regularities among events, people and relationships not on 
sporadic infrequent, explosive episodes. Most case studies do not describe any 
circumstances in which the author's prescriptions did not work. Some case studies 
that have been described as action research have not properly fulfilled the 
requirements of scientific research but have been closer to consultation or 
journalism. 
There is disagreement regarding the number of case studies required to generate 
theory. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the more cases a researcher studies the 
better. She considers that between four and ten case studies are suitable as less 
than four often makes it difficult to generate theory with much complexity. The 
empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing when there is a small number 
unless each case has several mini case studies within it. Dyer and Wilkins (1991) 
disagree with Eisenhardt. They argue that classical case studies tend to focus on 
comparisons within the same organisational context. The critical trade off for 
researchers is between the deep understanding of a particular social setting and 
the benefits of comparative insights. The more contexts a researcher investigates 
the less contextual insight he or she can communicate and the less understanding 
of the underlying dynamics of the case. Dyer and Wilkins (1991) continue their 
argument by stating that if researchers apply the paradigm of hypotheses testing to 
case study work without the goal of telling good stories, they are likely to miss both 
the calibre and the quantity of theory seen as a result of classical story telling in the 
case studies of the past. Most of the single organisation case studies are in fact 
multiple cases in a single setting such as an organisation. They rely on the 
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comparative multiple case logic of replication and extension for their theoretical 
insights (Eisenhardt, 1991). 
The strengths and limitations of case studies are summarised in table 4.2 below 
Table 4.2 Strengths and Limitations of Case Studies 
Strengths Limitations 
" allows researchers to get close to the 0 Perceived as risky and are the target of 
action scepticism in the scientific community. 
" Can act as a catalyst at the early 0 Situation specific and not generalisable 
(exploratory) stage of theory 
development 
" Can be carried out within positivist or 0 May need several case studies before 
qualitative paradigms theory can be convincingly generated 
" Can focus on context and gain a 0 Can be prescriptive and one sided 
deeper insight into an organisation 
Organisational Case Studies and Complexity Theory Research 
There are many examples of case studies looking at the strategic development of 
organisations for example Pettigrew's (1985) study of the development of ICI, 
Mair's (1999) review of the development of Honda and Dair's (1993) description of 
the formation and development of English Nature. As previously indicated in 
Chapter 3 empirical studies applying complexity theory to organisation 
development are few in number. Much of complexity research is still computer 
simulation and includes simulation models (Levy 1994, Smithson 1997) and rating 
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scales (Smith and Comer, 1994). Empirical examples of complexity theory based 
research reported in management journals are case studies. 
These include 
1. Brown, S. L. and Eisenhardt, K. (1997) The Art of Continuous Change: 
Linking complexity Theory and Time-paced Evolution in Relentlessly 
Shifting Organisations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, pp. 1- 34. 
This well written article is based on a study of six firms in the computer 
industry and makes interesting comparisons between them. The authors 
offer complexity theory as a theory of prediction rather than a theory of 
explanation. It provides insufficient information of the context of these firms 
and how this influences their performance. To some extent the article 
justifies Staceys comment that there are problems in the literature as much 
complexity theory research starts from a position of objective external 
observer which makes it hard to hold onto the radical perspectives of the 
theory (Stacey, 2000). 
2. Patricia Shaw (1997) describes how complexity theory was used in a 
consulting assignment to bring about change in a public sector 
organisation. Shaw describes the process the consultants went through 
with the senior management in order to work with them using the theory 
and reflects the emergent nature of complexity theory. The article clearly 
demonstrates how complexity theory was applied. The period of the 
research is relatively short resulting in no long term assessment of the 
success of the consultancy assignment. (intervening in the shadow 
systems in organisations in the Journal of Organisational Change 
Management, (10) 3) 
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3. In an article "Chaos to Chaords" published in Training and Development in 
April 1997, Durrance describes how Dee Hock the founder of Visa used the 
principles of chaos theory to run his company. Unsuccessful activities are 
avoided and complexity theory is not used to explain these. The article 
raised awareness of the theory but gave little of substance to those who 
might seek to understand why Visa became the organisation it is today. It 
is an example of an article that tries to "sell the benefits" of complexity 
theory without giving an academic justification for doing so. 
The examples quoted have informed the development of my own approach which 
I will now go on to describe. The research I am undertaking aims to extend our 
understanding of how complexity theory can be useful in helping us understand 
organisation development. To paraphrase Goldstein (1999) 1 aim to make the 
process of emergence in organisations less opaque. Without more examples of 
actually applying the theory to real organisations it will remain a topic for 
discussion and not a means for helping managers understand the environment in 
which they work. 
My Approach to the Research 
I have briefly described the research paradigms, the requirement for the research 
methodology to be congruent with complexity theory, the usefulness of case 
studies to the development of new theory regardless of the paradigm and listed 
some of the relevant research cases. It is now appropriate to define my own 
approach. 
Daft (1983) states that significant studies often begin with direct contact with 
organisations through such things as training sessions and consulting work. I was 
employed by the organisation that is the subject of my research. I took advantage 
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of my work situation and the access it gave me to pursue this PhD. It gave me an 
ideal opportunity to undertake a case study. As already highlighted case studies 
are suitable for exploratory research required for increasing our understanding of 
the application of complexity theory. Case studies are popular with researchers 
looking at the relevance of complexity theory to organisation development. 
I was responsible for corporate training and development in AYTAG. I made 
recommendations to the Corporate Management Team and implemented 
strategies to develop staff. I operated as an internal consultant. The approach I 
took to my work had a significant effect on the direction of human resource 
development in the organisation and on the outcome of this piece of research. As 
a member of the organisation I was not in a position to stand outside it as an 
objective observer. This made it almost impossible to use a positivist or post 
positivist methodology. It was not possible to separate the content from the 
context and myself as the researcher from what was being researched. 
I am not the first person to see the appropriateness of a qualitative approach in 
order to gain an understanding of organisation development from the perspective 
of complexity theory. Stacey (2000) deals with the research approach issue by 
arguing for a reflexive methodological position to seek out the patterns of 
behaviour which lead to emergent self organising processes. Easterby-Smith et 
al (1991) state that the role of the researcher as an employee is appropriate when 
the researcher needs to become totally immersed and experience the work or 
situation first hand as sometimes it is the only way to gain the kinds of insights 
sought. MacLean and Maclntosh (2002) also highlight the importance of the 
research process being consistent with complexity theory with insights regarding 
the research coming from the broad principles of the theory itself. The concept of 
emergent properties made it not only impossible to predict in detail the research 
outcomes but also the exact method of the research itself. There had to be a 
lesser degree of control over the research process than with a reductionist 
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approach which does predict outcomes. My role within AYTAG meant that I was 
involved in the creation and shape of what was being researched. The 
perceptions of myself and others in the organisation played a role in the creation 
of the emerging properties. I agree with Morgan (1986) when he says that we 
cannot obtain knowledge independent of our own judgement and social 
construction and with Tsoukas (1998) who said that we can never escape the 
maze of language which causes us (according to the community in which we 
belong) to describe the world in a particular way. However I remained very aware 
of issues relating to the subjectivity of the research and the need to ensure that I 
collected data from a wide variety of sources. 
In this thesis I am using four key concepts of complexity theory to explain the 
development of an organisation. Ethnography and action research were both 
initially attractive from a complexity theory and an organisation perspective. 
There would have been the advantage of convenience of using action research as 
I could have used the same work for my thesis and for my paid employment. 
However action research entails bringing about change to the system being 
studied. My research for this thesis did not involve using complexity theory to 
inform the actions I undertook which made action research unsuitable. It was not 
my intention to show that by applying key concepts of complexity theory the 
development of AYTAG could be influenced. I chose ethnography, as this would 
enable me to observe the system of which I was a member without the express 
purpose of bringing about a change to the system. From the perspective of this 
thesis I was observing AYTAG, not trying to change it. 
Table 4.3 below surnmarises the suitability of action research and ethnography for 
researching complexity theory as a theory of explanation. 
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Table 4.3 Action Research and Ethnography as Research Methodologies 
Method Key Features Suitability 
Action Research Requirement to be close to the "action" Suitable 
over a long period of time 
Primary purpose to bring about a change Unsuitable 
in client system 
Ethnography Requirement to be close to the "action" Suitable 
over a long period of time 
Research is not directed a bring about a Suitable 
change in the system studied 
Primary client is academia Suitable 
Ethnographical research is well established method for furthering our 
understanding of human behaviour in organisations and how this helps and 
hinders the achievements of organisational aims. Hodson (2001) in his study of 
disorganised workplaces identified over a hundred of organisational 
ethnographies which were relevant to his work giving an indication of the extent to 
which ethnography is used as a means to study them. 
Participant observation is the main ethnographic data collection method. 
Participant observation allows the researcher to observe what people actually do 
rather than reporting what people say they do. The researcher can examine first 
hand social situations from participants' points of view and gain access to 
concepts used in everyday life, thereby obtaining insights about core meanings 
and experience. Webb and Palmer (1998) successfully used this method to 
investigate how the circumvention of workplace rules and procedures contributed 
to maintaining production targets in a British based Japanese manufacturing 
company. 
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Working ethnographically using participant observation I was able to observe and 
gather information in AYTAG as I went about my day-to-day business. As 
indicated earlier in this chapter I was carrying out action research projects to 
progress multiskilling professional employees and to develop managers as these 
were two main areas of my job. I was careful to make the distinction between my 
researcher role to progress the work I did in AYTAG and my researcher role for 
this thesis. From the perspective of this thesis I gathered data from the action 
research projects in my role as a participant observer. 
The results of ethnographic research lend themselves to being written up in 
narrative format. Juarrero (2000) states that interpretive narrative models of 
explanation are suited to the dynamics of self organisation. Narrative descriptions 
can give historical interpretation and describe how meaningful intentions emerge. 
I have already highlighted that the skills of the researcher are fundamental to the 
quality of the research results. I felt confident undertaking a qualitative approach, 
my career history having given me the skills and knowledge required. For 
example I have considerable group facilitation experience. I was aware of the 
pitfalls that could occur for organisation development practitioners. It was 
important for me to understand such processes as projective identification, 
consultant over-functioning and avoid joining collusively with images that people 
had of the situations existing in AYTAG in order to take on the role of participant 
observer effectively (Gilmore and Krantz, 1985). 
Limitations of the Chosen Research Process 
I recognise that no single approach to theory development is self sufficient and 
that even the best research provides an imperfect model of organisational reality 
(Parkhe, 1993). 1 worked in the organisation which was the subject of my 
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research and as such the research could be viewed as overly subjective. The 
demands of the organisation could be seen as detractors for producing well 
grounded theory. 
Complexity theory is a new field and can be perceived as "high risk" particularly 
for a PhD student. Management research generally is fragmented and operates 
to no single agreed ontological or epistemological paradigm. Paradigmatic 
agreement in disciplines serves an important co-coordinating role aiding in the 
definition of key research questions and the specification of appropriate 
epistemological orientations (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998). This research could 
be seen as contributing to this fragmentation as it is not trying to clarify what 
already exists. The limitations and strengths of my chosen approach are 
summarised in table 4,4 below. Also highlighted are the implications of the 
research process. 
Table 4.4 Research limitations, advantages and implications for the 
research process 
Limitations Advantages Implications for the 
Research Process 
New theory - High involvement case study Multiple source of data 
complexity theory useful at the outset of a new High involvement may result 
theory in data "overload" 
Less well defined Fits with research As the researcher I could be 
research path for requirements of complexity seen as too "close to the 
strategy research - theory - research as an action" 
ethnography with emergent process 
participant observation Careful use of language to 
as a data collection Research can be told as a convey meaning 
method story which best describes the 
dynamics of emergent order. 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Limitations Advantages Implications for the 
Research Process 
High risk Possibility of making an early Awareness of the possibility 
contribution to the of the theory being 
development of the application inappropriate 
of a new theory 
Could be seen as As an employee able to gain Need to guard against over 
overly subjective entry easily and overcome functioning 
lacking in academic gatekeeper issues Requirement for the 
rigour Results are accessible to the academic perspective remain 
management community in view 
Knowledge produced is Detailed description will allow Requires clarity regarding 
not necessarily the knowledge gained to be added value when writing up 
generalisable generalised by others conclusions 
Conclusion 
Complexity theory research describing how key concepts of the theory can be 
useful to understanding the strategic development of organisations is a new field. 
The practical application of complexity theory is only in its early stages, much of 
our current understanding comes from simulations. This empirical study will add 
to the relatively few robust studies which apply complexity theory to the study of 
organisations. Its main purpose however is to explore how far complexity theory 
is a useful conceptual device for understanding the strategic development of 
organisations. High involvement case studies into the development of new 
organisations particularly those in the public sector are not numerous so this 
research has the added benefit of increasing our understanding of such 
development. 
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In this chapter I have argued that the ontological and epistemological framework 
within which the researcher operates and the nature of research topic have 
implications for the way research is carried out. This together with the level of 
existing research in complexity theory, the key concepts of the theory, my 
knowledge, experience and my relationship to AYTAG and its employees all 
influenced the way I undertook this research. It has resulted in me using an 
ethnographic approach with participant observation as the main method for 
gathering data. I now move on to describe what data was collected and how I 
collected and analysed it. 
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Chapter Five 
The Research Process - Data Collection and Analysis 
The purpose of my research is to provide an empirical study showing the value 
of complexity theory as a theory of explanation. As I have stated earlier I aim to 
I describe the development of AYTAG through four complexity theory concepts 
namely 
its initial conditions, 
events and actions planned and unplanned which created disequilibrium 
the feedback processes operating in the organisation leading to the 
emergence of order 
In my last chapter I described why I decided to take an ethnographic approach 
to this research with participant observation as the main method of collecting 
data. Also important to this study is the written data I gathered such as official 
documents, memos, e-mails and workshop outputs. In this chapter I describe 
the large variety of data I collected and how I collected it in order to gain insight 
into the way AYTAG developed. I show how the data collected links to my 
original ideas in my complexity theory chapter. Also detailed is how I reviewed 
and sorted the data through chronological ordering, mind mapping and process 
flow charts to determine my findings. The chapter notes my awareness of 
possible biases and validity issues during the data collection and analysis 
process and describes the steps I took to address these. 
Introduction to data collection 
In my chapter on complexity theory I outlined my thoughts on what useful data I 
could collect. With these thoughts in mind I began to gather data to help identify 
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emergent themes. I realised that I would need to collect data over a significant 
period of time to allow for these themes to emerge. The data gathering covered 
a four year period from May 1995 to August 1999.1 joined AYTAG in May 1996. 
For information about the setting up of AYTAG in the year prior to it becoming 
operational in April 1996 1 collected historical data. The remaining data was 
collected at the time it was produced. Data collection was an ongoing activity 
from May 1996 to August 1999. Figure 5.1 depicts the data collection activity. 
Figure 5.1 Data Collection and analysis In AYTAG 
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An issue for a researcher is how much data to collect. I was responsible for 
training and development in AYTAG giving me access to large numbers of 
people and multiple sources of data. Employees from over sixty parent 
organisations came into AYTAG. My job was to facilitate the merger through the 
development of a multiskilled workforce and a programme of management 
development. The nature of this job meant I had easy access large quantities of 
data with the possibility of getting myself into a position of data overload. To help 
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me focus my data collection activities I drew on Reason and Heron's (1995) 
comments that a fundamental skill of the researcher is aftentional competence, 
that is the ability to "know what is going on". 
I had to keep to the forefront several factors in order to "know what was going 
on" and these influenced my data collection. These factors were the skills 
required to be "aftentionally competent", the opportunities to gather data, my 
interest in complexity theory and my role as a participant observer. In order to be 
"attentionally competent", Reason and Heron suggest that a researcher needs 
skills such as being open to meaning and being able to reframe constructs. 
These are skills which an experienced facilitator requires and skills I used 
frequently in training events and meetings during the period of this research. 
AYTAG is an organisation that sponsors and undertakes research. The majority 
of staff are professionals who use research information on a regular basis. This 
meant that there was a great deal of easily available explicit information. My 
interest in complexity theory ensured that I collected both tacit and explicit data 
(Stacey, 2000; Seel, 2001). 1 collected as much data as I had access to as it 
was only with hindsight that I knew which proved to be most useful and relevant. 
In my participant observer role I noted my observations in a personal diary. My 
observations were made in situations where I had an organisational reason for 
being there. I had regular access to operational, policy and administrative staff 
at all levels of the organisation and I attended meeting of various teams and 
working groups. I did not ask to observe events I would not normally have 
attended purely for purpose of this PhD. This was because I could not have 
acted as a complete observer. The nature of my day to day work would have 
made it difficult for others to accept me as a such. They would have wanted to 
involve me or restrict the conversation if the topic was sensitive, thus altering the 
course of the event I was trying to observe. By collecting data in a "natural 
setting, " that is as I went about my day to day business in AYTAG I lessened 
biases that can be caused through having to develop trust and establish 
relationships which ethnographic researchers frequently have to confront. 
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The Data Collection Process 
As I described in my chapter on complexity theory to determine patterns both 
observation and participation are required (Medd and Haynes, 1998). My main 
method of data collection was participant observation. Participant observation 
is an umbrella term covering several combinations of participation and 
observation. To map out my role as a participant observer I modified a 
topology devised by Gold (1958, in Tyrrell, 2001) in which he distinguished 
four ideal typical field roles; complete participant, participant as observer, 
observer as participant and complete observer. I have distinguished where I 
acted as a complete participant and a complete observer. I have reduced his 
remaining two categories to one, that of participant observer. The 
circumstances in which I collected data made the distinction between the two 
seem contrived. Table 5.2 below gives examples of work situations and the 
roles I undertook. 
Table 5.2 My Participant Observation Roles In different Work Situations 
Complete Participant Participant Observer Complete Observer 
Member of working Workshop facilitator Visits to other offices and 
groups to implement Delivering training courses other parts of Head Office 
new environmental and presentations Recipient of circulated 
legislation Invited attendant at meetings documents / general e- 
Responding to Attending presentations mails 
correspondence Action researcher Working in an open plan 
Personnel Team implementing projects to office 
Meetings multiskill professional staff 
Membership of project and develop managers 
teams eg management Conducting semi-structured 
development interviews eg for training 
Informal conversations needs analysis 
In addition to participant observation I examined historical documents and 
interviewed three senior managers. Any data collection activity gives selective 
exposure to certain types of data and can be perceived as a biased with the 
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result that it affects the outcome of the research project. I took steps to 
minimise this by collecting data from a variety of the sources. Figure 5.3 gives 
an overview of the data collection and analysis process. 
Figure 5.3 Overview of the data collection and analysis process 
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As the figure 5.3 shows my data collection came from four separate areas, 
historical documents, projects I managed, day to day work activities and my 
diary. In chapter 3 (complexity theory) I stated where I thought I would find 
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data relevant to the different complexity theory concepts I was researching. 
Table 5.4 below shows the actual data I collected and how it relates to these 
concepts. This table extends Table 3.1 in my chapter in complexity theory. 
Table 5.4 Linking the data obtained to the key concepts of complexity theory 
Key Concepts Thoughts on where to collect data Sources of Data obtained during 
of Complexity and what data to collect the period of the research 
theory (from complexity theory chapter) 
I 
Initial 
conditions 
The nature of the previous 
organisations, their size, structure, etc 
Reports and studies recommending 
setting up of AYTAG and the 
organisation of its work. 
The structure of AYTAG 
The transfer of staff into the new 
organisation 
Recruitment policy for senior managers 
and additional staff 
Policies and procedures in place to 
guide the regulatory activities 
Early human resource initiatives to 
integrate staff and functions 
Public perception of the need to protect 
the environment 
Management styles and cultures in the 
previous organisations 
Feelings and opinions of employees 
about the new organisation 
Documents produced by the 
Personnel Department 
Options Team second report 
Semi structured interviews with senior 
managers 
Reports from the Introduction 
Programme facilitator 
Dairy comments 
AYTAG's first Corporate Plan 
Environment Act 1995 
Staff Survey 
Publicity Material produced by Public 
Relations 
AYTAG files containing meetings of 
the Corporate Management Team 
and Board 
Semi structured interviews with 
directors/senior managers 
Disequilibrium 
Changes to senior staff 
Unexpected crises for example an 
environmental disaster 
Large swings in funding commitments 
for example for new offices and 
laboratories, research, training, etc 
Sudden intakes/ redundancies of large 
numbers of employees 
New work as the result of the 
requirement to implement new 
legislation 
Covert resistance to change initiatives 
for example through criticism and lack 
of time to carry out tasks 
Memos to staff from senior managers 
and the Board Chairman 
AYTAG's second and third Corporate 
Plans 
AYTAG Annual reports 
Diary comments 
Staff and management development 
reports to the Corporate Management 
Team 
Minutes of CIVIT meetings 
Semi structured interviews with 
directors/senior managers 
Flipchart comments etc produced 
during workshops 
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Table 5.4 continued 
Feedback Continuous shifts in resources in a Memos to staff from senior managers 
particular direction and the Board Chairman 
Decisions supporting change initiatives AYTAG's second and third Corporate 
Regular communication to staff through Plans 
newsletters, e-mail etc on progress AYTAG Annual reports 
Unshifting opinions on the organisation Diary comments 
and change initiatives Tender documents 
Continuation of traditional ways of Management competency statements 
working Minutes of meetings eg project teams, 
working groups, CMT, 
Flipchart comments etc produced 
during workshops 
Personnel policies 
Consultant/facilitator reports from staff 
and management development 
initiatives. 
Training needs analysis meeting 
reports 
Training evaluation questionnaires 
Emergence of Patterns appearing in the way AYTAG's Corporate Plans and 
Order decisions are taken Annual reports 
Patterns of behaviour appearing in staff Diary comments 
Development of the management Flipchart comments etc produced 
process during workshops 
Changes to staff workloads/skill bases Consultant/facilitator reports from staff 
Achievement / non achievement of and management development 
publicly stated strategic objectives initiatives 
Shifts in the balance of power between Memos to staff from senior managers 
members of the corporate management and the Board Chairman 
team Minutes of meetings eg project teams, 
Organisational structure changes such working groups, CMT, 
as increases I decreases in hierarchy 
I will now move on to describe my data collection in more detail. 
Desk Research/ Historical Documents 
Much of the data I gathered on the formation of AYTAG came from historical 
documents. I had free access to the library in AYTAG which contained official 
reports on how and why the organisation was set up. I also had access to 
AYTAG files containing other historical data such as reports by the Options 
Team set up to advise on the structure of AYTAG and minutes of Board and 
Corporate Management Team meetings prior to the organisation becoming 
operational in April 1996. All of this data was particularly useful for 
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determining AYTAG's initial conditions. The library kept all publicly available 
documents produced by AYTAG such as corporate plans, environmental 
strategies, environmental legislation and implementation guidance, press 
cuttings and information booklets produced by AYTAG's public relations 
department. 
Semi Structured Interviews 
I carried out semi-structured, one to one interviews with three senior managers. I 
specifically asked to interview them because of this PhD. These interviews were 
1. Interview (6.4.97) with the East Region Director, a former head of a water 
quality board (WQB) who had been closely involved with the setting up of 
AYTAG. I wanted to gather detailed first hand information on the structure 
and operation of the WQBs and what work had been undertaken to set up 
AYTAG 
2. Interview (3.7.97) with the Management Services Manager a civil servant 
who had been seconded to the project team (The Options Team) setting 
up AYTAG and who stayed on in the organisation until July 1997.1 
wanted detailed information on how AYTAG had been set up and his 
views on the organisation after it had been in operation for one year. I 
interviewed him shortly before he returned to his civil service post 
3. Interview (25.9.97) with the Director for Special Projects who had been 
recruited to AYTAG as Director of Corporate Services in Autumn 1995. 
He was leaving AYTAG after two years and I wanted his views on the 
development of AYTAG 
At the beginning of each interview I explained the purpose to each interviewee 
and took detailed notes which I later transcribed. As an example of how these 
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interviews were structured I have included a copy of the questions I prepared for 
the interview with the director of special projects in Appendix 1 The interviews 
were particularly useful in helping me understand the way in which Water Quality 
Boards had operated and their functions and what work had gone into setting up 
AYTAG. The interviewees also gave me their views on the development of the 
organisation which helped further my understanding of AYTAG's initial 
conditions, feedback processes and disequilibrium activities. 
Data Gathered during the Management of Projects 
During the period of this research I managed three organisation development 
initiatives. The first of these the Introduction Programme was a series of two day 
workshops run from August to December 1996. All employees attended. The 
purpose of these workshops was to act as unifying influence so that staff could 
get to know each other and learn more about the work of the new organisation. I 
determined the programme content, ran the first two workshops and then trained 
an external consultant to facilitate them. Each workshop was run by the 
consultant and a senior manager who produced a workshop report for the chief 
executive. The consultant produced two reports one half way through the 
workshops and a second at the end of them. Each workshop was also evaluated 
by means of an end of course questionnaire. 
The Introduction Programme produced data that was helpful to describe 
AYTAG's initial conditions. For the purposes of this research my role was a 
mixture of participant observer and complete observer. There was information 
on the management styles existing in the predecessor organisations and the 
concerns that staff had about the unstructured environment they were working in. 
AYTAG wanted to provide a customer focused service which required a more 
effective use of front line, professional environmental protection staff. 
Multiskilling these employees was seen as the way to do this and many in the 
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organisation were opposed to it. The second project I managed was to progress 
multiskilling. I used action research methodology (see appendix 2) which was 
highly suited to AYTAG. AYTAG managers and professional staff felt more 
comfortable when they understood that initiatives taken were rooted in theory. 
They also felt it appropriate to be involved, as their knowledge and experience 
would give valuable input. This was needed to ensure that what was developed 
was right for their work circumstances. 
With respect to this thesis, during the multiskilling project I acted in all three 
participant observer roles. Data gathered during the multiskilling project was 
particularly useful for indication of disequilibrium activities, feedback processes 
and emergence of order as drivers and blockages to multiskilling were identified 
and acted upon. 
The third initiative I project managed was AYTAG's Management Development 
Programme. The corporate management team recognised that traditional 
management practices would be unsuitable if AYTAG was to run effectively. In 
1996 all AYTAG's managers were from predecessor organisations. With few 
exceptions middle and first line managers had managed staff whose technical 
expertise was the same as their own. In the smaller organisations they had 
undertaken a traditional supervisory role with very limited authority. Some had 
come from organisations where there had been no management training, 
others from organisations that had been close to gaining Investors in People. 
The expertise of the managers was very varied. In 1996 they had all joined an 
organisation that required managers to manage multifunctional teams, actively 
contribute to the business planning process and take on corporate work as 
members of inter-regional and organisation wide working groups and project 
teams. 
My job was to introduce a programme of management development for all 
managers to increase their skills and confidence and enable them to take on a 
different management role. I took the same approach to management 
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development as I took to multiskilling and used action research as the way to 
progress it (see appendix 2). During this project I acted in complete participant 
and participant observer roles. Of the three projects this one provided me with 
the largest amount of data. The data was gathered from a variety of sources; 
meeting minutes, consultant reports, questionnaires, outputs from facilitated 
workshops, reports I produced for the corporate management team and the 
project board and many diary entries. The data was particularly helpful for the 
key complexity theory concepts of feedback and emergent order as the 
changes in the views of the Corporate Management Team were recognised 
and acknowledged during the implementation of the programme. 
Data Gathered during my Day to Day Work 
I worked in a large open plan office as a senior member of a busy personnel 
department. I contributed to the work of the section on a day to day basis, 
attended departmental team meetings and received requests from managers and 
working groups to provide specific input into other projects. The work was wide 
ranging, from dealing with requests from members of the public wanting to work 
in AYTAG to providing training to implement new environmental legislation. I 
frequently visited other offices throughout Scotland. This general work activity 
allowed me to take on the three roles of participant observation. Working in the 
open plan office and visiting other parts of AYTAG gave me the greatest 
opportunity to act as a complete observer. I recorded my observations in my 
diary, such as observations on the general mood staff in different places as I 
perceived it. The rest of my day to day work gave me opportunity to act as a 
participant observer such as when I ran trainings sessions and as a complete 
participant as when I attended personnel team meetings. 
The data gathered was helpful for all four key concepts of complexity theory. I 
had easy access to information about recruitment and terms and conditions of 
service which was useful for understanding AYTAG's initial conditions and 
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disequilibriurn factors. My observations of others, my participant observer and 
complete participant roles gave me data for disequilibriurn factors, feedback 
processes and emergent order and significantly added to and supported data I 
had obtained through the projects I managed. 
My Diary 
According to Easterby-Smith et al (1991) there is quite a long history of using 
diaries as a basis for social research. They consider that a diary can provide a 
rich qualitative picture, allowing the researcher to gain considerable insight into 
the situations being examined. I began to keep a diary from November 1996 at 
the suggestion of my research supervisor. I needed a method to record data that 
would be useful for uncovering AYTAG's organisational shadow system; "the 
covert, the undiscussed, the undiscussable, and the unmentionable" (Egan, 1994 
pp. 4). 1 regarded a personal diary as the main source of data in which to do 
this. The intention of the diary was to capture data that would not be available 
from other sources such as e-mails, records of workshops, minutes of meetings 
etc. The regularity of the entries in the diary ranged from a daily, to a weekly 
basis. These variations occurred as a result of the irregular nature of my work, 
for example I sometimes had periods when I spent a large amount of my time 
visiting other offices and the unpredictable nature of unfolding events such as the 
budget crisis that occurred in AYTAG in 1997. The dairy provided me with data 
to input into the four concepts of complexity theory I was concerned with. The 
data recorded was generally "soft" data. Detailed below are the areas I focussed 
my recording. 
I recorded informal conversations and my own thoughts on them. For example 
on 5.5.98 1 wrote 
'At the professional development workshop the group said that no one had 
applied for Ws support team because they disagreed with having such a team. 
One member said to me how would an individual feel if they were dipping in and 
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out of teams picking up things others didnY want. I was interested to hear that he 
put that interpretation on it. / thought it could be a career development 
oppoitunity" 
I noted the feelings of others and myself. For example 28.1.99 
"Had a waste minimisation meeting with C yesterday. C seemed fine until / told 
her what / was planning for the second day. / could see she wanted to criticise it 
but was worried about saying so. She said one or two minor things - maybe 
should e-mail her. " 
For example November 1998 
'Today I felt lazy - Friday 13th 9" 
I noted incidents that I found intriguing. For example 12.9.97 
'We were discussing the Scottish Parliament vote. W comes in and remains 
silent waiting to be given attention despite me saying hello. He then Y4 tums his 
back on R so we are forced to stop and focus on him. R asks him is he OK, 
have you got a headache. W replies yes, but you arenY the cause of it. -" 
I observed people in other offices I visited and noted my comments. For 
example 25.4.99 
"/ ran an appraisal course in East Kilbride on Thursday. The whole place 
seemed very subdued and the desks where the admin staff sit were empty. " 
I continued the diary until the research ended in August 1999.1 then typed up 
the extracts in "Word" and used the "find" facility to search for key words and 
phrases. The diary was useful for helping identify behavioural themes. For 
example I identified that individuals who had to give "bad news" took leave for at 
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least one day when the news was given. The first person to do this was the chief 
executive in April 1997 on announcing the extent of AYTAG's debt, others 
included the project manager for job evaluation in May 1998 when the results 
were made public and the Director for West Region when he restructured in the 
spring of 1999. 
The data gathered covered a period of just over four years in total. I needed an 
end point for my research and I chose to limit it to the period of office of the first 
chairman. His four year term was extended slightly and finished in August 1999. 
This became the cut off date for my data gathering activities. 
Making Sense of the Data 
During the course of this research I gathered a great deal of data and I had to 
decide the best way to make sense of it. Prior to beginning writing any 
remaining hand collected data such as interview notes and my personal diary 
which had not been previously typed were transcribed using Microsoft Word. 
Some data such as comments on flipcharts from workshops had already been 
transcribed as it was the practice to feedback information generated in 
workshops to the participants. Word searches etc when analysing the data 
could now be easily undertaken. I put all the data I had collected - corporate 
plans, memos, e-mails, management team reports and transcribed hand 
written data etc in date order. Sorting the data in this way was my method of 
organising it and integrating data obtained from different sources. 
In chapter three on complexity theory I identified that traditional methods of 
analysis and synthesis have proved to be of limited use in the search for 
"knowing the whole" and that methods need to be found to comprehend "the 
whole". I chose two data analysis techniques which I thought would help me to 
"know the whole". These were mind mapping (Buzan, 1991) and visual 
process mapping (Langley, 1999). Mind mapping or concept mapping involves 
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writing down a central idea and adding new and related information to it in 
such a way that this additional information radiates out from the original idea. 
Visual process mapping involves the graphical representation of large 
quantities of information in a chronological form revealing the occurrence of 
precedence and parallel processes. Both techniques can give an overview of 
a large subject area and the non linear nature of a mind map makes it easy to 
visualise a whole, link and cross reference the different elements of the map. 
Through the use of lines, colours and branches, connections can be made 
between the data recorded on the mind map. This is helpful when we study 
organisations from a complexity theory perspective. Mind mapping and to 
some extent visual process mapping preserve ambiguities in data useful for 
understanding shadow side norms. Process mapping is useful for identifying 
precedent, a possible indicator of disequilibrium in a system. I used both 
techniques to develop and verify the theoretical ideas I had. Both acted as a 
check on each other to lessen possible bias towards certain types of 
information. 
Once I had my data in data order I used these two techniques to group it 
around individual themes, before beginning to write the story of AYTAG. As I 
looked through the chronological data, ideas for themes occurred to me and I 
tried to see if I could build a mind or visual process map around each of them. 
The themes that I eventually identified were those ideas that had produced the 
most extensive maps from the most varied data sources. They are listed 
below. 
The Business of AYTAG 
The initial structure and employee profile 
The end of first year budget crisis and subsequent restructuring 
Corporate and Business Planning in AYTAG 
Personnel initiatives 
The Science Reviews 
Development of Information Systems 
Development of Environmental Strategies 
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Employee and Management Development in AYTAG 
I wrote up each of these themes as a narrative account in preparation for 
subsequent analysis. I explained in my previous chapter on research 
methodology the appropriateness of narrative accounts for describing 
emergent phenomena. A narrative description can move backwards and 
forwards between parts and wholes reproducing the way dynamic systems self 
organise (Juarrero, 2000). 1 used Pentland's (1999) five features to guide the 
way I wrote my text to give a comprehensive narrative description. Pentland's 
features and how they influenced the way I wrote my narratives are illustrated 
in the table 5.5 below. 
Table 5.5 Writing narrative 
Narrative Feature Influence 
1. time sequence Used to provide the structure for the narrative 
2. focal actor / actors The focal actor is the organisation AYTAG itself. I have 
brought in other actors, directors, managers, consultants to 
help support the structure of the narrative 
3. Identifiable voice The text was written in my own personal style 
4. Moral context I am aware that I was writing from the perspective of an ex 
member of AYTAG staff and the effect this could have on 
how I perceived things. 
5. Other indicators (these I used quotations from what individuals said in meetings 
do not advance the and interviews and notes I made in my personal diary. I 
plot they serve to help have quoted from documents available to me. This was to 
interpretation) add detail to the narrative and help interpret events 
Each theme told a chronological story describing what happened in AYTAG. 
Each narrative involved me in "distilling the essence" of what occurred from the 
multitude of data. In order to limit personal distortions that could result from 
using mind and visual process mapping to develop key themes I tried to 
ensure that I expressed myself in a way that brought out the issues from the 
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perspective of the participants. I illustrated my text with the language and 
expressions of the participants to convey their meaning. I gave each narrative 
to others from AYTAG to feedback their views on the way each had been 
written so that any perceived biases could be noted and dealt with. For 
example the consultants who ran the management development programme 
reviewed the narrative on management development and an environmental 
protection officer read the narrative relating to multiskilling. A summary of 
these narrative accounts is presented in my next chapter - Chapter 6, The 
formation and development of AYTAG. 
Once I had written the narratives describing the development of AYTAG I 
moved on to a more detailed analysis. This allowed me to map events and 
actions against the key concepts of complexity theory - sensitivity to initial 
conditions, disequilibrium, feedback and emergent order. I systematically read 
through each narrative and again used mind mapping (Buzan, 1991) and 
visual process mapping (Langley, 1999) to identify and aggregate themes and 
issues relevant to the complexity theory concept I was investigating. Once I 
thought I had identified a theme from studying the narratives I checked back to 
the original data to confirm what I had identified was justifiable and to seek 
additional confirmation - information I had not fully included or overlooked 
when I wrote my narratives. I added this information to the mind or process 
map. 
An example of one of the mind maps I produced is in Appendix Three. This 
one is for the key concept of initial conditions. In chapter 8 on page 162 1 have 
included the process map I produced for disequilibrium. The information for 
these mapping exercises came from the narrative accounts with some 
additions when I checked back to the original data. For example I had 
originally discarded some of the job adverts when writing my narrative on 
human resource management initiatives. On returning to this material during 
my mind and process mapping phase I found it supported my thoughts that 
there was very high ongoing recruitment activity in AYTAG and I included it in 
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my process map for disequilibrium. Mind and visual process maps for the 
other concepts of complexity theory I was investigating (feedback and 
emergent order) were developed in the same way. 
Once the mind and process maps had been constructed I then wrote them up 
as chapters - one for each complexity theory concept. Once again it was 
necessary to limit the amount of information I could include and I took on the 
potentially distorting role of editor of the material. In order to deal with this 
issue and my further reliance on mind mapping I sought feedback from a range 
of colleagues. My research findings benefited from the cycling of action and 
reflection through comments made by my research supervisor and colleagues 
in the Management Studies Department at Glasgow University, PhD review 
meetings, from presenting the findings at a British Academy of Management 
conference in Edinburgh in November 2000, the International Non-linear 
Sciences Conference in Vienna in February 2003 and for review by the 
editorial board for the British Journal of Management who made 
recommendations for resubmitting the paper which I have since done. In 
review meetings university colleagues took on the role of devil's advocate one 
of the procedures that Reason and Heron (1995) suggest for enhancing the 
validity of the research findings. 
One of the major criticisms of research conducted in the hermeneutic paradigm 
is that it is subjective. The use of mind mapping in particular to surface themes 
in the data could be seen as "unscientific" and "subjective" particularly as this 
is a technique associated with ideas generation rather than critical analysis. I 
have explained how I have dealt with the issues of potential subjectivity and 
distortion during the data collection and analysis phases. I have done this by 
cross checking mind and visual process mapping findings, continuous self 
awareness of my own role in the process, undertaking cycles of action and 
reflection and seeking feedback from others who could comment on AYTAG or 
on the research process. 
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My findings are described in the next five chapters; chapter 6 briefly describes 
the formation and development of AYTAG, chapter 7 deals with sensitivity to 
initial conditions, chapter 8 with disequilibrium, chapter 9 with feedback 
processes and chapter 10 with emergent order. 
In Conclusion 
In my research I am showing that complexity theory can be used as a theory of 
explanation for organisation development. Explanation theories use 
organisational events and the comments and actions of organisational actors 
to tell a story about how organisational outcomes come about. Time is a 
crucial element in constructing a theory. As well as covering the organisation's 
history my case study of AYTAG's development covers the first three and a 
half years of that organisation's existence giving time for organisational 
processes to unfold. I am mindful however of Calas and Smircich's (1999) 
comments that the kind of theory developed can vary widely depending on the 
time interval is used. Throughout my data collection and analysis I have used 
validity procedures to minimise bias such as using a variety of data sources 
and exposing my findings to others for_ comment. I am not stating that my 
research is valid in any absolute meaning of the term. By using these 
procedures I am suggesting that some of the distortions which can occur in 
qualitative research are diminished and the perspective from which the 
research conclusions are derived can be communicated more clearly. 
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Chapter Six 
The Formation and Development of AYTAG 
Introduction 
In my introduction to this thesis I briefly described the quango which is the 
subject of my research. In this chapter I give more detail about the organisation 
I studied between April 1996 and August 1999 during the period of the first 
chairman. In my last chapter on data collection I outlined how I had used mind 
mapping to develop individual themes to structure a description of AYTAG 
which I then wrote up as narrative accounts, one for each of these themes. 
These narrative accounts provide the basis for this chapter. It contains a 
summary of each. I describe how AYTAG came into being, the size of its 
business, its initial organisational structure and recruitment of staff. I briefly 
outline the budget crisis that occurred in 1997 and the subsequent 
organisational restructuring. The chapter continues with short accounts of the 
personnel initiatives, the reviews of the science function, the development of 
information systems, the business planning process and the development of 
environmental strategies. I end the chapter with the training and development 
programmes undertaken. This chapter sets the scene for the following four 
chapters where I describe the development of AYTAG from the perspective of 
key complexity theory concepts. 
The legislation which set up AYTAG is the Environment Act 1995. It received 
the Royal Assent on 19 July 1995. AYTAG became operational on I April 
1996. Its role was to provide an efficient and integrated environmental 
protection system for Scotland, to improve the environment and to contribute to 
the Government's goal of sustainable development. AYTAG's powers and 
duties extend beyond the sum of those of its predecessors. Its range of new 
powers gave Scotland a national, integrated approach to environmental 
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protection. Its employees were a mixture, the majority who transferred from 
predecessor organisations and some externally recruited. It was a melting pot 
of organisational cultures and expectations with varying levels of morale. There 
were twenty three offices scattered throughout Scotland from Wigtownshire in 
the South to Shetland in the North. 
The Business of AYTAG 
AYTAG inherited the duties of Scotland's seven Water Quality Boards and the 
functions undertaken by the three island authorities, HM Industrial Pollution 
Inspectorate and the waste regulation and local air pollution functions of the 
District Councils. The state of the initial inheritance varied greatly. Consistency 
of approach quickly became an important issue. Figure 6.1 below indicates the 
extent of AYTAG's work when it became operational in April 1996. 
Figure 6.1 The size of AYTAG's business in 1996 
indication of the size of AYTAG's business is that 
" there are approximately 50,000 km of rivers and lakes, 800 sq km of estuaries 
and over 7,000 km of coastal waters to protect, 
" some 40,000 consents to discharge substances into these waters are 
operating 
" around 1,200 more complex industrial processes are regulated (including oil 
refineries, power generators, waste incinerators and industries producing a 
wide range of products 
" the disposal and treatment of 16 million tonnes of controlled waste per annum 
is regulated 
" approximately 800 waste disposal sites are licensed and 6,500 waste carriers 
registered 
disposals from 10 licensed nuclear sites are regulated and 
around 550 "sealed" and 170 users of "open" radioactive sources is regulated. 
Taken from publicity material produced by AYTAG's Public Relations Department 
AYTAG had eight strategic objectives, seven of which were developed for the 
Agency by Central Government prior to the organisation becoming operational. 
They formed part of central government's Management Statement for the 
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development of AYTAG. The Management Team developed the eighth 
objective. This focused on AYTAG acting as a good employer. 
Additional work came to AYTAG after it was set up as new European 
Community and European Union environmental directives were implemented. 
These included The Producer Responsibility Regulations 1997, Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations (IPPC), the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards (COMAH), The Water Framework Directive, the Ground 
Water Directive, the Solvents Directive, Sewage Sludge in Agriculture and 
implementation of the Contaminated Land Provisions introduced in section 57 
of the Environment Act 1995. 
AYTAG is funded through grant-in aid from central government, from cost 
recovery charging schemes and from income from sources such as contract 
work. In 1999 grant in aid of around E20 million made up about 75% of 
AYTAG's income. Income from charging was approximately 23% and other 
income sources 2%. Any new duties AYTAG took on were carried out on a 
cost recovery basis. 
The Structure of AYTAG and Employee Profile 
The Main Board of AYTAG is the Agency. It consists of a chairman and ten 
board members including the chief executive. They were appointed during 
1995 by the Secretary of State from amongst those who applied when the 
positions were publicly advertised. The first Chairman was appointed in April 
1995, one year before the start date for the organisation and before the 
enactment of the Environment Bill. He served until August 1999. There was a 
balance of expertise on the Board with the Board Members coming from 
different sector backgrounds. AYTAG also had three Regional Boards, each 
chaired by a member of the main board. The Main Board met every two 
months and the Regional Boards met on a quarterly basis. 
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In order to determine the workload of the new organisation and how it should 
be structured an Options Team was set up early in 1995. The second report by 
the Options Team in September 1995 proposed a flat organisational structure 
with central administrative and policy making units. It was accepted in principle 
by the newly formed Board. 
The chief executive was appointed in August 1995 and five directorates were 
formed. Two, Corporate Services and Environmental Strategy, were to be 
based at Head Office. The other three were regional directorates; East, West 
and North. The day to day operational business of AYTAG was carried out in 
the Regions with most staff working either in science laboratories or in 
multidisciplinary pollution prevention and control teams. Corporate Services 
contained the support functions; finance, personnel, management services, 
information technology and public relations. The Environmental Strategy 
Directorate consisted of policy advisers whose role was to lead the 
development of AYTAG's strategy and policy in relation to environment 
protection, sponsor research and promote the non legislative aspects of 
environment protection. 
By the end of its first year AYTAG had approximately 650 employees. Over 
500 came from 63 different predecessor bodies and around 150 were directly 
recruited. With the exception of staff working in the Head Office and the West 
Region Headquarters most employees worked in former Water Quality Board 
offices. AYTAG's employees were highly educated. About 80% had at least a 
first degree. Managers considered a science based first degree essential for 
operational and policy staff. Over half the employees had postgraduate 
qualifications and membership of a professional body. These were seen as 
crucial to career development. By August 1999 AYTAG had nearly 700 full time 
staff with 35% in pollution prevention and control, 35% in science, 5% in policy 
development and the remainder in support services. Staffing costs accounted 
for 60% of its expenditure. 
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The Crisis at the End of Year One and Resultant Restructuring 
In March 1997 a major financial crisis occurred. It was realised that AYTAG 
was unable to meet its VAT bill. During the course of 1996 AYTAG was in 
discussion with central government about its liability to pay VAT. Its 
predecessor organisations had been exempt. In mid March 1997 the 
Secretary of State finally confirmed that, as it was funded differently from 
these organisations AYTAG would not be exempt. AYTAG did not have an 
accurate picture of its expenditure during its first year of operation and by the 
end of March there was concern that there could be insufficient reserves to 
pay its VAT bill. The financial system common to two of the previous Water 
Quality Boards was being used initially and it quickly proved to be inadequate. 
Adding to the problem was the fact that the majority of finance staff were on 
temporary contracts. There had been frequent changes. Budget holders had 
no information coming to them. The finance department had an inadequate 
picture of how much was being spent. The overall impression was that there 
was sufficient money to do what was required to set up the new organisation. 
A new integrated finance and personnel system began to come on stream in 
April 1997. By mid April the size of the debt was put at E3.5 million. Staff 
were informed of the situation through a letter sent to each of them by the 
Chief Executive. He left for a holiday immediately afterwards. In the spring 
and summer of 1997 employees at all levels first felt shock and disbelief, then 
anger then cynicism. Gestures to save money appeared all over the 
organisation. The crisis led to restructuring the corporate management team. 
The Corporate Services Director became Director of Special Projects and left 
shortly afterwards. The East Region Director became acting director of 
Corporate Services. The organisation had to grapple with budget cuts. Some 
were very severe. The training and research budgets were cut to a few 
thousand pounds. In August 1997 additional funding of E2.5m was secured 
from central government. Part of the agreement for this funding was the 
recruitment of a Director of Finance. He took up his post in January 1998. 
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In July 1997 the break up of Corporate Services was announced. The 
responsibilities of the directorate with the exception of finance were distributed 
between Regional Directors and the Director of Environmental Strategy. 
Finance became a separate directorate. Two groups were set up to assist the 
Corporate Management Team, the AYTAG Planning Team (APT) and the 
Organisation Development Team (ODT). Planning became the responsibility of 
the APT and a corporate planner was recruited internally. The formation of the 
APT formalised the corporate and business planning process. The ODT did not 
find a clear role. In December 1998 the Director of Finance became its chair, 
its membership changed and he attempted to make it more influential. 
Corporate and Business Planning in AYTAG 
The production of the annual corporate plans was initially the responsibility of 
the Management Services Unit in the Corporate Services Department. The 
first plan was produced in August 1996. It focused on the additional tasks that 
AYTAG had to carry out in its launch year rather than AYTAG's day to day 
business. By the end of the first year much of the transitional work had been 
accomplished. There was a clearer understanding of AYTAG's inherited 
business and the organisation's strengths and shortcomings. The second 
Corporate Plan produced in the Spring of 1997 described the size of the 
organisation's day to day business and began the process of giving targets for 
the future. It was issued to all senior staff and made available to others who 
requested it. There was very little involvement of managers in the production 
of the second corporate plan. It was not well received. This was summed up 
in a comment made by a Head of Policy who when asked if a particular 
document was the Corporate Plan said "it appears to be, it was lying on my 
chair when I came in this morning. It says things in there which I have no 
ownership of". 
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In August 1997 the production corporate plans, annual reports and directorate 
business plans became the responsibility of the AYTAG Planning Team (APT). 
During its first year of operating the APT did a large amount of data gathering 
about workload, particularly in pollution prevention and control. The detailed 
review of the work of the environment protection teams resulted in additional 
funding for an extra 26 full time employees. For the first two years the 
production of departmental business plans was haphazard. It was very much 
dependant on the individual line manager. Not all departments within 
directorates produced one and those that did used their own criteria. By the 
start of the 1998/99 financial year each Region, the Environmental Strategy 
Directorate and the central administration sections they managed had 
business plans with clear achievement targets. Consultation with managers 
in setting business targets increased but managers still felt they had little 
ownership of them. Managers complained regularly that targets had been 
imposed on them. They used business targets as an excuse for not doing 
other things such as refusing to release staff for training. Many officers 
worked overtime in order to cope with the workload 
Development of Human Resource Systems, Policies -and 
Procedures 
The majority of staff transferred to AYTAG from previous organisations retained 
their terms and conditions and pay scales. Recruitment of additional staff was 
continuous in 1996. Those recruited were placed on temporary terms and 
conditions devised by AYTAG. It was envisaged that these would be replaced 
with permanent terms and conditions which would apply to all staff. There was 
a shortage of suitable applicants particularly where specific environmental 
expertise was required. Staff were given permanent posts in the Environmental 
Strategy Directorate but in Corporate Services most jobs were short term 
contracts as it was assumed that after an initial high workload work, the 
demand would decrease requiring fewer staff. Recruitment of environmental 
protection staff continued for longer than expected as transferred employees 
moved to fill vacancies as a way of improving their salaries. They switched to 
Chapter 6 132 
the temporarily implemented AYTAG pay scales as in many cases these were 
considerably higher than those offered by predecessor Water Quality Boards 
and local authorities. 
During the period of this research the Personnel Department was continuously 
involved in developing policies and procedures. These ranged from a flexitime 
system to a maternity leave policy, to a car leasing scheme. To goal was for all 
employees to have the same terms and conditions. In order to reduce the 
variety of job descriptions and pay scales, job evaluation and pay and grading 
exercises were undertaken. These were done with union involvement. All 
employees were issued with new AYTAG contracts of employment in October 
1998. This considerably reduced the work of the department. Until then they 
had had to accommodate 30 different sets of terms and conditions, fourteen 
different pay dates and adherence to different local holidays. 
An appraisal scheme was introduced in March 1997. Managers were 
encouraged to set work objectives for staff and identify their training needs. In 
the first year of the scheme nearly all staff were appraised by their managers. 
In 1998 fewer managers appraised their staff and it was in danger of collapsing. 
The chief executive with support from central government wanted to implement 
a performance related pay scheme (PRP). This was generally unpopular with 
employees. A PRP scheme was eventually introduced in March 1999. 
The personnel staff found it difficult to keep up with their workload. This was 
particularly problematic in the first year when there were no computerised 
systems. Computerisation happened gradually between 1997 an 1999 as 
successive modules of the Personnel and Finance Information System were 
installed. First came access to basic employee information such as address 
and salary details followed by absence statistics, training records and course 
administration and finally recruitment administration in the summer of 1999. 
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The Science Reviews 
AYTAG inherited its science base from the former Water Quality Boards. The 
scientists, chemists, biologists and hydrologists had all worked in water pollution 
control and had no experience in the other environmental media that AYTAG 
regulated. In each region a regional scientist reporting to the director was in 
charge of all the science functions. During 1996 each of the regional science 
functions was reviewed. This resulted in some 8% efficiency gains achieved 
through closing the four smaller laboratories and concentrating the service in 
the six larger ones. These reviews also looked at the communication that 
science staff had with other members of the organisation. This was very low. 
Between 1% and 5% of chemists communicated directly with environment 
protection staff. The comparable figure for biologists and hydrologists was 30% 
to 50%. This concerned the senior scientists. One of them commented "We 
canT have 200 brains tucked away in the organisation. " The functional reviews 
did not change the way in which science staff worked but the increase in 
efficiency did allow for additional work to be undertaken in air monitoring and 
the analysis of waste samples. 
Following the regional reviews, the first national review was attempted and 
rejected by the Corporate Management Team (CMT) in May 1997. The 
strategic review of science was delayed until after the publication of AYTAG's 
Environmental Strategy. In July 1998 the Chief Executive formed the Science 
Review Project Board. The Project Board proposed that Science should 
become a National rather than a regionally based service with a National 
Director and functional heads. This proposal was rejected by the CIVIT who 
chose to keep the Regional Scientists. The Project Board proposed a matrix 
structure in which Regional Scientists still reported to Directors but had 
"national" responsibility for one scientific function. This proposal was accepted 
and implemented. The most controversial decision as far as staff were 
concerned was the agreement to close two more of the smaller laboratories and 
concentrate the service in the larger ones based in the regional headquarters. 
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The reviews did not propose decreasing the number of levels of managers in 
science. They remained with their original hierarchical structures mostly intact. 
The Development of AYTAG Information Systems 
When AYTAG was set up in April 1996 the responsibility for information 
systems (IS) lay with the Head of the Management Services Unit. He 
recognised that critical to AYTAG's success was its ability to handle all its 
information requirements. By September 1996 he had set up a project team 
consisting of regional information systems managers and senior environment 
protection and science managers to look at the information needs of AYTAG. 
The organisation had inherited incompatible environmental databases from its 
predecessor bodies. Most were not year 2000 compliant. Between September 
and December 1996 the project team held a number of regional workshops to 
define priorities for business applications. The first priority was to have a 
management information system for environmental licences, a central 
information point for all applications, to record and monitor progress and 
highlight deviations and delays. The second priority was a system to manage 
work plans for sampling, monitoring and inspection to improve the efficiency. 
The third priority was a charging management system to set common charges 
and to monitor recovery. 
The project team put their proposals to the Corporate Management Team 
(CMT). They were initially sceptical of the benefits of such systems. In 
December 1996 the CIVIT agreed to implement the project team's proposals. 
They committed E200,000 to the project in its first year rather than the 
E600,000 asked for. Once the extent of AYTAG's funding crisis was known in 
May 1997 funding was withdrawn. The Head of the Management Services Unit 
left before implementation started. 
The Head of the Management Services Unit returned to his civil service post in 
August 1997 and the IS managers began to operate as a self directed team. 
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The development of organisation-wide information systems for gathering 
environmental and customer information was slow, hampered by high turnover 
of IS staff on temporary contracts. In the summer of 1999, when this research 
ended, databases outlined as priorities in 1996 were still to be rolled out to 
SEPA staff although much work had gone into their development. In other 
areas the implementation of information systems was much quicker. New 
individual databases were set up to implement new regulations such as the 
Producer Responsibility Regulations. All AYTAG staff were linked by e-mail by 
December 1996 and had access to AYTAG's Intranet by December 1998. The 
Intranet was developed by team headed by the Environmental Services 
Manager and not by IS staff. 
The Development of Environmental Strategies 
I explained in my introduction to this chapter that along with its inherited duties 
AYTAG had new powers to enable it to provide a national, integrated 
approach to environmental protection. The first step that AYTAG took to 
develop a national overview was to produce a "State of the Environment" 
report which it launched in November 1996. This enabled the organisation to 
identify the gaps in its knowledge of how human activity impacted on the 
environment. The report underpinned AYTAG's activities. It identified areas 
where more information was needed and committed AYTAG to closing 
material knowledge gaps. The report emphasised AYTAG's role in supporting 
the achievement of the UK government's objective of making future 
development sustainable. The Director of Environmental Strategy produced a 
statement of AYTAG's approach to sustainable development in February 
1997. Sustainable development was defined and guidance issued to staff. 
The production of the Environmental Strategy was a major landmark for 
AYTAG. The first draft was issued in January 1998. Consultation followed and 
the strategy itself was launched in June 1998. It identified and prioritised the 
most important environmental issues, analysed their potential environmental 
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impacts and assessed the extent to which AYTAG could address them. It was 
recognised that the implementation of this strategy would require a 
considerable shift in resources within the organisation and place a greater 
emphasis on working in partnership and on influencing others. This in turn 
would lead to a shift in SEPA skills. It implied a considerable training effort. 
Another landmark was the production of a National Waste Strategy. First 
drafted in December 1997 and discussed in detail with representatives from 
organisations in different economic sectors, it was finally published in 
December 1999. 
Employee and Management Development 
Between August and December 1996 AYTAG ran its Introduction Programme. 
Each employee attended as part of the process of bringing about a unified 
organisation. Participants discussed the human aspects of mergers, AYTAG's 
objectives, environmental issues and human resource topics such as job 
evaluation, harmonisation of terms and conditions and management training. 
Large scale training and development programmes for manager and 
environment protection staff were planned for 1997 but were severely curtailed 
as a result of the budget crisis. 
Multiskilled teams of environmental protection officers (EPO's) were seen as 
critical to the development of a "one door' approach to environment protection. 
As it was seen to be the most efficient and effective use of staff resources 
AYTAG was expected to move to this approach. It would enable AYTAG to 
send one officer to a regulated site rather than two or three as had happened 
previously. Prior to April 1996 EPO's had only worked in one environmental 
medium; water, air or waste. Multiskilling was one of the most talked about 
issues in AYTAG. Some were for it. Many were not. There was great dislike of 
the term. To make the concept more acceptable it was referred to as 
"professional" diversification from the beginning of 1998. The budget crisis 
which cut the training budget in 1997 meant that no training could be delivered 
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that financial year. However some progress was made through job shadowing 
and site visits. In September 1998 a senior environmental protection officer 
was seconded to corporate training and development to help develop 
professional diversification training. Waste, water and air pollution regulation 
training was piloted on a AYTAG wide basis in March 1999. Further training 
courses were delivered in summer 1999. After this professional diversification 
training was incorporated into technical training and delivered on a regional 
basis. No agreement was reached on the definition of professional 
diversification or how far the CIVIT saw it progressing in the organisation. 
A two day management development course was offered to managers between 
December 1996 and April 1997. Managers attended on a voluntary basis. 
Attendance was very variable. It ranged from almost all East Region managers 
to almost none from head office directorates. Plans for a Corporate 
Management Development Programme were postponed in 1997 and in 1998 
AYTAG embarked on a large management development programme attended 
by all managers. During 1997 management competency statements were 
developed based on the management style and culture the Corporate 
Management team said they wanted to see in AYTAG. A project team was set 
up in February 1998 reporting to the Organisation Development Team to design 
and implement a programme based around the competency statements. The 
purpose of the programme was to develop both individual manager skills and 
the management process in AYTAG. The programme was launched by the 
chief executive in September 1998 and continued until July 1999 when review 
days were held with the 150 managers who attended the programme. 
Following this, managers were offered a selection of short training courses. 
They attended them on an individual basis. 
Conclusion 
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In the first three and a half years of operation AYTAG achieved much. All staff 
had the same terms and conditions of service and all jobs had been evaluated. 
Large training programmes had been run and a performance management 
process put in place. The implementation of environmental strategies was 
proceeding as planned, new legislation had been implemented and there were 
performance targets in place for environmental protection staff. These 
achievements masked a workforce which was becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with the way in which policies and procedures were developed and 
implemented, staff turnover and absence rates were rising and there was 
increasing criticism of the Corporate Management Team. 
Now that I have briefly outlined AYTAG's formation and development during the 
period of the first chairman I will move on to describe its development using key 
complexity theory concepts, initial conditions, disequilibrium, feedback process 
and emergence of order. In chapter 71 outline AYTAG's initials conditions, 
chapter 8 covers planned and unplanned events and actions that maintained 
disequilibrium in AYTAG. Chapter 9 deals with opposing feedback processes 
that pushed the organisation either towards or away from its desired new state. 
Finally chapter 10 describes the order that emerged in AYTAG. 
GLASGO 
UNIVERSITY 
139 Chapter 6 LIBRARY 
d 
